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CONFRONTING THE TWENTY-FIRST-CENTURY MARIAN
EXAMINATION
Lauren McLane*
“To be sure, the Clause’s ultimate goal is to ensure reliability of
evidence, but it is a procedural rather than a substantive guarantee.
It commands, not that evidence be reliable, but that reliability be
assessed in a particular manner: by testing in the crucible of crossexamination.”
– Justice Scalia, Crawford v. Washington1
INTRODUCTION
Today, in criminal courtrooms across our nation, the accused, at
trial, are routinely denied what was long ago purposefully
implemented by our Founders, the Framers of our Constitution and
its Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause: “[i]n all criminal
prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to be confronted
with the witnesses against him.”2 Our Framers meant to create a
clause that would forever test the reliability of evidence introduced
against the criminally accused. Certainly, not many at that time
claimed to know what the Twenty-First century would bring, much
less the kinds of evidence that would be introduced at a criminal trial.
Nevertheless, the clause’s purpose has withstood the test of time and
remains the same, though now it is tasked with not only traditional
witness statements, but also DNA, toxicology, alcohol breath test
results (i.e., often multi-analyst forensic disciplines where several or
* Assistant Professor of Law and Faculty Director, Defender Aid Clinic, University of
Wyoming, College of Law. J.D., Seattle University School of Law. The author would like to
thank Professors Jacquelyn Bridgeman, Jason Robison, and Melissa Alexander of the
University of Wyoming, College of Law, as well as attorney Ben Goldsmith of the King County
Department of Public Defense for their insight and comments on this work, and Kate Mercer
for her valuable research assistance.
1 Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 61 (2004).
2 U.S. CONST. amend. VI. The Sixth Amendment is made applicable to the states via the
Fourteenth Amendment. Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 403 (1965).
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more analysts are involved in the testing process) and other similar
types of forensic evidence.3
Haunted by the execution of Sir Walter Raleigh and the misuse of
the Marian examination, the Framers set out to eliminate arbitrary
and untested out-of-court processes meant to substitute for in-court
justice and truth seeking.4 The Marian examination, derived from
the Marian Committal Statute of 1555, “arrang[ed] for the examining
[justices of the peace] to gather evidence for trial and to bind
witnesses to appear [at trial] to testify.”5 Although it was not
intended to serve as an out-of-court replacement for live testimony,
in practice (at times) the Marian examination allowed for the
introduction of this evidence at trial without confrontation.6 The oftcited 1603 trial of Sir Walter Raleigh, who was convicted of treason
and sentenced to death, is the prime example.7 Raleigh begged the
court to bring his accuser, Lord Cobham, before him so that the
reliability of Cobham’s out-of-court statements could be tested.8
Raleigh was denied this opportunity; instead, apparently satisfied
with the inherent reliability (i.e., presumed reliability) of the Marian
examination process—where accusers and witnesses were examined
by justices of the peace prior to the trial and such examinations were
recorded and then used at trial in lieu of in-court testimony—the
judicial officials in Raleigh’s trial thought his request preposterous.9
It was this practice, this acceptance of untested (and presumed
reliable) evidence that the Framers sought to forbid.10
Our Supreme Court continued in the footsteps of our Framers in
its modern-day jurisprudence for some time with Justice Scalia at the
helm in Crawford v. Washington.11 In Crawford, the Court looked to
the Framers for guidance and decisively rejected out-of-court

3 See, e.g., Williams v. Illinois, 567 U.S. 50, 56–57 (2012); Bullcoming v. New Mexico, 564
U.S. 647, 651, 652 (2011); Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305, 308–09 (2009).
4 See Crawford, 541 U.S. at 50.
5 JOHN H. LANGBEIN ET AL., HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW: THE DEVELOPMENT OF ANGLOAMERICAN LEGAL INSTITUTIONS 561, 581 (2009). Named after then reigning Queen Mary
(15531558). Id. at 561.
6 See JOHN H. LANGBEIN, PROSECUTING CRIME IN THE RENAISSANCE 24 (1974). There is
support that the Marian examination was not intended to become “a system of written
evidence” in lieu of live testimony. Id.; see also Crawford, 541 U.S. at 43–44 (noting that while
it was unlikely that the original purpose of the Marian Committal Statute was to obtain
evidence to be used during trial, in some cases it was so utilized).
7 See Crawford, 541 U.S. at 44; DAVID JARDINE, THE LIBRARY OF ENTERTAINING
KNOWLEDGE: CRIMINAL TRIALS 400 (1832).
8 See JARDINE, supra note 7, at 417, 418.
9 See id. at 415, 417, 421, 427.
10 Crawford, 561 U.S. at 49.
11 Id. at 37.
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evidence that was presumed already tested, eliminating “amorphous
notions of ‘reliability’”12 that had been the law of the land since Ohio
v. Roberts13 in 1980. Specifically, the Crawford court created a new
approach to confrontation—what it termed a “core class of
‘testimonial’ statements” that must be met with confrontation—in
the place of the Roberts rule where reliability of out-of-court evidence
that met a “firmly rooted” hearsay exception was inherent.14
Since its 2004 decision in Crawford, the Court, especially within
the forensic evidence context, has struggled to pinpoint what out-ofcourt evidence it must reject to stay true to the Framers’ course and
purpose in adopting the Confrontation Clause.15 While this quest
continues in cases involving “conventional witness” statements, i.e.,
those made by non-scientific witnesses, the Court’s strife is never
more present and cognizable than in cases where present-day
technology and forensic evidence are at issue.16 Indeed, in many
respects, the Court’s trend with regard to forensic evidence appears
to be headed back in time to 1980 where inherent reliability was the
rule, monitored only by “firmly rooted” exceptions to the hearsay
rule.17 That is, more and more, what appears to be condoned by our
High Court and, significantly, our lower courts that deal with forensic
evidence day in and day out, is that the scientific process and its
human counterparts are inherently reliable.18 After all, it is science.
Forensic evidence in cases involving multi-analyst laboratory
settings, or “assembly line” forensic analysis, such as DNA testing,
toxicology, and alcohol breath testing, have become the modern-day
Marian examination.19 It is routine practice across our country in
both misdemeanor and felony cases to allow surrogate or conduit

Id. at 49, 50–51, 61.
Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 66 (1980).
14 Crawford, 541 U.S. at 51; Roberts, 448, U.S. at 66.
15 See, e.g., Williams v. Illinois, 567 U.S. 50, 56 (2012); Bullcoming v. New Mexico, 564 U.S.
647, 652 (2011); Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305, 311 (2009).
16 See, e.g., Melendez-Diaz, 557 U.S. at 308, 317–18. In his dissent in Melendez-Diaz, Justice
Kennedy distinguishes a laboratory analyst from a “conventional witness,” i.e., “one who
witnesses (that is, perceives) an event that gives him or her personal knowledge of some aspect
of the defendant’s guilt.” Id. at 343–44 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). Throughout this article, the
author uses the “conventional witness” phrase to distinguish traditional witnesses from
analysts or scientific witnesses as well as to refer to rules that were created by the Court with
regard to non-scientific witnesses. See also Jennifer Mnookin & David Kaye, Confronting
Science: Expert Evidence and the Confrontation Clause, 2013 SUP. CT. REV. 99, 146–47 (2012)
(providing counter-analysis to Justice Kennedy’s “conventional witness” label).
17 See Roberts, 448 U.S. at 66.
18 See, e.g., State v. Griep, 2014 WI App. 25, ¶ 1, 353 Wis. 2d 252, 845 N.W.2d 25.
19 But see Williams v. Illinois, 567 U.S. 50, 86 (2012) (quoting Michigan v. Bryant, 562 U.S.
344, 379 (2011)).
12
13
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experts (i.e., those witnesses who relay a non-testifying analyst’s
work or findings) who never laid a hand or an eye on the evidentiary
sample nor operated the machine that analyzed it to testify in lieu of
the actual “performing analyst.”20 This is the new, Twenty-FirstCentury Marian examination, where science and its process is
presumed to be inherently reliable and, therefore, is insulated from,
as Justice Scalia put it, “the crucible of cross-examination.”21
This practice of insulation plays out in the courtroom in a variety
of ways, particularly in forensic disciplines where laboratories have
chosen to assign multiple analysts to the analysis of a single
evidentiary sample.22 First, the “surrogate expert”23 may not actually
be an expert at all; specifically, where the expert lacks the requisite
qualifications and knowledge under Evidence Rule 702 to testify
about a specific area that is intimately bound up with the forensic
evidence.24 Second, the surrogate expert may not have seen, let alone
actually tested or observed, the analysis of the evidentiary sample at
issue; instead, testifying blissfully ignorant and presuming that the
many steps in the cumulative scientific process before the final stage
(or report) was performed competently.25 Third, the surrogate may
not have reviewed any of the “raw data” to assess the appropriateness
of the performing analyst’s ultimate conclusions.26 Fourth, the
surrogate may not be employed by or at the bare minimum, know and

20 See, e.g., State v. Young, No. 1 CA-CR 17-0044, 2018 WL 828299, at *5–6 (Ariz. Ct. App.
2018); Taylor v. State, 811 S.E.2d 286, 291 (Ga. 2018). The author uses this phrase in the
article to describe the analyst who performed testing on an evidentiary sample. From receipt
of the sample on his or her benchtop for preparation through review, machine analysis, and
human interpretation.
21 Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 61 (2004).
22 See, e.g., Williams, 567 U.S. at 86; Griep, 2014 WI App. 25, ¶ 17 (quoting State v. Williams,
2002 WI 58, ¶¶ 19–20, 253 Wis. 2d 99, 644 N.W.2d 919).
23 As we shall see, many courts have used the term “surrogate” more positively in reasoning
that the instant witness before them is not the same surrogate that the Court in Bullcoming v.
New Mexico rejected. Specifically, in Bullcoming, the Court found that the testifying analyst,
albeit knowledgeable of the laboratory’s protocols and procedures, was not a proper surrogate
to testify about the defendant’s blood alcohol results because he “could not convey what [the
performing analyst] knew or observed about the events his certification concerned, i.e., the
particular test and testing process he employed.” Bullcoming v. New Mexico, 564 U.S. 647,
661(2011). On the other hand, when viewing the witness as an improper surrogate, courts tend
to refer to such witness as a mere “conduit.” See People v. John, 52 N.E.3d 1114, 1128 (N.Y.
2016) (stating a conduit is someone who merely reports “the conclusions of others” and is not a
proper surrogate witness). The author intends for both “surrogate” and “conduit” to have
negative connotations, with the term “shepherd” to be viewed more positively and acceptable.
24 See FED. R. EVID. 720; see also infra Part I, Section B (describing where the “surrogate”
expert witness is not an expert themselves).
25 See Williams, 567 U.S. at 60, 62.
26 See id. at 62.
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understand the protocols and practices of the testing laboratory.27
It is undisputed that forensic evidence is fallible.28 If that were not
true, we would not have to regularly remind the courts of Josiah
Sutton who was wrongfully convicted of rape and sentenced to
twenty-five years in prison based on erroneous DNA expert
testimony.29 As in Sutton’s case, many other innocent individuals
have been wrongfully accused or, far worse, convicted and imprisoned
for years of their lives due to bad science and dishonest or
incompetent analysts.30
Indeed, flawed forensics and the
misapplication of forensic science is the second leading cause of
wrongful convictions in approximately forty-four percent of the more
than 365 DNA exonerations.31 Even if the end result is not a
wrongful conviction, we must inquire: is this the kind of system our
Framers envisioned, the kind of system we want? Where evidence,
due to its scientific nature, is presumed reliable and, thus, accepted
without confrontation?
Further, to say that science is powerful is a severe understatement;
it convicts like no other witness or evidence. “As judges have long
recognized, forensic evidence can play an important role in criminal
trials. Juries may give special weight to testimony by forensic

See id. at 59.
See, e.g., Josiah Sutton, NAT’L REGISTRY EXONERATIONS, http://www.law.umich.edu/speci
al/exoneration/Pages/casedetail.aspx?caseid=3672%20 (last updated Nov. 26, 2016) (“Sutton’s
conviction was the result of . . . faulty scientific testing.”).
29 Id.; see Brief of Amicus Curiae the Innocence Network in Support of Petitioner, Williams
v. Illinois, 567 U.S. 50 (2012) (No. 10-8505), 2011 WL 3973568, at *11 [hereinafter Brief of
Amicus Curiae the Innocence Network, Williams].
30 See Brief of Amicus Curiae the Innocence Network, Williams, supra note 29, at *711;
Brief of Amicus Curiae the Innocence Network in Support of Petitioner, Bullcoming v. New
Mexico, 564 U.S. 647 (2011) (No. 09-10876), 2010 WL 5043100, at *16–17 [hereinafter Brief of
Amicus Curiae the Innocence Network, Bullcoming]; Brief of Amicus Curiae the National
Innocence Network in Support of Petitioner, Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305
(2009) (No. 07-591), 2008 WL 2550614, at *8 [hereinafter Brief of Amicus Curiae the National
Innocence Network, Melendez-Diaz]; see also BRANDON L. GARRETT, CONVICTING THE
INNOCENT: WHERE CRIMINAL PROSECUTIONS GO WRONG 84–89 (2011) (describing the specific
faults with the forensic analyst’s testimony in the Gary Dotson trial, leading to his
exoneration); Brandon L. Garrett & Peter J. Neufeld, Invalid Forensic Science Testimony and
Wrongful Convictions, 95 VA. L. REV. 1, 4 (2009) (explaining that Gary Dotson spent ten years
in prison before being exonerated due to faulty testimony by a forensic analyst); Detail List,
NAT’L REGISTRY EXONERATIONS, http://www.law.umich.edu/special/exoneration/Pages/detaillis
t.aspx (last visited Feb. 5, 2019) (displaying 554 exonerations where “False or Misleading
Forensic Evidence” was an issue).
31 See Misapplication of Forensic Science, INNOCENCE PROJECT, https://www.innocenceproje
ct.org/causes/misapplication-forensic-science/ (last visited Apr. 19, 2019); see also DNA
Exonerations in the United States, INNOCENCE PROJECT, https://www.innocenceproject.org/dnaexonerations-in-the-united-states/ (last visited Apr. 19, 2019) (finding 44% of DNA
Exonerations involved misapplication of forensics).
27
28
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scientists.”32 Recently, Justice Gorsuch noted, “[m]ore and more,
forensic evidence plays a decisive role in criminal trials today. But it
is hardly ‘immune from the risk of manipulation.’”33 As Chief Justice
Bender for the Colorado Supreme Court acknowledged in his dissent
in Marshall v. People,34 “[r]eliance upon forensic evidence has
increased in criminal cases and the need to retain the traditional
right of cross-examination must nonetheless be preserved.”35
There are, at minimum, four distinct ways cross-examination is
critical to the testing of forensic science and, potentially, to the
prevention of wrongful convictions based on flawed forensics. First,
it is capable of unmasking mistake or mischief in forensic work or, at
the very least, testing the competency of the responsible performing
analyst.36 Second, even when cross-examination has not been
successful in preventing wrongful convictions, it has hastened
exonerations years later.37 Next, the opportunity to cross-examine
the performing analyst incentivizes effective assistance of counsel.38
Finally, as scholar Jennifer Mnookin has written, with former
Attorney General Jeff Session’s decision, last year, to end the
National Commission on Forensic Science (NCFS), “we now lack any
locus for a broadly conceived, authoritative panel of experts and
stakeholders to convene regularly and assess the state of forensic
science and recommend reforms.”39 Thus, there is little in the way of
testing the reliability of the forensic disciplines these days.
Confrontation remains the best and most instantly available

GARRETT, supra note 30, at 91.
Stuart v. Alabama, 139 S. Ct. 36, 36 (2018) (quoting Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557
U.S. 305, 318 (2009)); see also People v. M.F., 25 N.Y.S.3d 816, 821 (Sup. Ct. 2016) (“An
important factor distinguishing this case from Williams is . . . the sole evidence against the
defendant is the DNA match produced as a result of laboratory analysis.”).
34 Marshall v. People, 2013 CO 51.
35 Id. ¶ 26 (Bender, C.J., dissenting in part).
36 See infra notes 112–14 and accompanying text (where cross-examination of forensic
analyst who has been disciplined for inattentive work would be relevant); see also Williams v.
Illinois, 567 U.S. 50, 118–19 (2012) (Kagan, J., dissenting) (referencing the John Kocak matter
where an analyst discovered her mistake during cross-examination); Brief of Amicus Curiae
the National Innocence Network, Melendez-Diaz, supra note 30, at *28–29 (describing several
cases where cross-examination revealed flawed work or testimony).
37 See Brief of Amicus Curiae the National Innocence Network, Melendez-Diaz, supra note
30, at *29–30.
38 See id. at *27.
39 Jennifer Mnookin, The Uncertain Future of Forensic Science, 147 DAEDALUS 99, 100
(2018); see Spencer Hsu, Sessions Orders Justice Dept. to end Forensic Science Commission,
Suspend Review Policy, WASH. POST (Apr. 10, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/pu
blic-safety/sessions-orders-justice-dept-to-end-forensic-science-commission-suspend-reviewpolicy/2017/04/10/2dada0ca-1c96-11e7-9887-1a5314b56a08_story.html?noredirect=on&utm_te
rm=.7702fccadf13.
32
33

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3414577

CONFRONTING THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY

2018/2019]

4/29/2019 11:18 AM

Confronting the Twenty-First Century

955

protection against the introduction of flawed forensic evidence in our
criminal trials.40 And, let us not forget, it is a constitutionally
guaranteed protection without exception.41
Therefore, the fact that it is difficult to answer questions such as
who is an “analyst”42 or who, in the “collective” that is the scientific
process,43 must testify for confrontation purposes is no excuse for the
Supreme Court’s lack of guidance in this area. Recently, Justice
Gorsuch (joined by Justice Sotomayor) wrote of the Court’s
confrontation clause jurisprudence, “we owe lower courts struggling
to abide our holdings more clarity than we have afforded them in this
area.”44 Since we have last heard from the Court in Williams v.
Illinois, lower courts have struggled to apply the “conventional
witness” rules borne out of Crawford v. Washington, Davis v.
Washington,45 and Michigan v. Bryant46 to forensic evidence, or they
have simply adjusted course completely by establishing new
(frequently arbitrary) rules along the way. Critically, the Crawford,
Davis, and Bryant cases each involved a declarant’s contact with and
statements to police in what may be considered a traditional context
where the declarant was a firsthand witness to the alleged crime.47
From those cases, two rules began to take shape—the “objective
witness” and “primary purpose” rules.
First, in Crawford, the Court tacked onto its list of “core
testimonial” statements those statements that would lead an
objective witness to reasonably believe such statements may be used
at a later trial.48 However, the creation of this list, while perhaps
helpful at the time in determining what the Court may consider
“testimonial” down the road, was not required.49 Specifically, it was
clear that the declarant’s statements, in that case, were made during

See Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305, 319 (2009).
See id. at 309 (quoting Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 51 (2004)); U.S. CONST.
amend. VI.
42 In his Melendez-Diaz dissent, Justice Kennedy notes, “[t]here is no accepted definition of
analyst, and there is no established precedent to define that term,” and proceeds to list four
different individuals involved in the toxicological drug analysis, arguing that it is not clear
which of these four persons would be considered an analyst. Melendez-Diaz, 557 U.S. at 332
(Kennedy, J., dissenting).
43 See Mnookin & Kaye, supra note 16, at 149 (“In thinking about why scientific evidence
might warrant some limited special treatment, it seems to us that the most important feature
of science is that it is a collective, rather than an individual enterprise.”) (emphasis in original).
44 Stuart v. Alabama, 139 S. Ct. 36, 37 (2018) (Gorsuch, J., dissenting).
45 Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813 (2006).
46 Michigan v. Bryant, 562 U.S. 344 (2011).
47 See id. at 34849; Davis, 547 U.S. at 817; Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 38 (2004).
48 See Crawford, 541 U.S. at 5152.
49 See id. at 53.
40
41

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3414577

CONFRONTING THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY

956

Albany Law Review

4/29/2019 11:18 AM

[Vol. 82.3

a police interrogation, which was easily found to be akin to the
Marian examination and to necessitate confrontation.50 Second, in
Davis, when the Court was faced with two different scenarios—a
frantic 911 call and a more calculated police interview—it crafted the
“primary purpose” rule, distinguishing between a declarant who was
aiding police in an ongoing emergency from one who aided a police
investigation with only the latter being considered “testimonial.”51 In
Bryant, the “primary purpose” rule further evolved, requiring courts
to review all the circumstances surrounding the statements made to
police as well as the intent of all participants in the contact.52 This
is also where the Court appeared to take a step back in time to
Roberts, claiming that the hearsay rules “designed to identify some
statements as reliable” were relevant to the confrontation analysis.53
As a result, the Court began to divide on the application of the
“conventional witness” rules with Justice Scalia writing a dissent
that highlighted the Court’s disunity in applying the clause even in
these traditional contexts.54
The “conventional witness” rules were first applied to the forensic
evidence context in Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts and Bullcoming
v. New Mexico,55 but barely so. Both of these cases involved forensic
reports that were akin to affidavits,56 which have been readily
accepted as part of the “core class of ‘testimonial statements’” even
before such a class began to take shape in Crawford.57 Indeed, since
at least 1992, Justice Thomas has included affidavits in his
“formalized testimonial materials” list, describing them as
statements that fall within the purview of the Confrontation
Clause.58 Thus, because Melendez-Diaz and Bullcoming were not
tasked with applying the “conventional witness” rules to the forensic
evidence context to any real extent, there was not an opportunity,
See id. at 5253.
See Davis, 547 U.S. at 817, 818, 822.
52 See Bryant, 562 U.S. at 370 (“[W]hen a court must determine whether the Confrontation
Clause bars the admission of a statement at trial, it should determine the ‘primary purpose of
the interrogation’ by objectively evaluating the statements and actions of the parties to the
encounter, in light of the circumstances in which the interrogation occurs.”).
53 See id. at 35859.
54 See id. at 380, 39092 (Scalia, J. dissenting) (“[T]oday’s decision is not only a gross
distortion of the facts. It is a gross distortion of the law—a revisionist narrative in which the
reliability continues to guide our Confrontation Clause jurisprudence, at least where
emergencies and faux emergencies are concerned.”).
55 Bullcoming v. New Mexico, 564 U.S. 647, 661 (2011); Meledez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557
U.S. 305, 311 (2009).
56 See Bullcoming, 564 U.S. at 65152; Melendez-Diaz, 557 U.S. at 307.
57 See White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346, 365 (1992) (Thomas, J., concurring in part).
58 See id.
50
51
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prior to Williams, to see how those rules might inform the
confrontation clause analysis to the forensic setting.
In Williams, however, the opportunity finally presented itself when
the Court applied the “conventional witness” rules to forensic
evidence testimony.59 In Williams, a critical piece of evidence against
the defendant (i.e., a DNA profile from rape kit evidence) was
generated by one laboratory.60 No one from that laboratory was
called to testify at trial.61 Instead, the prosecution presented another
expert from the state crime laboratory who had not participated in or
observed the underlying testing, nor was she familiar with the
specific protocols that were followed by the performing analyst or
that were required by the testing laboratory.62 Both the plurality63
and the dissent applied the “conventional witness” rules (particularly
the “primary purpose” rule), coming to two completely different
conclusions.64 What resulted was a mess of an opinion, fractured as
can be with Justice Kagan aptly stating: “What comes out of four
Justices’ desire to limit Melendez-Diaz and Bullcoming in whatever
way possible, combined with one Justice’s one-justice view of those
holdings, is—to be frank—who knows what.”65
Significantly, in Williams, it was the first time the Court
comprehensively applied the “conventional witness” rules to forensic
evidence and the divided results demonstrated just how malleable
and unwieldy the rules were, supporting Justice Thomas’s (who held
the “one-justice view” referenced by Justice Kagan in Williams) longheld view that such rules were unworkable and would cause courts
great difficulties in practice.66 Even before the birth of the
“conventional witness” rules, Justice Thomas warned of the
impracticality of such rules in his 1992 concurrence in White,
recognizing that “[a]ttempts to draw a line between statements made
in contemplation of legal proceedings and those not so made would
entangle the courts in a multitude of difficulties.”67 This has been

See Williams v. Illinois, 567 U.S. 50, 6667 (2012).
See id. at 59.
61 See id. at 60.
62 See id. at 6061.
63 The term “plurality” is used for ease; however, it should be noted, as was articulated by
Justice Kagan in her dissenting opinion and by many lower courts since then, the fractured
nature of the Williams opinion does not offer a true plurality. See id. at 120 (Kagan, J.,
dissenting).
64 See id. at 83, 84–85 (plurality opinion); id. at 13435 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
65 Id. at 141 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
66 See id. at 118 (Thomas, J., concurring); White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346, 364 (Thomas, J.,
concurring in part).
67 White, 502 U.S. at 364 (Thomas, J., concurring in part).
59
60
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Justice Thomas’s position ever since, taking each opportunity to point
out the unworkability of the “conventional witness” rules and to
advocate for his “formality and solemnity” requirement, i.e., he
advances that only “formalized testimonial materials, such as
affidavits, depositions, prior testimony, or confessions” are captured
by the Confrontation Clause.68
It is abundantly clear that the Court’s confrontation clause
jurisprudence is in disarray, especially in the forensic evidence
context. Critically, forensic evidence is no longer properly described
as “the way of the future.”69 In our modern-day courtrooms, forensic
evidence and testimony is our present and it will continue to be so for
many years, decades, and centuries to come. With the advent of new
and updated technologies as well as the increased use of forensic
evidence to convict,70 this question of what confrontation analysis
should apply in the forensic evidence context is one that can no longer
wait for an answer. This is so because, in many respects, one of the
few routes available to test the reliability of forensic science and its
processes is “the greatest legal engine ever invented for the discovery
of truth,” the crucible of cross-examination.71
This Article proposes an answer to the question. It recommends
that the Supreme Court implement Justice Thomas’s “formality and
solemnity” approach72 as a rule of law the next time the Court is
asked to interpret the Confrontation Clause in the context of multianalyst forensic disciplines—specifically, in toxicology, DNA, and
alcohol breath testing.73 However, Justice Thomas’s test must be

68 Id. at 365; see Williams, 567 U.S. at 111 (Thomas, J., concurring); Michigan v. Bryant,
562 U.S. 344, 379 (2011) (Thomas, J., concurring); Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S.
305, 329 (2009) (Thomas, J., concurring); Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 836–37 (2006)
(Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
69 But see NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, COMM. ON IDENTIFYING THE NEEDS OF THE FORENSIC
SCIS. CMTY., STRENGTHENING FORENSIC SCIENCE IN THE UNITED STATES: A PATH FORWARD 4
(2009), http://www.nap.edu/catalog/12589.html.
70 See id.
71 White, 502 U.S. at 356 (quoting California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 158 (1970).
72 Williams, 567 U.S. at 103–04 (Thomas, J. concurring).
73 It should be noted that the Article’s suggested approach could very well be implemented
in all forensic science contexts; however, here, the author has chosen to focus on that which
seems to trouble the Court most, the involvement of a number of analysts in one process. The
toxicology, DNA, and alcohol breath test disciplines offer the best examples of where we might
see a vast number of individuals involved in the scientific process; they are also the areas that
are most often before the appellate courts. Nevertheless, the author is troubled that
“conventional witness” rules do not appear to work in all forensic science contexts and that
other contexts not explored herein are far more subjective than those discussed in this article.
See NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, COMM. ON IDENTIFYING THE NEEDS OF THE FORENSIC SCIS.
CMTY., supra note 69, at 4; PRESIDENT’S COUNCIL OF ADVISORS ON SCI. & TECH., REPORT TO THE
PRESIDENT FORENSIC SCIENCE IN CRIMINAL COURTS: ENSURING SCIENTIFIC VALIDITY OF
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qualified, i.e., in determining whether forensic evidence is “formal” or
“solemn,” process over form must be emphasized.74 That is, it is not
the mere documentary form or format that tells whether forensic
evidence is “formal” or “solemn,” but it is how the forensic evidence
was processed that shows its “formality and solemnity.”75
Part I discusses the current state of these forensic disciplines in
criminal courtrooms and highlights how lower courts across the
country insulate them from reliability testing. Part II explores why
the Framers found the Confrontation Clause to be indispensable and
the principal evil from the Sixteenth and Seventeenth centuries that
it was designed to eliminate, focusing on the insulated process that
most concerned the Framers. It then argues forensic science is the
Twenty-First-century version of the Marian examination,
emphasizing the need to focus on the process that creates forensic
evidence. Part III summarizes the “conventional witness” rules in
confrontation clause jurisprudence and asserts that, based on
Williams, it is clear these rules are not a proper fit for forensic
evidence. Part IV describes the lower courts’ response to Williams
and the variety of approaches that are the direct result of the
Supreme Court’s lack of guidance. Part V offers the answer; a rule
that classifies science, not the analysts, as the relevant witness to be
confronted and argues that Justice Thomas’s “formality and
solemnity” rule with qualification offers the best direction in the
forensic evidence context. It asserts that science is formal and
solemn, focusing on its processes over the form of its end products,
i.e., reports. Part VI suggests that the performing analyst or an
observer to the scientific process should be required to testify and
confronted as the “shepherd” of the forensic evidence. Finally, the
Article concludes with a call to the Supreme Court that it accept the
next available multi-analyst forensic evidence case to apply Justice

FEATURE-COMPARISON METHODS 7 (2016), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default
/files/microsites/ostp/PCAST/pcast_forensic_science_report_final.pdf; see also State v. Lebrick,
178 A.3d 1064, 1079 (Conn. App. Ct. 2018) (court found no confrontation clause violation in
case involving firearms analysis). PCAST was an advisory group consisting of the country’s
leading scientists and engineers appointed by President Obama to advise the President on
policies related to science, technology, and innovation. PRESIDENT’S COUNCIL OF ADVISORS ON
SCI. & TECH., supra.
74 See Williams, 567 U.S. at 111 (Thomas, J., concurring) (“[C]onclud[ing] that [the] report
is not . . . within the meaning of the Confrontation Clause . . . [for the] report lacks the solemnity
of an affidavit or deposition.”) (Thomas, J., concurring); Derr v. State, 73 A.3d 254, 272 (Md.
2013) (agreeing with Justice Thomas’s solemnity analysis in Williams).
75 Cf. Williams, 567 U.S. at 111 (Thomas, J., concurring) (stating that the Cellmark report
lacked solemnity as it was neither sworn nor certified and did not attest that it accurately
reflected the DNA testing processes used or the results obtained).
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Thomas’s rule (again, with qualification) and adopt this Article’s
approach.
I. THE INSULATION OF SCIENCE NECESSITATING CONFRONTATION
A perfect example of what is meant by “insulated” science is found
in Williams where the testifying surrogate expert had no personal
knowledge of how the performing analyst or testing laboratory
developed the critical piece of evidence used to convict Mr. Williams.76
There, the testifying analyst was not a part of the testing laboratory,
she had not participated in or observed the generation of the DNA
profile from critical crime scene evidence, and she did not specifically
know what protocols or procedures were applied during the testing.77
Thus, the DNA profile taken from crime scene evidence was insulated
from cross-examination and adversarial testing because there was no
way to test its reliability through the surrogate witness called to the
stand.78 In particular, that witness had no idea how the DNA profile
was specifically developed or what protocols or procedures were
implemented and actually followed by the laboratory to ensure its
proper generation.79 Instead, the surrogate presumed the profile was
reliable based on her superficial knowledge of the testing laboratory
and her trust in its reputation.80 Insulated from cross-examination
was the performing analyst’s “proficiency, the care [taken] in
performing [the] work, and [his or her] veracity.”81
Forensic evidence is the sum of a cumulative process made up of
interrelated and interdependent steps that ensure the ultimate
accuracy and reliability of the end results.82 Frightfully, in Williams,
the Plurality condoned the surrogate expert’s claim of inherent
reliability and insulated from confrontation the critical (and
cumulative) process.83 This is just one instance that reached the
Supreme Court, but, to be sure, this is routine practice in the lower
courts.84
This is a problem because authoritative and well-

See id. at 62 (plurality opinion).
See id.
78 See id. at 12425 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
79 See id. at 62 (plurality opinion).
80 See id.
81 Bullcoming v. New Mexico, 564 U.S. 647, 661 n.7 (2011); see Williams, 657 U.S. at 62.
82 See, e.g., PRESIDENT’S COUNCIL OF ADVISORS ON SCI. & TECH., supra note 73, at 7–8.
83 See Williams, 567 U.S. at 8586.
84 See, e.g., State v. Lui, 315 P.3d 493, 50708 (Wash. 2014). The author has practiced for
ten years in the lower courts and tried numerous cases that involve forensic evidence in the
toxicology, DNA, and alcohol breath testing contexts; occasionally, she will draw upon these
experiences, but also couple them with examples from appellate decisions across the country to
76
77
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researched reports and empirical evidence has demonstrated that
science is not inherently reliable.85
Significantly, misapplied or flawed forensic science is one of the
leading causes of wrongful convictions (as shown in forty-four percent
of the more than 365 DNA exonerations), second to unreliable
eyewitness identifications.86 The evidence that unreliable and bad
science has led to wrongful convictions is, unfortunately, plentiful. 87
In the first study to analyze forensic testimony in the trials of
innocent individuals, Brandon Garrett and Peter Neufeld found that
in sixty percent of such trials, “forensic analysts called by the
prosecution provided invalid testimony.”88
Significantly, such
testimony included invalid testimony “by [seventy-two] forensic
analysts called by the prosecution and employed by [fifty-two]
laboratories, practices, or hospitals from [twenty-five] states.”89
Further, Garrett has noted that “[i]nvalid and unreliable forensics
were so prominent in [his research] that they raise[d] more troubling
questions about the use of forensics in criminal cases more generally.
How can analysts testify in such a patently unscientific way without
any consequences?”90
In its 2009 report, the National Academy of Sciences (and National
Research Council) warned that in light of flawed forensic science’s
contributions to wrongful convictions, there is “the potential danger
of giving undue weight to evidence and testimony derived from
imperfect testing and analysis. Moreover, imprecise and exaggerated
expert testimony has sometimes contributed to the admissions of
erroneous or misleading evidence.”91 The report proposed two
significant questions underlying the admission and reliance upon

illustrate the current problems in actual practice.
85 See Jessica D. Gabel, Realizing Reliability in Forensic Science from the Ground Up, 104
J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 283, 284 (2014) (stating that forensic science is broken and has
many shortcomings).
86 Misapplication of Forensic Science, supra note 31; DNA Exonerations in the United States,
supra note 31.
87 See Brief of Amicus Curiae the Innocence Network, Williams, supra note 29, at *7–11;
Brief of Amicus Curiae the Innocence Network, Bullcoming, supra note 30, at *15–30; Brief of
Amicus Curiae the National Innocence Network, Melendez-Diaz, supra note 30, at *15–25;
GARRETT, supra note 30, at 89–90; Garrett & Neufeld, supra note 30, at 9; Our Mission, NAT’L
REGISTRY EXONERATIONS, https://www.law.umich.edu/special/exoneration/Pages/about.aspx
(last visited Mar., 25, 2019).
88 Garrett & Neufeld, supra note 30, at 9 (defining invalid testimony as conclusions
misstating empirical data or wholly unsupported by empirical data).
89 Id. at 24.
90 GARRETT, supra note 30, at 90–91.
91 NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, COMM. ON IDENTIFYING THE NEEDS OF THE FORENSIC SCIS.
CMTY., supra note 69, at 4.
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forensic evidence at trial:
(1) the extent to which a particular forensic discipline is
founded on a reliable scientific methodology that gives it the
capacity to accurately analyze evidence and report findings
and (2) the extent to which practitioners in a particular
forensic discipline rely on human interpretation that could be
tainted by error, the threat of bias, or the absence of sound
operational procedures and robust performance standards.92
The report labelled these questions as vital and noted that “it
matters a great deal whether an expert is qualified to testify about
forensic evidence and whether the evidence is sufficiently reliable to
merit a fact finder’s reliance on the truth that it purports to
support.”93 Further, the National Academy of Sciences (NAS) report
made a number of recommendations that encompassed the
competency of forensic science and the scientific processes as well as
the analysts’ part of the collective that is science.94
Since 2009, there have been advancements in forensic science, such
as expanded DNA amplification kits (where more locations, i.e., loci,
containing DNA may be amplified and detected) and the creation of
probabilistic genotyping (where complex DNA mixtures can be
analyzed by software).95 However, we are far from professing that
science is inherently reliable and, therefore, need not be subjected to

Id. at 9.
Id. There has been much ado about Frye, Daubert, and Kumho Tire Co., but, in spite of
these admissibility or gatekeeping analyses, there remains a supreme need for reliability
testing during the trial itself through cross-examination. Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526
U.S. 137 (1999); Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993); Frye v. United
States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923); see NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, COMM. ON IDENTIFYING THE
NEEDS OF THE FORENSIC SCIS. CMTY., supra note 69, at 9–13.
94 See NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, COMM. ON IDENTIFYING THE NEEDS OF THE FORENSIC SCIS.
CMTY., supra note 69, at 14–33; Mnookin & Kaye, supra note 16, at 149 (describing science as
a collective process).
95 See Michael Coble, Current Issues in Forensic DNA Testing, NAT’L INST. STANDARDS &
TECH., (June 2, 2017), https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/events/criminal_justice/2
017/Current_Issues_Forensic_DNA_Testing.pdf. The Promega Fusion 6C amplification kit is
capable of amplifying and detecting twenty-seven loci (i.e., fixed locations on a chromosome
where DNA sequences may be found). See Promega PowerPlex Fusion 6C System, PROMEGA,
https://www.promega.com/products/genetic-identity/genetic-identity-workflow/str-amplificatio
n/powerplex-fusion-6c-system/?catNum=DC2705 (last visited Mar. 25, 2019). Probabilistic
genotyping is software designed to interpret complex DNA mixtures and is being steadily
approved for use by law enforcement agencies and other entities across the country. See Ray
Weiss, STRmix™ Approved for Use in LA, Washington State, PRWEB, (July 26, 2018), https://w
ww.prweb.com/releases/strmix_approved_for_use_in_la_washington_state/prweb15652987.ht
m.
92
93
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confrontation. In 2013, the former National Commission on Forensic
Science (NCFS) was created as an advisory body to the U.S.
Department of Justice.96 Until its dissolution by former Attorney
General Jeff Sessions in 2017, NCFS was tasked with “enhanc[ing]
the practice and improv[ing] the reliability of forensic science.”97
Some recommendations or views by NCFS were shared with the
Department of Justice over the course of its four-year life, including
“foundational work products” (i.e., that sought to fulfill the objective
of “strengthening the validity and reliability of forensic evidence”),
“operational work products” (i.e., that meant to address the
enhancement of “quality assurance and quality control in forensic
science laboratories and units”), and “relational work products” (i.e.,
analysis of “the way forensic science is understood and communicated
to the users of forensic science, including investigators, lawyers,
judges, victims, defendants, and the general public”).98 At the close
of its work, NCFS outlined multiple other “foundational”,
“operational”, and “relational” recommendations, tasks, and reform
efforts that remained.99 As NCFS concluded, “there is still work to
be done.”100
In its 2016 report, the President’s Council of Advisors on Science
and Technology (PCAST) called for empirical studies in order to
establish the validity of forensic feature-comparison methods,
including, relevant to this discussion, complex DNA mixture
interpretation.101 Although PCAST found single-source and simplemixture DNA analysis less problematic in terms of its overall validity
as a forensic feature-comparison method, it still noted that even this
kind of DNA analysis is fallible.102 “Errors can and do occur.
Although the probability that two samples from different sources
have the same DNA profile is tiny, the chance of human error is much
higher. Such errors stem from sample mix-ups, contamination,
incorrect interpretation, and errors in reporting.”103 Arguably, even
the most advanced form of forensic science, i.e., DNA analysis, has
its flaws; a number of exonerations have resulted in cases where DNA

96 See NAT’L COMM’N ON FORENSIC SCI., REFLECTING BACK—LOOKING TOWARD THE FUTURE
1 (2017), https://www.justice.gov/archives/ncfs/page/file/959356/download.
97 See id. at 3; Hsu, supra note 39.
98 NAT’L COMM’N ON FORENSIC SCI., supra note 96, at 56; Mnookin, supra note 39, at 112.
99 NAT’L COMM’N ON FORENSIC SCI., supra note 96, at 79.
100 Id. at 10.
101 See PRESIDENT’S COUNCIL OF ADVISORS ON SCI. & TECH., supra note 73, at 7.
102 See id. at 8.
103 See id. at 7.

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3414577

CONFRONTING THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY

964

Albany Law Review

4/29/2019 11:18 AM

[Vol. 82.3

testing was used to convict the innocent.104
As scholar Jennifer Mnookin writes, “[t]his present reality—a host
of meaningful but mostly superficial changes alongside a stillfaltering trickle of serious research—permits two radically different
stories to be told about the likely future of the forensic sciences over
the next decade or two.”105 Mnookin describes one story of “just
barely” momentum where “we are on the cusp of an increasingly
empirically based, science-driven approach to the validation and use
of these influential kinds of evidence.”106 She then goes on to describe
another possible story that is more realistic in her view, one
characterizing “the changes made thus far as genuine, but limited
and sputtering efforts at reform, unlikely to operate as gateways
toward necessary substantial transformations, at least on the near
horizon.”107 Mnookin concludes that:
[O]ur best chance for substantial ongoing improvements rests
on the creation, or re-creation, of an entity akin to the NCFS.
Simply put, we need some institutional structure, some body,
separate from the courts, from adversarial advocates, and
from practitioners themselves, a body that includes
representatives from all these arenas along with
accomplished research scientists.108
In the meantime, however, there is one constitutionally guaranteed
safeguard that remains available to poke and prod the reliability of
scientific evidence: the Confrontation Clause.
A. Confrontation Safeguards Against Flawed Forensics
It is true that although cross-examination may be available as a
means of testing forensic evidence, it does not necessarily follow that
it will be utilized by defense counsel and, thereby, prevent wrongful
convictions. At least one study focused on wrongful convictions
illustrated that “[d]efense counsel rarely cross-examined analysts
concerning invalid testimony” in such cases.109 Of course, that
Brief of Amicus Curiae the Innocence Network, Williams, supra note 29, at *2–3.
Mnookin, supra note 39, at 100.
106 Id.
107 Id.
108 Id. at 114.
109 Garrett & Neufeld, supra note 30, at 11–12. This sentence also goes on to expose another
issue; that is, courts routinely denying defense expert funding requests in cases involving
forensic science. See id. This is rather ironic given that one of Justice Kennedy’s proposed
104
105
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counsel was either ineffective or, perhaps, strategic in such judgment
call does not dictate that the Confrontation Clause is of no use in
challenging scientific evidence and testimony. When confrontation
has potentially been successful in doing so, it is difficult to
empirically tell that story when those cases may have resulted in not
guilty verdicts.110 Furthermore, as the Supreme Court opinions over
the decades have noted, confrontation is still the best tool available
to bring to light “the sorts of witness mistakes, overreaching, bias and
outright fabrication exposed by the exonerations and their
aftermath.”111
Cross-examination has the power to reveal mistake or mischief on
the part of the performing analyst.112 For example, in Maryland, the
cross-examination of an analyst at a pretrial proceeding in a murder
case revealed that the analyst “‘did not understand the science
behind many of the tests that she performed,’ and ‘she did not
perform a number of standard tests on the blood samples in the
case.’”113 As cross-examination ensued, the analyst went on to
“‘agree[] that other tests she had completed were useless’ and
‘acknowledged that she had failed to record the results of some
testing steps needed to ensure accuracy in blood typing.’”114
Ultimately, the analyst testified that her “entire analysis was
absolutely worthless.”115 As a result, the prosecution did not call the
analyst to testify at trial, indicating to media that the transcripts of
her testimony were telling as to the decision not to have her testify.116
Similarly, in Ragland v. Commonwealth,117 an FBI analyst
responsible for bullet lead composition testing “was caught in a lie by
defense counsel on cross-examination, confronted with her earlier

solutions is that in lieu of confrontation the defense can simply hire its own experts to challenge
the forensic evidence. See Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305, 338, 340 (Kennedy,
J., dissenting).
110 See Brief of Amicus Curiae the National Innocence Network, Melendez-Diaz, supra note
30, at *44.
111 Id. at *43; see also Williams v. Illinois, 567 U.S. 50, 119 (2012) (Kagan, J., dissenting)
(recognizing that the Confrontation Clause is a mechanism for catching errors in forensic work);
Bullcoming v. New Mexico, 564 U.S. 647, 661 n.7, 661–62 (2011) (“[The analysts] testimony
under oath would have enabled [defense] counsel to raise before a jury questions concerning
[the analyst’s] proficiency, the care he took in performing his work, and his veracity.”).
112 See Brief of Amicus Curiae the National Innocence Network, Melendez-Diaz, supra note
30, at 42–43.
113 Id. at 45 n.53 (referencing another case where this chemist testified falsely in DNAexoneree Bernard Webster’s case).
114 Id.
115 Id.
116 Id.
117 Ragland v. Commonwealth, 191 S.W.3d 569 (Ky. 2006).
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statements, and eventually forced to admit that her prior statements
were false[,] . . . [l]ater . . . admit[ing], ‘[i]t was only after the crossexamination at trial that I knew I had to address the consequences of
my actions.’”118
Recently, in the state of Washington, it was uncovered through
Brady119 disclosures and public disclosure requests by the defense
that a forensic toxicologist with the Washington State Patrol
Toxicology Laboratory Division (WSPTLD) had misplaced samples
into the machine during the extraction stage for basic routine blood
drug screening.120
These mistakes required three separate
“Corrective Action Reports” to be generated by the WSPTLD, and
ultimately led WSPTLD to remove the analyst from case work until
the laboratory’s review of the issue was completed.121 The root cause
was the analyst’s lack of attention during his extraction work.122
These mistakes were caught after the evidentiary samples continued
the course of further necessary testing by either the analyst himself
or other analysts within the laboratory.123 If this had happened to be
later on in the analysis or if it was an evidentiary sample subjected
to blood alcohol testing, the errors may not have been uncovered.124
Cross-examination of this particular analyst would test both the
competency and reliability of his work in addition to exposing his
documented inattention to detail that the fact finder should be
permitted to hear.
Next, even when cross-examination may not have unmasked
118 Brief of Amicus Curiae the National Innocence Network, Melendez-Diaz, supra note 30,
at 46 (quoting Ragland, 191 S.W.3d at 581) (emphasis added).
119 Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
120 See Corrective Action Report—Basic Drug Screen Sample Switching from Brittany
Thomas, Wash. State Patrol Toxicology Laboratory Div., to Amanda Black, Wash. State Patrol
Toxicology Laboratory Div. 2 (Mar. 27, 2017).
121 See id.; Washington State Patrol Corrective Action Report—EMIT Screen Sample
Switching from Brian Capron, Wash. State Patrol Toxicology Laboratory Div., to Amanda
Black, Wash. State Patrol Toxicology Laboratory Div. (Apr. 24, 2017); Corrective Action
Report—Cocaine Confirmation Sample Switch from Brian Capron, Wash. State Patrol
Toxicology Laboratory Div., to Amanda Black, Wash. State Patrol Toxicology Laboratory Div.
(Apr. 12, 2018).
122 See Corrective Action Report—Basic Drug Screen Sample Switching, supra note 120;
Corrective Action Report—EMIT Screen Sample Switching, supra note 121; Corrective Action
Report—Cocaine Confirmation Switch, supra note 121. Readers can obtain this information
via public disclosure request to the WSPTLD, requesting all corrective actions for forensic
toxicologist David Nguyen from February 2017 through April 2018. See Public Disclosure
Requests, WASH. ST. PATROL, http://wsp-staging.fluidnrgclients.com/public-disclosure-requests/
(last visited Mar. 25, 2019).
123 See Corrective Action Report—Basic Drug Screen Sample Switching, supra note 120.
124 See Brief of Amicus Curiae the Innocence Network, Bullcoming, supra note 30, at *40
(“Unless the data are so false as to appear ridiculous on their face, any colleague who reviews
the data may fail to recognize the possibility of error.”).
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mistake or mischief and, thus, did not prevent wrongful conviction, it
still hastened the later exoneration.125 For instance, Hector Gonzalez
was wrongfully convicted of murder in New York; at trial, the analyst
testified “that blood stains found on a pair of Mr. Gonzalez’[s] jeans
were ‘consistent with the victim’s blood type’ but failed to reveal what
percentage of the population shared that blood type.”126 During crossexamination, the analyst admitted “that the genetic markers she was
relying on for her direct examination testimony were found in 54% of
the New York [C]ity population.”127 This powerful statistic was only
uncovered via cross-examination of the analyst.128
Third, by allowing for cross-examination of the performing analyst,
effective assistance of counsel is promoted.129 No longer would
defense counsel be stuck with what a surrogate expert presumed
about the performing analyst’s competency and work (and, therefore,
trial counsel also left to presume herself); the performing analyst
would be directly subject to confrontation and, to be effective, defense
counsel would have to adequately investigate, prepare for, and
execute cross-examination accounting for the entire analysis.130
Affording such a right provides the defense with strong
incentives to identify and correct simple mistakes in examiner
conclusions, to push back against testimony that overstates
the probative value of the results, and to probe and explore
conclusions to ensure they have some grounding in validated
procedures actually performed in connection with the case.131
Indeed, ineffective assistance of counsel is another leading cause of
wrongful convictions.132 In addition, the NCFS, in recognizing the
importance of attorneys and their role in ensuring the validity of
125 See Brief of Amicus Curiae the National Innocence Network, Melendez-Diaz, supra note
30, at *46–47.
126 Id. at *47; see Hector Gonzalez, NAT’L REGISTRY EXONERATIONS, https://www.law.umich.e
du/special/exoneration/Pages/casedetail.aspx?caseid=3246 (last updated June 5, 2016).
127 Brief of Amicus Curiae the National Innocence Network, Melendez-Diaz, supra note 30,
at *47; see also id. at 48 (describing a similar scenario in the case of Dwayne Allen Dail); see,
e.g., Dwayne Allen Dail, NAT’L REGISTRY EXONERATIONS, http://www.law.umich.edu/special/ex
oneration/Pages/casedetail.aspx?caseid=3147 (last updated June 1, 2014).
128 See Brief of Amicus Curiae the National Innocence Network, Melendez-Diaz, supra note
30, at *48.
129 See, e.g., Schwab v. Crosby, 451 F.3d 1308, 132021 (11th Cir. 2006).
130 See Brief of Amicus Curiae the National Innocence Network, Melendez-Diaz, supra note
30, at *44.
131 Id.
132 See Causes of Wrongful Convictions, NEW ENGLAND INNOCENCE PROJECT, http://www.ne
wenglandinnocence.org/causes-of-wrongful-convictions/ (last visited Apr. 19, 2019).
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forensic testimony, noted that the training of “forensic science users,”
such as lawyers, ought to be a continued focus.133
Finally, after former Attorney General Jeff Sessions’s decision to
decommission the NCFS, there is now, as Mnookin put it, no “locus
for a broadly conceived, authoritative panel of experts and
stakeholders to convene regularly to assess the state of forensic
science and recommended reforms.”134 Thus, the reliability testing of
forensic science is, now, very much a grassroots effort.135 We have
one certain guarantee for such testing and that is the guarantee of
the Confrontation Clause, which is a constitutionally mandated stopgap while efforts for serious reform in how forensic science is used in
our courtrooms may be on the decline.136
It would also behoove us, momentarily, to set aside the atrocities
that are all of the wrongful convictions based on flawed forensics, and
ask, what kind of system do we want? Do we want a system where
some evidence is outright, without any real process, found to be
inherently reliable? Does that not sound a lot like the Marian
examination and what was advanced by the judicial officers in Sir
Walter Raleigh’s disastrous trial?137 As Judge Harry Edwards138 once
reflected in a speech at the first NCFS meeting in 2014:
In his 1963 Letter from Birmingham Jail, Rev. Martin Luther
King, Jr., reminded us that “Injustice anywhere is a threat to
justice everywhere.” Isn’t that the point? We are not talking
about good science merely for its own sake. We are talking about
the need for good science in order to serve justice.139
A rule from the Supreme Court that requires the confrontation (and,
thus, the cross-examination) of the performing analyst or observer of
the underlying testing moves us a step closer to serving justice.140

See NAT’L COMM’N ON FORENSIC SCI., supra note 96, at 6, 9.
Mnookin, supra note 39, at 100.
135 See id. at 100–02.
136 See Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305, 318 (2009).
137 See Allen D. Boyer, The Trial of Sir Walter Ralegh: The Law of Treason, the Trial of
Treason and the Origins of the Confrontation Clause, 74 MISS. L.J. 869, 88990 (2005).
138 A former Senior Court Judge for the United States Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit. Harry T. Edwards, U.S. CT. OF APPEALS D.C. CIR., https://www.cadc.uscourt
s.gov/internet/home.nsf/Content/VL+-+Judges+-+THE (last visited Mar. 25, 2019).
139 Hon. Harry T. Edwards, Senior Circuit Judge, U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit,
Speaker at the First Public Meeting of the National Commission on Forensic Science 6 (Feb. 3,
2014), https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/ncfs/legacy/2014/05/13/harry-edwards.pdf.
140 It should be noted that in Judge Edwards’s speech, he ended the above quote with the
line: “I sincerely hope that the work of this Commission will push us closer to this goal.” Id.
133
134
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B. Four Primary Ways Forensic Science Is Insulated in Practice
Science is insulated from reliability testing in a variety of ways in
the lower courts. First, the surrogate expert may not actually be an
expert at all; specifically, where the expert lacks the requisite
qualifications and knowledge to speak to the forensic area, but,
nonetheless, satisfies the lower bar under Evidence Rule 702 in the
eyes of the court.141 This is particularly so when such surrogate is
asked to testify about a specific area that is intimately bound up with
his or her findings, such as a standard or reference that is used to
ensure the accuracy and reliability of an alcohol breath test that was
created and certified by an external laboratory.142 Permitting such
an “expert” to rely upon crucial evidence that supports the accuracy
and reliability of the end results (i.e., breath test results) even though
he or she does not have the requisite knowledge to speak on such
evidence eliminates any meaningful opportunity to cross-examine
about that evidence.143 Because this expert lacks knowledge to testify
about the particular piece of evidence, cross-examination is limited
to that fact alone; meanwhile, insulated from reliability testing, is the
forensic evidence that supports the expert’s overall conclusions.144
Second, the surrogate expert may not have seen, let alone actually
tested or observed the analysis of the evidentiary sample at issue;
instead, presuming that the many steps in the cumulative scientific
process before the final stage (or report) was performed
competently.145 This is problematic as the discussion in Subsections
1 and 2 of this Part, infra, demonstrate because particularly in
toxicology and DNA testing, the accuracy and reliability of the end
results rest on all of the stages that come before that final one, i.e.,
the publication of results.146
Third, the surrogate may not have reviewed any of the “raw data”
to assess the appropriateness of the performing analyst’s ultimate
conclusions and reported results.147 This was the case in Williams
where the testifying expert was not employed by the testing

141 See, e.g., In re Paoli R.R. Yard PCB Litig., 35 F.3d 717, 744 (3d Cir. 1994) (“The
evidentiary requirement of reliability is lower than the merits standard of correctness.”).
142 See Elizabeth Stevens, Crawford’s Last Stand? What Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts
Means for the Confrontation Clause and for Criminal Trials, 2 CONLAWNOW 81, 12930 (2011).
143 See Bullcoming v. New Mexico, 564 U.S. 647, 662 (2011).
144 See Stevens, supra note 142, at 104, 120, 125–26, 130.
145 See id. at 12324.
146 See Brief of Amicus Curie the Innocence Network Bullcoming, supra note 30, at 24, 32.
147 See, e.g., Williams v. Illinois, 567 U.S. 50, 62 (2012); id. at 124–25 (Kagan, J., dissenting)
(quoting Bullcoming v. New Mexico, 564 U.S. 647, 661 (2011)).
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laboratory and testified that while she compared the defendant’s
DNA profile with the profile generated by the outside laboratory from
crime scene evidence, she “confirmed that she did not conduct or
observe any of the testing on [the rape kit evidence], and that her
testimony relied on the DNA profile produced by [an outside
laboratory].”148 The testifying expert then added that she “trusted
[the testing laboratory] to do reliable work because it was an
accredited lab, but she admitted she had not seen any of the
calibrations or work [that the laboratory] had done in deducing [the
relevant DNA profile].”149 In this way, the testifying expert was a
mere conduit who served only to relay the conclusions and findings
of the performing analyst who had conducted the testing and then
reviewed and interpreted the raw data.150 Insulated from crossexamination was not only the early-on processing of the DNA sample,
but also the interpretation (which represents an extremely important
stage of DNA analysis as illustrated in Subsection 2 of this Part) of
the raw data.151
Finally, the surrogate may not be employed by or, at the bare
minimum, know and understand the protocols and practices of the
testing laboratory.152 These practices are particularly prevalent in
the “assembly line” or multi-analyst forensic disciplines of toxicology,
DNA, and alcohol breath testing, where some laboratories assign
multiple analysts to analyze a single evidentiary sample or outsource
work to third party laboratories as was the case in Williams.153 Here,
too, alcohol breath testing serves as an example of this scenario
where the testifying expert is not employed by the laboratory that
prepared or certified important standards or reference materials,
such as the dry gas external standard154 discussed in Subsection 3 of
this Part.
C. The Insulated Scientific Processes of Toxicology, DNA, and
Alcohol Breath Testing
Each of the three multi-analyst forensic disciplines at the center of
this Article consist of processes that involve both humans and
Williams, 567 U.S. at 62 (plurality opinion).
Id.
150 See id.
151 See id. at 124–25 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
152 See id. at 123–25.
153 See id. at 85 (plurality opinion); Bullcoming v. New Mexico, 564 U.S. 647, 654 n.1 (2011).
154 See Lightfoot v. State, No. 05-12-00428-CR, 2013 Tex. App. LEXIS 9052, at *12–13, 14,
16 (Tex. Ct. App. July 23, 2013).
148
149
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machines.155 They (especially Toxicology and DNA analysis)156
present the potential for what may be described as a feedback loop
between humans and machines where the analysts may respond to
some output from a machine, adjust accordingly, and continue with
the processing of evidence.157 Both the Toxicology and DNA
disciplines, along with their specific processes, have been effectively
explained by others who have come before this Article, appearing
before the Supreme Court.158
1. Summary of the Insulated Process and Practice of Toxicology
First, in Bullcoming v. New Mexico, the Innocence Network and the
National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers (NACDL)159
submitted amici curiae briefs in support of the petitioner.160 These
briefs fully describe the toxicological processing of an evidentiary
blood sample for alcohol and drugs.161 There are multiple stages of
the process where human error can impact the accuracy and
reliability of the end product, including vital steps that must be taken
by the performing analyst in the pre-analysis, analysis, and
interpretation stages.162 “Each tier of the process of testing by [gas
chromatography] involves the exercise of judgment and proper
technique, and presents a risk of error by the analyst that can be
155 See Brief of Amicus Curiae National Ass’n of Criminal Defense Lawyers et al. in Support
of Petitioner, Bullcoming v. New Mexico, 564 U.S. 647 (2011) (No. 09–10876), 2010 WL
5043101, at *2021; Brief of Amicus Curiae the Innocence Project, Bullcoming, supra note 30,
at *55; Brief of Amicus Curiae the Innocence Network, Williams, supra note 29, at *21–22.
156 See Brief of Amicus Curiae National Ass’n of Criminal Defense Lawyers et al.,
Bullcoming, supra note 155, at *19, *23, *28 (regarding toxicology testing on a gas
chromatograph machine); Brief of Amicus Curiae the Innocence Network, Bullcoming, supra
note 30, at *26, *28–29 (regarding all stages of DNA testing).
157 See Brief of Amicus Curiae National Ass’n of Criminal Defense Lawyers et al.,
Bullcoming, supra note 155, at *20–21; Brief of Amicus Curiae the Innocence Network,
Williams, supra note 29, at *21–22.
158 See Brief of Amicus Curiae National Ass’n of Criminal Defense Lawyers et al.,
Bullcoming, supra note 155, at *9, *11, *12, *14, *20; Brief of Amicus Curiae the Innocence
Network, Williams, supra note 29, at *23–24.
159 The National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers was joined by the National
College for DUI Defense and the New Mexico Criminal Defense Lawyers Association as amici
curiae. Brief of Amicus Curiae National Ass’n of Criminal Defense Lawyers et al., Bullcoming,
supra note 155, at *5–6.
160 Id. at *5–6; Brief of Amicus Curiae the Innocence Network, Bullcoming, supra note 30,
at 9.
161 See Brief of Amicus Curiae National Ass’n of Criminal Defense Lawyers et al.,
Bullcoming, supra note 155, at *9, *11, *12, *14, *20; Brief of Amicus Curiae the Innocence
Network, Bullcoming, supra note 30, at *48, *49–50, *51, *52–53.
162 See Brief of Amicus Curiae National Ass’n of Criminal Defense Lawyers et al.,
Bullcoming, supra note 155, at *21; Brief of Amicus Curiae the Innocence Network, Bullcoming,
supra note 30, at *26.
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disclosed only through cross-examination of the actual analyst who
performed those steps in sample preparation.”163
For example, the performing analyst is responsible for properly
loading vials into the machine; at first blush, this may appear to be
akin to a “chain of custody” or simple administrative task.164
However, the analyst is actually communicating with a machine that
cannot know whether there has been proper placement of unknown
samples within it.165 There is potential for mistake in this stage as
demonstrated in Section A of this Part where recently a Washington
State Patrol forensic toxicologist had multiple episodes of improper
vial placement.166
Further, and significantly, after the machine-generated data is
produced, the analyst must review and interpret this data (this is
printed in the form of a graph) before rendering conclusions and
writing the report.167 The data does not pop out of the machine ready
for evidentiary admission.168 For example, in blood alcohol testing,
the gas chromatography machine produces graphs consisting of
peaks and data, which lead to a particular reported alcohol
concentration.169 Sometimes the graphs contain unknown peaks or
asymmetrical peaks that have the potential of co-eluting (i.e., not
appearing symmetrical or separated from one another)170 with the
most important peaks, such as the alcohol or internal standard (e.g.,
163 Brief of Amicus Curiae National Ass’n of Criminal Defense Lawyers et al., Bullcoming,
supra note 155, at *21.
164 See id. at *25.
165 NACDL, in its amici brief, argued:

The proper labeling and placement of the vials in the autosampler is not only necessary
to determine which blood samples belong to which defendants, but it is also essential that
sufficient calibrators, controls, and water blanks be placed in their proper places in the
autosampler to protect the integrity of the test.
Id. at *26.
166 See Corrective Action Report—Basic Drug Screen Sample Switching, supra note 120, at
1, 2; Corrective Action Report—EMIT Screen Sample Switching, supra note 121, at 1;
Corrective Action Report—Cocaine Confirmation Sample Switch, supra note 121, at 1.
167 See Brief of Amicus Curiae National Ass’n of Criminal Defense Lawyers et al.,
Bullcoming, supra note 155, at *13–14, *30–31; Brief of Amicus Curiae the Innocence Network,
Bullcoming, supra note 30, at 56.
168 See Brief of Amicus Curiae National Ass’n of Criminal Defense Lawyers et al.,
Bullcoming, supra note 155, at *30–31.
169 See id. at *13–14, *30–31.
170 See WASH. STATE PATROL TOXICOLOGY LAB., ANALYSIS OF VOLATILES IN AQUEOUS AND
BIOLOGICAL SPECIMENS BY HEADSPACE GAS CHROMATOGRAPHY 7, 9 (2017), http://wsp.wa.gov/fo
rensics/docs/toxicology/sop_manuals/sop_volatiles_07-24-2017.pdf (referring to peaks for
ethanol and the internal standard, n-propanol being symmetrical, i.e., no co-elution, split
peaks, or shoulders and stating peaks for ethanol, acetone, isopropanol, methanol, and npropanol “shall appear symmetrical” with no footnoted exceptions).
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n-propanol) peaks.171 Analysts have to make judgment calls as to
whether or not co-elution (non-separation between peaks) exists and
whether to perform manual integration upon reviewing and
considering the machine’s output.172
Based on the human decision-making that occurs during the
interpretation stage as well as the human contributions to the entire
toxicology testing process, it would be erroneous to believe, as many
courts do, that the machine alone is responsible for the end product,
rather than the analyst.173 “Print-outs from a machine are still the
work products of the analyst and may contain within them
manifestations of human error that only confrontation of the analyst
can reveal.”174 Unfortunately, it is routine practice in cases involving
toxicology results to allow supervisors and other surrogates to testify
in place of the performing analyst.175
Subjecting a performing analyst, such as the aforementioned
Washington State Patrol forensic toxicologist (and his lack of
attention to detail),176 to cross-examination is the only way to fully
test the competency, accuracy, and reliability of the end product, the
test results. All of those tasks and actions conducted by the
171 See id. at 2, 7; Brief of Amicus Curiae National Ass’n of Criminal Defense Lawyers et al.,
Bullcoming, supra note 155, at *31.
172 See Brief of Amicus Curiae National Ass’n of Criminal Defense Lawyers et al.,
Bullcoming, supra note 155, at *19; see also WASH. STATE PATROL TOXICOLOGY LAB., supra note
170, at 7, 9 (referring to peaks for ethanol and the internal standard, n-propanol being
symmetrical, i.e., no co-elution, split peaks, or shoulders and stating peaks for ethanol, acetone,
isopropanol, methanol, and n-propanol “shall appear symmetrical” with no footnoted
exceptions).
173 See Bullcoming v. New Mexico, 564 U.S. 647, 673 (2011) (Sotomayor, J., concurring)
(“[T]his is not a case in which the State introduced only machine-generated results, such as a
printout from a gas chromatograph.”); see also United States v. Moon, 512 F.3d 359, 362 (7th
Cir. 2008) (citing United States v. Washington, 498 F.3d 225, 230, 232 (4th Cir. 2007) (“Only
the machine, through its diagnostic and technical process, could provide facts about the
chemical composition of [the] blood” and “the raw data generated by the machines [was] not the
statements of technicians.”)) (finding the machine’s printouts in a drug testing case were not
statements); cf. People v. John, 52 N.E.3d 1114, 1125 (N.Y. 2016) (“We will not indulge in the
science fiction that DNA evidence is merely machine-generated, a concept that reduces DNA
testing to an automated exercise requiring no skill set or application of expertise or judgment.”).
174 Brief of Amicus Curiae the Innocence Network, Bullcoming, supra note 30, at *20.
175 See, e.g., People v. Lopez, 286 P.3d 469, 471–72 (Cal. 2012); Marshall v. People, 2013 CO
51, ¶¶ 1–2; Jenkins v. State, 2010-CT-00203-SCT (¶¶ 19–20) (Miss. 2012); State v. Watson, 185
A.3d 845, 859–60 (N.H. 2018); State v. Michaels, 95 A.3d 648, 651–52 (N.J. 2014); State v.
Ortiz-Zape, 743 S.E.2d 156, 157, 165 (N.C. 2013); Commonwealth v. Yohe, 79 A.3d 520, 540–41
(Pa. 2013); State v. Jones, No. 31639-4-III, 2014 Wash. App. LEXIS 2695, *3–4, *10–11 (Wash.
Ct. App. 2014); State v. Mattox, 2017 WI 9, ¶¶ 2–4, 373 Wis. 2d 122, 890 N.W.2d 256; but see
Martin v. State, 60 A.3d 1100, 1109 (Del. 2013); Burch v. State, 401 S.W.3d 634, 637 (Tex.
2013).
176 See Corrective Action Report—Cocaine Confirmation Sample Switch, supra note 121;
Corrective Action Report—EMIT Screen Sample Switching, supra note 121; Corrective Action
Report—Basic Drug Screen Sample Switching, supra note 120.
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performing analyst that occur prior to the writing of a report
cumulatively impact the truth of the test results.177 “Only the testing
analyst is aware of how the sample appeared, how he or she prepared
it for testing, and how he or she operated the machine in a particular
test.”178 Furthermore, as the Supreme Court highlighted long ago,
Confrontation:
(1) insures that the witness will give his statement under
oath—thus impressing him with the seriousness of the matter
and guarding against the lie by the possibility of a penalty for
perjury; (2) forces the witness to submit to cross-examination,
the “greatest legal engine ever invented for the discovery of
truth”; (3) permits the jury that is to decide the defendant’s
fate to observe the demeanor of the witness making his
statement, thus aiding the jury in assessing his credibility.179
Without the opportunity to cross-examine the performing analyst,
all work, judgment calls, and decision-making that preceded the final
results are insulated and, instead, presumed to be reliable and an
adequate out-of-court substitute for adversarial testing.180 This, our
Framers, would have vehemently opposed.
2. Summary of the Insulated Process and Practice of DNA Analysis
In Williams, the Innocence Network amicus curiae provided a
comprehensive overview of the primary stages of DNA analysis and
outlined the potential for error in each step.181 The five stages of DNA
testing are extraction (where DNA is extracted from a biological
sample), quantification (where the amount of DNA is quantified in
the sample), amplification (where polymerase chain reaction (PCR)
is utilized to amplify or copy alleles), capillary electrophoresis (where
DNA fragments are separated and passed through a detector), and,
finally, interpretation (where the analyst must translate the data
from electropherograms and make significant judgment calls, often
referred to as “allele calls,” related to the generation of a DNA
profile).182 Some courts erroneously believe that human decisionSee Brief of Amicus Curie the Innocence Network, Bullcoming, supra note 30, at *6.
Id. at *37.
179 Lee v. Illinois, 476 U.S. 530, 540 (1986) (quoting California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 158
(1970)).
180 See Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305, 319–21 (2009).
181 See Brief of Amicus Curie the Innocence Network, Williams, supra note 29, at *15–23.
182 Id.
177
178
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making only enters the equation at the final stage, interpretation.183
This is simply not the case, the analyst has to make decisions
throughout the entire processing of an evidentiary sample, and there
is much room for error along each step of the way.184
As noted previously, in its 2016 report, while PCAST found singlesource and simple-mixture DNA analysis less problematic in terms
of its overall validity as a forensic feature-comparison method, it still
noted that even this kind of DNA analysis is fallible.185 Although its
reliability and power has increased throughout its decades of
existence, it is not infallible.186 Indeed, a number of exonerations
have resulted in cases where DNA testing was used to convict the
innocent.187
Take Josiah Sutton, for example. In 1998, Mr. Sutton and an
alleged accomplice were accused of raping a woman in the backseat
of her vehicle; semen was collected from the vaginal swabs and a
stain from the back seat.188 “DNA analysis was performed on the
evidence, and Sutton was excluded as the source of the stain. That
conclusion, however, was not mentioned in the official report or in the
analyst’s testimony at trial.”189 Although the probability that the
male profile deduced from the vaginal swabs belonged to someone
other than Sutton was extremely high (between one in eight and one
in fifteen black men in Texas, including Sutton), the expert provided
no such statistical analysis at trial.190 Instead, the analyst testified,
“[i]f it came from one person, it should have a same exact DNA
pattern. No other two persons will have [the] same DNA except in
the case of-of identical twins.”191 Implicit from this expert testimony
was that the DNA profile on the swabs from the victim uniquely
belonged to Sutton, but that was simply not the case.192 After proper
DNA analysis and interpretation was applied, the truth was
revealed, Mr. Sutton was excluded as a contributor to the vaginal

See e.g., State v. Lui, 315 P.3d 493, 507–08 (Wash. 2014).
See Brief of Amicus Curiae the Innocence Network, Williams, supra note 29, at *36.
185 See PRESIDENT’S COUNCIL OF ADVISORS ON SCI. & TECH., supra note 73, at 7.
186 See Brief of Amicus Curiae the Innocence Network, Williams, supra note 29, at *2–3.
187 See id. at 3; William C. Thompson, Tarnish on the ‘Gold Standard:’ Understanding Recent
Problems in Forensic DNA Testing, 30 CHAMPION 10, 10 (2006).
188 Brief of Amicus Curiae the Innocence Network, Williams, supra note 29, at *11; see
Josiah Sutton, NAT’L REGISTRY EXONERATIONS, http://www.law.umich.edu/special/exoneration
/Pages/casedetail.aspx?caseid=3672 (last updated Nov. 26, 2016).
189 Brief of Amicus Curiae the Innocence Network, Williams, supra note 29, at *11.
190 Id.
191 Id.
192 See Josiah Sutton, supra note 28.
183
184
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swabs and, ultimately, exonerated.193
In spite of the great stock jurors put into this evidence and the
many opportunities for error to insert itself into the analytical
process, it is common practice for courts to condone the insulation of
most of the DNA testing process and the performing analyst’s
work.194 Even in cases where there is no resulting exoneration (and
perhaps no wrongful conviction), this kind of insulation ought not to
be tolerated in a system that sets its course for justice. One stark
example of a court permitting unacceptable insulation is in People v.
Rodriguez,195 where the appellate court upheld the lower court’s
decision to allow a surrogate witness to testify in lieu of the
performing analysts.196 One such analyst conducted the quantitation
phase and found, per the surrogate witness’s testimony, “significant
amount of DNA” belonging to one male donor on the wire cutters at
issue.197 Apparently, “[t]he handles contained five or six times more
than the minimum amount of DNA required for testing, which
suggested that the donor had used the tool ‘[f]orcefully or for a decent
amount of time.’”198 Ultimately, this profile was associated with the
defendant, and the analyst that performed the quantitation phase of
the DNA process was not required to testify and, thus, was insulated
from cross-examination.199
Cross-examination of the performing analysts in the DNA process
is capable of exposing incompetency and error in each stage of the
analysis.200 One of the most formidable DNA experts in the nation,
Dr. John Butler, has noted the importance of cross-examination in
the DNA context, stating that it “provides the final level of review in
order to confirm the DNA testing results.”201
3. Alcohol Breath Testing—Insulation of the External Standard
The forensic discipline of alcohol breath testing has received much
less attention; therefore, a brief explanation of that process and how
courts insulate the attendant evidence supporting the accuracy and
reliability of the breath test is appropriate.
See id.
See, e.g., People v. Barba, 155 Cal. Rptr. 3d 707, 730 (Ct. App. 2013); Derr v. State, 73
A.3d 254, 272 (Md. 2013); State v. Lui, 315 P.3d 493, 507 (Wash. 2014).
195 People v. Rodriguez, 59 N.Y.S.3d 337 (App. Div. 2017), aff’d, 31 N.Y.3d 1067 (2018).
196 See Rodriguez, 59 N.Y.S.3d at 347.
197 Id. at 350 (Acosta, J., dissenting).
198 Id.
199 See id. at 340 (majority opinion).
200 See Brief of Amicus Curiae the Innocence Network, Williams, supra note 29, at *26.
201 Id.
193
194
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It is routine practice in misdemeanor courts—where most driving
under the influence (DUI) cases are heard—for the court to not
require the analyst who certified the external standard (typically in
a third party laboratory) to appear, finding such testing and
certification to be “nontestimonial” under “conventional witness”
confrontation clause analysis.202 In addition, in some states,
unqualified witnesses are permitted to testify about the external
standard as their qualifications do not suit the testimony or they do
not work in the testing laboratory.203 Although this forensic evidence
is most frequently admitted in misdemeanor matters, the
Confrontation Clause makes no distinction between lower level
crimes and felonies.204

202 State v. Kramer, 278 P.3d 431, 43738 (Idaho Ct. App. 2012) (holding certificates were
nontestimonial because they were not direct proof of an element of the crime, were admitted
only as proof that the machine was working properly, and were not tied to the prosecution of
any particular person); State v. Fischer, 726 N.W.2d 176, 182–83 (Neb. 2007) (“[T]he
statements in the certificate did not occur in the context of structured police questioning and
did not pertain to any particular pending matter. . . . [Instead] the primary purpose . . . was to
assure that the solution used to calibrate and test breath testing devices was of the proper
concentration.”); People v. Pealer, 933 N.Y.S.2d 473, 474 (App. Div. 2011) (“[T]he statements
contained in the breath test documents are not accusatory in the sense that they do not
establish an element of the crimes.”); Green v. DeMarco, 812 N.Y.S.2d 772, 777–78, 782–83
(Sup. Ct. 2005) (finding that the records at issue had a primary business purpose and were
admissible under the business records exception to hearsay and that the records are not
inculpatory, but neutral in character); Alcaraz v. State, 401 S.W.3d 277, 282 (Tex. Ct. App.
2013) (“[T]he reference samples were created for the purpose of confirming the breathalyzer
machine’s accuracy by demonstrating whether the machine was working at the time of
administration.”); Boutang v. State, 402 S.W.3d 782, 790 (Tex. Ct. App. 2013) (holding that the
records were not necessary to establish or prove some facts potentially relevant to later criminal
prosecution and were prepared for equipment maintenance purposes).
203 The type of individual called to testify in these cases varies by jurisdiction. For example,
in the state of Washington, the prosecution calls a breath test technician to testify who is a
trooper with the Washington State patrol that has had some training in the area of alcohol
breath testing and machines; notably, many of these individuals have only a high school degree.
See Breath Test Program Public Records Index, WASH. ST. PATROL, https://www.wsp.wa.gov/bre
athtest/btpindex.php (last visited Apr. 16, 2019); see, e.g., Shane Madsen: Curriculum Vitae,
WASH. ST. PATROL (Jan. 19, 2018), https://www.wsp.wa.gov/breathtest/docs/webdms/Breath_C
urriculum_Vitae/Madsen,%20Shane%20Curriculum%20Vitae%2002-19-2019.pdf
(for
an
example of such individual). In Wyoming, the prosecution tends to call a forensic toxicologist
from Wyoming Chemical Testing, a branch of the state’s Department of Health. See Chemical
Testing Program, WYO. DEP’T HEALTH, https://health.wyo.gov/publichealth/lab/ctp/ (last visited
Apr. 16, 2019). Nevertheless, both states use third party laboratories to create, test, and certify
the dry gas external standards utilized in their respective breath test programs. See, e.g.,
WASH. STATE PATROL, BREATH TEST PROGRAM: TECHNICAL MANUAL 10 (2017), https://www.ws
p.wa.gov/breathtest/docs/webdms/Breath_Calibration_Manuals/BTP_Technical%20Manual_Is
sued_20171107.pdf (outlining the ordering and subsequent receipt of dry gas external
standards from vendors); Calgaz External Standard Documentation, WASH. ST. PATROL
BREATH TEST PROGRAM: DRAEGER ALCOTEST 9510, https://www.wsp.wa.gov/breathtest/draeger
_docs.php#dry_gas (last visited Apr. 16, 2019).
204 See U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
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i. The Alcohol Breath Test
The actual breath test on any machine is quite automated.205
An individual is asked to provide several breath samples into a
breath tube that is connected to the machine.206 From there,
analysis occurs within the machine as programmed via algorithms
in the software.207 The end result of the test is a printed ticket with
some limited information about the breath test along with the test
results.208 Although the breath test itself is automated, there are
several steps that are specific to ensuring the accuracy and
reliability of the results that take place external to the machine.209
Relevant to this discussion is the external standard.210
ii. The External Standard
In alcohol breath testing, the external standard (which may be in
the form of a wet bath simulator solution or a dry gas)211 serves as a
reference or accuracy check during each evidential breath test
performed on a given machine.212 Its role is to verify the accuracy
and proper working order of the breath test machine during each
evidential breath test.213 The external standard is run during every
breath test in between the two subject samples.214 The external
standard result is so vital to each evidential breath test that if it does
not fall within the set acceptable range, “the instrument will place
itself out of service.”215 The dry gas external standard is typically

205 See, e.g., Draeger Alcotest 9510 Operator’s Manual, WASH. ST. PATROL, https://www.wsp.
wa.gov/breathtest/docs/webdms/Draeger/Op_T/Draeger%20Operator's%20Manual.pdf
(last
visited Apr. 16, 2019).
206 See id.
207 See id.; Letter from Ken Denton, Sergeant Impaired Driving Section, to Dr. Fiona J.
Couper, Toxicology Lab. Div. (Sept. 30, 2014), https://www.wsp.wa.gov/breathtest/docs/webdms
/Draeger/Software/Draeger%20Software%20Approval%202014.pdf.
208 See WASH. STATE PATROL, supra note 203, at 22.
209 See id. at 30.
210 Although not discussed here, it is worth noting that the officer or operator of the machine
at the time of the breath test must comply with certain procedures, such as a 15-minute
observation period and mouth check per agency manuals as well as many administrative codes
or statutes. Id. at 10.; see also WASH. REV. CODE § 46.61.506 (4)(a)(i)–(viii) (2018) (often referred
to as the “admissibility statute” in breath test cases in the state of Washington).
211 WASH. STATE PATROL, supra note 203, at 7.
212 Id. at 5, 7.
213 Id. at 7; see also Lightfoot v. State, No. 05-12-00428-CR, 2013 Tex. App. LEXIS 9052, at
*2 (Ct. App. July 23, 2013).
214 WASH. STATE PATROL, supra note 203, at 3; see Lightfoot, 2013 Tex. App. LEXIS 9052,
at *2.
215 See id.
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prepared, tested, and certified by a third party laboratory; the testing
laboratory provides a “Certificate of Analysis” for the lot of dry gas
cylinders provided to the agency.216 This certificate or the mere fact
that the dry gas is certified by an accredited laboratory is routinely
relied upon to establish the accuracy and reliability of breath test
results. State breath test experts testify that if the machine is
capable of measuring the external standard properly, then it can
validly read the subject’s unknown sample.217 Critically, this forensic
evidence remains insulated from reliability testing since it is often
labelled “nontestimonial” under the “conventional witness”
confrontation clause analysis.218 The message to jurors is that, based
on the proper certification of the dry gas external standard and its
accuracy checks during the breath test process, the defendant’s
breath test sample is accurate and reliable.219
The preparation and certification of the external standard is
subject to error and manipulation.220 In 2008, the head of the
Washington State Patrol crime and toxicology laboratories resigned
“for allegations of sloppy work and fraud.”221 In particular, the breath
test program’s credibility and competency was called into question
“when former toxicology lab[oratory] manager Anne Marie Gordon
was accused of falsely claiming to have verified solutions used for
breath testing in drunken-driving cases.”222 Here, too, crossexamination of the performing analyst who claims to have properly
prepared and certified the external standard, would be able to test
that analyst’s competency and honesty.

216 See WASH. STATE PATROL, supra note 203, at 10, 32, 35 (noting that only certified gas
cylinders are to be used). Washington’s provider is Calgaz, a division of Airgas USA LLC. See
Certificate of Registration of Calgaz Ltd., WASH. ST. PATROL (Apr. 28, 2016), https://www.wsp.w
a.gov/breathtest/draeger_docs.php (follow “Calgaz Accreditation Certificate 01132017.pdf”
hyperlink).
217 See, e.g., Lightfoot, 2013 Tex. App. LEXIS 9052, at *2.
218 See, e.g., supra note 202.
219 To this end, the Washington State Patrol Breath Test Program’s definition of the external
standard contemplates: “[t]he reference standard attached to the instrument and used to
provide a known alcohol vapor concentration to verify the accuracy and proper working order of
the instrument as part of a field evidentiary breath test.” WASH. STATE PATROL, supra note 203,
at 7 (emphasis added).
220 See State v. Lui, 315 P.3d 493, 521 (Wash. 2014) (Stephens, J. dissenting); Jennifer
Sullivan, State Crime-Lab Chief to Resign, SEATTLE TIMES (Feb. 15, 2008), https://www.seattlet
imes.com/nation-world/state-crime-lab-chief-to-resign/.
221 Sullivan, supra note 220.
222 Id.; see Lui, 315 P.3d at 521.
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II. THE MAKE AND DESIGN OF THE CONFRONTATION CLAUSE: THE
MARIAN EXAMINATION AND A CONCERN WITH PROCESS (NOT MERELY
FORM)
One would be hard-pressed to write anything about the
confrontation clause (or even mention Justice Scalia) without, first,
paying homage to its history. Indeed, when one pays close attention
to the history surrounding the adoption of the Confrontation Clause,
it evidences how the Supreme Court should respond to its forensic
evidence confrontation conundrum. The key is process; process over
mere form.223
A. The Marian Examination Then and Now—a Problematic,
Insulated, Substitute Process
It is undisputed that the “principal evil” the Confrontation Clause
was designed to prevent was the Sixteenth and Seventeenth century
Marian examination.224 In nearly all its primary opinions centered
on confrontation, the Supreme Court cites to this problematic
historical practice as the impetus for the clause.225 A careful review
of this process, particularly in examining the oft-cited 1603 trial of
Sir Walter Raleigh, illustrates that the Framers were concerned not
merely with the form of evidence borne out of the Marian
examination or the mere use of the examinations, but with the
process itself that was meant to serve as a substitute for in-court
processes.226
The problem with how the Marian examination was ultimately
implemented in some of our historical cases is that its process became
a substitute for that which was supposed to happen in court. 227
Ironically, there is historical support that the Marian committal
statute from which the Marian examination was derived was not
intended to institute “a system of written evidence.”228 Interestingly,

See People v. Lopez, 286 P.3d 469, 486 (Cal. 2012) (Liu, J., dissenting).
Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 50 (2004).
225 See, e.g., Williams v. Illinois, 567 U.S. 50, 111 (2012) (Breyer, J., concurring) (citing Davis
v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 835 (2006) (Thomas, J., dissenting)); Michigan v. Bryant, 562 U.S.
344, 357–58 (2011) (citing Crawford, 541 U.S. at 51); Crawford, 541 U.S. at 43–44, 50; White
v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346, 352 (1992); White, 502 U.S. at 36162 (Thomas, J., concurring) (citing
Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74, 94 (1970)); California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 156 (1970); Mattox
v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, 242–43 (1895).
226 See Crawford, 541 U.S. at 50.
227 See id. at 43, 50.
228 LANGBEIN, supra note 6, at 24. Justice Scalia also noted in Crawford that it was unlikely
that the original purpose of the Marian committal statute was to obtain evidence to be used
223
224
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historian John H. Langbein (who is frequently cited to by the Court)
contends that the transcription (within two days) of the oral
examination and the certification or physical transmission of the
written examination to the courts were conceived as minor
administrative matters.229 The emphasis, Langbein asserts, was on
the oral examination: “[t]he predominant purpose of the statute was
to institute systematic questioning of the accused and the
witnesses.”230
Regardless of its intended purpose, the Marian examination was
used as evidence in some cases, including in the 1603 trial of Sir
Walter Raleigh.231 “Justices of the peace or other officials examined
suspects and witnesses before trial. These examinations were
sometimes read in court in lieu of live testimony, a practice that
‘occasioned frequent demands by the prisoner to have his “accusers,”
i.e., the witness against him, brought before him face to face.’”232
Insulated from testing were certain out-of-court declarants along
with their statements and written evidence; instead, the reliability of
such things was declared already tested—a sort of “been there, done
that, you needn’t worry about it” message to the court and the
accused. Such message was loud and clear in Sir Walter Raleigh’s
trial.
Much focus has been placed on Raleigh’s trial as the prime example
of the principal evil that was the Marian examination. Raleigh was
sentenced to death after having been found guilty based, primarily,
on his alleged accomplice’s statements.233 And there is much
discourse that the reason this process was so problematic was the
presentation of ex parte affidavits in lieu of live testimony to
prosecute the defendant.234 However, in reading the transcript of
Raleigh’s trial, what is perhaps most instructive is how the judicial
officers reacted when Raleigh challenged the Marian examination
process and how Lord Cobham’s statements were obtained by
demanding face-to-face confrontation.235
From their strong

later at trial. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 44.
229 See LANGBEIN, supra note 6, at 23.
230 Id.
231 See Crawford, 541 U.S. at 44.
232 Id. at 43.
233 See id. at 44.
234 See Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74, 94 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring) (“[T]he paradigmatic
evil the Confrontation Clause was aimed at [was] trial by affidavit.”); California v. Green, 399
U.S. 149, 156 (1970); Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, 242–43 (1895).
235 JARDINE, supra note 7, at 418, 420–22.
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reactions,236 it is evident that they held the process up as solemn,
formal, and impenetrably reliable.
At the trial, Lord Chief Justice Popham described the
circumstances under which Cobham made his accusation against
Raleigh.237 He reported to the court that when Cobham had reviewed
a letter written by Raleigh to Lord Cecil that Cobham exclaimed,
“That wretch! that traitor, Raleigh! [H]ath he used me thus? Nay,
then, I will tell you all.”238 Thereafter, Cobham made his accusation
and Lord Chief Justice Popham told the court “and surely the
countenance and action of my Lord Cobham much satisfied me that
what he confessed was true, and that he surely thought Sir W.
Raleigh had betrayed him.”239 Later, Popham claimed, in response to
Raleigh’s persistent request for confrontation, that he was worried if
Cobham should be forced to testify, that he may recant,
[w]here no circumstances do concur to make a matter probable,
then an accuser may be heard; but so many circumstances
agreeing and confirming the accusation in this case, the accuser
is not to be produced . . . if we shall now hear [Cobham] again in
person, he may favour or fear retract what formerly he hath said,
and the jury may, by that means, be inveigled.240
The second examination of Cobham was read into evidence; this
examination was not signed by Cobham.241 Notably, when Raleigh
questioned this, the Attorney-General asserted, “[b]eing taken in the
presence of so many Privy Councillors, to whom faith must be given,
the Declaration is of like force as if it had been subscribed.”242 When
the Attorney-General then proceeded to question Raleigh’s doubt in
the reliability of Cobham’s examination, the Attorney-General stated
that “the Lord Cobham had twice called for the letter, and twice
paused a good while upon it.”243 The Attorney-General went on to
note that Cobham’s accusation also implicated himself, making it
more believable.244
Significantly, later, Justice Warburton claimed to marvel at

236
237
238
239
240
241
242
243
244

Id. at 421–22.
Id. at 415.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 427.
Id. at 415.
Id.
Id. at 417.
See id.
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Raleigh who remained steadfast in his demand for face-to-face
confrontation of Cobham.245 The Justice exclaimed, “for many horsestealers should escape if they may not be condemned without
witnesses. By law, a man may be condemned upon presumption and
circumstances, without any witness to the main fact.”246 Raleigh
aptly responded: “Yet by your favour, my Lord, the trial of fact at the
common law is by jury and witnesses.”247
The process was the issue in Marian examinations. The inferred
reliability of out-of-court evidence attained by what judicial officers
of that time believed to be commendable, formal, and solemn
procedures.248 That Popham believed Cobham’s accusations to be
true by witnessing its delivery.249 That the Attorney-General asked
the fact finders to presume reliability of Cobham’s examination
because it was taken before so many Privy Councillors, whom should
be trusted.250 That Cobham thought long and hard and deeply
considered his accusation before so making it.251 All of this supports
that the Raleigh court believed the Marian examination to be a
trustworthy process. Warbuton’s comments, that a man may be
condemned upon presumption and circumstances without witness,
resemble those of Justices Kennedy, Alito, and Breyer when
discussing forensic evidence, its processes, and its analysts.252
Forensic science and its processes are the Twenty-First century
Marian examination. The very same insulation and presumptions
that plagued the Marian examination are at work when modern-day
courts do not require confrontation to test the reliability and accuracy
of the performing analyst’s work.253 Justice Alito described the DNA
report in Williams as having been prepared by a “modern, accredited
laboratory,” asserting that it bore “little if any resemblance to the
historical practices that the Confrontation Clause aimed to
eliminate.”254 Justice Breyer referred to the analysts who developed
the relevant DNA profile as “professional analysts working on

Id. at 421.
Id. (emphasis added).
247 Id.
248 See id. at 420.
249 Id. at 415.
250 Id.
251 Id. at 417.
252 See Williams v. Illinois, 567 U.S. 50, 62 (2012); Williams, 567 U.S. at 93 (Breyer, J.,
concurring); Bullcoming v. New Mexico, 564 U.S. 647, 681 (2011) (Kennedy, J., dissenting);
Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305, 345–46, 351 (2009) (Kennedy, J., dissenting);
JARDINE, supra note 7, at 421.
253 See, e.g., Williams v. Illinois, 567 U.S. 50, 62 (2012).
254 Id. at 86 (quoting Michigan v. Bryant, 562 U.S. 344, 379 (2011) (Thomas, J., concurring)).
245
246
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technical matters at a certified laboratory.”255 He also suggested that
the lower courts could “create an exception that presumptively would
allow introduction of DNA reports from accredited crime
laboratories.”256 Justice Kennedy has condoned the use of lab reports
like that in Bullcoming, labelling them impartial reports “prepared
by experienced technicians in laboratories that follow professional
norms and scientific protocols.”257
Although within the context of separating “analyst” from
“conventional witness,” Justice Kenney has, nonetheless,
acknowledged the danger that the Confrontation Clause was
designed to prevent:
The danger is that innocent defendants may be convicted on the
basis of unreliable, untested statements by those who observed—
or claimed to have observed—preparation for or commission of
the crime. And, of course, those statements might not have been
uttered at all or—even if spoken—might not have been true.258
To be clear, even though there may be some notable differences
between an “analyst”259 and a “conventional witness,” the same level
of insulation that the Court has been unwilling to accept in the more
traditional context is becoming readily acceptable in the forensic

Williams, 567 U.S. at 93 (Breyer, J., concurring).
Id. Justice Breyer then suggests that if there was “significant reason to question a
laboratory’s technical competence or its neutrality, the presumptive exception would
disappear,” requiring the prosecution to call the proper witnesses. Id.
257 Bullcoming v. New Mexico, 564 U.S. 647, 681 (2011) (Kennedy, J., dissenting); see also
Melendez-Diaz, 557 U.S. at 351 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (“The modern trend in the state courts
has been away from the Court’s rule and toward the admission of scientific test results without
testimony—perhaps because the States have recognized the increasing reliability of scientific
testing.”). Justice Kennedy has also equated forensic analysts to “copyists” who, in the 19th
century, would create copies of the original records; these copies were relied upon by the
prosecution in order to introduce records into evidence at trial as the originals could not be
taken from the archives. Melendez-Diaz, 557 U.S. at 347. Thus, Justice Kennedy asserts that
“the copyist’s honesty and diligence are just as important as the analyst’s [in Melendez-Diaz].”
Id. Here, Justice Kennedy fails to appreciate the analytical demands of forensic analysts,
analogizing them to mere copyists, as well as the impact of cognitive bias on their work,
especially when (like many laboratories across the nation) the testing laboratory is attached to
a law enforcement entity. See AAFS Workshop, BOARD FORENSIC DOCUMENT EXAMINERS,
https://www.bfde.org/cognitive_bias.html (last visited Apr. 22, 2019) (describing the concept
and impact of cognitive bias in forensic analytical work); see, e.g., About Us, WASH. ST. PATROL,
http://www.wsp.wa.gov/about-us/bureaus/ (last visited Apr. 21, 2019) (“The Crime Laboratory
Division provides forensic science services to local, state, and federal law enforcement agencies
throughout Washington.”).
258 Bullcoming, 564 U.S. at 680 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
259 Melendez-Diaz, 557 U.S. at 330, 332–33 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (discussing who may
be considered an “analyst” under the majority’s confrontation clause interpretation).
255
256
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evidence context.
Take for instance the DNA process, if the Supreme Court were to
adopt a surrogate witness rule (i.e., where a surrogate who has had,
arguably, more connection to the testing process than the surrogate
presented in the Bullcoming case is permitted to testify in lieu of the
performing analyst)260 akin to what is steadily being implemented by
lower courts that would be wholly unacceptable. Specifically,
insulated from reliability testing are all those tasks the surrogate did
not personally observe—extraction, quantification, amplification,
capillary electrophoresis, and (in some cases) interpretation of the
electropherograms (as some courts have held that only the
comparison of DNA profiles is “inculpatory”).261 As has been
previously noted, each of those steps is subject to error; error that will
be shielded from challenge should only the surrogate have to testify.
This is how forensic evidence has become the modern-day Marian
examination. There have been too many instances of flawed,
mistaken, and dishonest forensic analysis to grant just this one
(surrogate) exception to the Confrontation Clause.262
B. A Concern with Formal Process, Not Mere Form
It is no wonder after reading Raleigh’s trial transcript that the
Framers were up in arms about the Marian examination. The
Raleigh court viewed Cobham’s examinations as properly insulated
from cross-examination by Raleigh because of perceived reliability,
formality, and solemnity of the process through which Cobham’s
statements were obtained.263 Apparently, a formal enough process
had taken place before trial in the court’s mind.264 Specifically,
references to the circumstances in which Cobham made his
statements and to whom he made them were frequent during trial.265
It did not matter that one of Cobham’s examinations was unsworn; it
was the process and its perceived formality and solemnity that
insulated Cobham from reliability testing and embraced notions of

See Bullcoming, 564 U.S. at 652–55; id. at 672–73 (Sotomayor, J., concurring in part).
See Brief of Amicus Curiae the Innocence Network, Williams, supra note 29, at 23–24,
29–30, 31; see, e.g., State v. Lui, 315 P.3d 493, 508 (Wash. 2014).
262 See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Chmiel, 173 A.3d 617, 632–33 (Pa. 2017) (Mundy, J.,
dissenting) (discussing the 2012 Department of Justice and Federal Bureau of Investigation
review of microscopic hair examination and widespread flawed forensic testimony in such
cases).
263 See JARDINE, supra note 7, at 409, 415, 417, 421.
264 See id. at 415, 417, 421.
265 See id. at 409, 415, 417, 421.
260
261
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inherent reliability that were at the core of Raleigh’s demise.266 It
was a concern over process, not mere form.
As Justice Thomas constantly reminds, it is those statements that
are sufficiently “formal” or “solemn” that are captured by the
Confrontation Clause.267 Justice Sotomayor has also aptly pointed
out the importance of “formality” to confrontation analysis,
highlighting that the forensic report at issue in Bullcoming was
inherently formal, which “suggest[ed] its evidentiary purpose.”268
Justice Thomas’s “formality and solemnity” approach, however,
unduly focuses on the form or format of documentary evidence sought
to be introduced at trial rather than the process that elicited the
statements in the first place.269 Thus, his approach must be modified
to better align with history. It is worth recalling that historian
Langbein has pointed out that the recording and transcription of the
end results of the Marian examination were merely administrative
matters (i.e., akin to mere form); in other words, the crux of the
Marian examination was the oral examination of witnesses and the
accused (i.e., the process).270 Raleigh’s trial transcript also provides
support that it was the process that was emphasized by the judicial
officers, i.e., the process that obtained Cobham’s statements that was
exceptional in their view, not merely the form of his letters or
statements.271 Indeed, one of Cobham’s examinations was not
sworn.272
That the Framers’ primary concern was about process over mere
form is supported not just by the Raleigh trial transcript, but also by
the Supreme Court’s emphasis—over years of confrontation clause
analysis—on process over form, particularly when it comes to
determining the formality of statements.273 Where Justice Thomas’s

See id. at 409, 415.
See, e.g., Williams v. Illinois, 567 U.S. 50, 103–04 (2012) (Thomas, J., concurring) (quoting
Michigan v. Bryant, 562 U.S. 344, 378 (2011) (Thomas, J., concurring)).
268 Bullcoming v. New Mexico, 564 U.S. 647, 671 (2011) (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
269 See, e.g., Williams, 567 U.S. at 111 (Thomas, J., concurring) (citing Bryant, 562 U.S. at
379) (distinguishing an informal questioning from formalized testimonial materials);
Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305, 329–30 (2009) (Thomas, J., concurring) (citing
White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346, 365 (1992)) (“[M]y position [is] that ‘the Confrontation Clause is
implicated by extrajudicial statements only insofar as they are contained in formalized
testimonial materials.”).
270 See LANGBEIN, supra note 6, at 23–24.
271 See JARDINE, supra note 7, at 415, 417, 421, 427.
272 Id. at 415.
273 See, e.g., Williams, 567 U.S. at 111 (Thomas, J., concurring) (citing Bryant, 562 U.S. at
379) (where Thomas draws upon historical practices of interrogation and finds that the police
questioning in the instant case was not, inter alia, “a formalized dialogue”) (internal citations
omitted).
266
267
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approach is lacking in emphasis on process, a dissenting opinion in
California provides instructive analysis of why process over form
illustrates what statements are formal.274 As Justice Liu of the
California Supreme Court wrote in his dissent in People v. Lopez, “a
careful reading of the Supreme Court’s decisions suggests that the
proper determination of a statement’s formality for purposes of the
confrontation clause is closely intertwined with the nature and
purpose of the process that procured the statement.”275
In analyzing Crawford, Justice Liu found that the Court paid
special attention to the process used to obtain out-of-court
statements; he paid particular close attention to the passage where
Crawford explained that,
[a]n accuser who makes a formal statement to government
officers bears testimony in a sense that a person who makes a
casual remark to an acquaintance does not. The constitutional
text, like the history underlying the common-law right of
confrontation, thus reflects an especially acute concern with a
specific type of out-of-court statement.276
Justice Liu noted that “[w]hile this reference to a ‘type’ of statement
could be read to pertain to the statement’s format, the high court paid
special attention to processes driven by government officers . . . .”277
Justice Liu then examined the importance of process that informed
the Davis decision; there, Justice Liu emphasized that the Supreme
Court compared Michelle McCottry’s 911 call to Sylvia Crawford’s
statements, observing that,
the difference in the level of formality between the two
interviews is striking. Crawford was responding calmly, at the
station house to a series of questions, with the officer-interrogator
taping and making notes of her answers; [here, the declarant’s]
frantic answers were provided over the phone, in an environment
that was not tranquil, or even (as far as any reasonable 911
operator could make out) safe.278
Justice Liu noted that these considerations related to context led
274
275
276
277
278

See People v. Lopez, 286 P.3d 469, 485, 486 (Cal. 2012) (Liu, J., dissenting).
Id. at 486 (emphasis in original).
Id. (citing Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 51 (2004)).
Lopez, 286 P.3d at 486 (emphasis in original).
Lopez, 286 P.3d at 487 (quoting Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 827 (2006)).
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the Court to the application of its “primary purpose” rule and to find
that the purpose of the 911 call was to aid police in an ongoing
emergency.279 Justice Liu concluded, “[a]s these passages from Davis
make clear, the high court focused on the process by which an out-ofcourt statement was generated, not the ultimate format of the
resulting statement.”280
Significantly, Justice Scalia has commented that “[t]he right to
confrontation was not invented in response to the use of the ex parte
examinations in Raleigh’s case. That use provoked such an outcry
precisely because it flouted the deeply rooted common-law tradition
‘of live testimony in court subject to adversarial testing.’”281 Even
Justice Thomas has, on occasion, emphasized process over form; for
example, in Davis, in support of his belief that affidavits, depositions,
prior testimony, and confessions were “formalized testimonial
materials” captured by the Confrontation Clause, he wrote that such
materials “are, by their very nature, taken through a formalized
process. Likewise, confessions, when extracted by police in a formal
manner, carry sufficient indicia of solemnity to constitute formalized
statements . . . .”282
It was, albeit, a formal and, perhaps, solemn substitute process
that produced such disdain for the Marian examination which
outright disregarded the preferred common-law practice. It is
process that best instructs us not only on what is “formal” or
“solemn,” but also what is akin to this “principal evil.”283
III. THE CURRENT CONFRONTATION CLAUSE NARRATIVE AS APPLIED
TO FORENSIC EVIDENCE—THE “CONVENTIONAL WITNESS” RULES TO
THE “WHO KNOWS WHAT” IN WILLIAMS
In part, Justice Kennedy is correct; analysts and the scientific
process are different from the “conventional witnesses” in Crawford,
Davis, and Bryant. For one, analysts and the scientific process are
(setting aside the emotional and distracted analyst who shows up to
work on a bad day) insusceptible to the emotions and motives of the
traditional witness.284
That is, what we have seen in the
See Lopez, 286 P.3d at 487 (citing Davis, 547 U.S. at 828).
Lopez, 286 P.3d at 487.
281 Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305, 315 (citing Crawford, 541 U.S. at 43)
(emphasis in original) (internal citation omitted).
282 Davis, 547 U.S. at 836–37 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (citing Crawford, 541 U.S. at 52)
(emphasis added).
283 See Crawford, 541 U.S. at 50, 51.
279
280

284

See Melendez-Diaz, 557 U.S. at 330 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
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“conventional witness” line of cases is the Court’s exploration of the
motives and purpose of the typical witness and the life events or
circumstances that surrounded the witness at the time of his or her
out-of-court statements to determine whether they are “testimonial”
and subject to confrontation.285 Science, on the other hand, is the
same whether on the outside of the laboratory walls there is an
ongoing emergency or a perfectly calm setting, or whether an
investigation is early on in its course or it is more calculated and
directed toward specific suspects.286 The practices, protocols, and
standards inside the laboratory for processing scientific evidence are
the same in all situations.287 This is why the “conventional witness”
rules—the objective witness rule and the primary purpose rule—as
exemplified by the Court’s ruling in Williams, do not work in the
forensic evidence context.288 Such rules must be abandoned for a
modified version of Justice Thomas’s “formality and solemnity”
approach where process, not mere form is determinative.
A. The Makings of the Primary Purpose and Objective Witness
Rules, the “Conventional Witness” Rules—White, Crawford, and
Davis
At first blush, it may seem that the “conventional witness” rules
were first borne out of Crawford and Davis, but a closer look at the
arguments put forth by the government in White along with Justice
Thomas’s concurrence illuminates what was to come to fruition in
Crawford and Davis.289
At the center of dispute in the White case was the admissibility of
statements made by a four-year-old victim of sexual assault to her
mother and a police officer.290 The government argued the admission
of these statements did not offend the Confrontation Clause,
asserting that because the clause’s purpose was to prevent
prosecuting defendants solely through ex parte affidavits, it was only
those statements that fit such description that must be confronted.291
Such argument was made in an attempt by the government to assert
See id. at 330–31.
See id. at 345–46.
287 See id.
288 See Williams v. Illinois, 567 U.S. 50, 117–18 (2012) (Thomas, J., concurring).
289 See White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346, 364 (1992) (Thomas, J., concurring).
290 See id. at 349–50 (majority opinion).
291 See id. at 352. To be sure, the government also asserted, what aligns with Justice
Thomas’s “formalized testimonial materials,” that affidavits, depositions, prior testimony, and
confessions would be of relevant character such that they should be confronted. Brief for
Respondent at 3, 7–8, White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346 (1992) (No. 90-6113).
285
286
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that confrontation did not apply to statements admitted under
hearsay exceptions.292
The Court responded that if that were to be the rule then
[t]he only situation in which the Confrontation Clause would
apply to such an exception, [the government] argues, would be
those few cases where the statement sought to be admitted
was in the character of an ex parte affidavit, i.e., where the
circumstances surrounding the out-of-court statement’s
utterance suggest that the statement has been made for the
principal purpose of accusing or incriminating the
defendant.293
Such characterization of the government’s proposed rule by the
Court smacks not only of an early version of the Davis primary
purpose rule,294 but of Justice Alito’s accusatory version of the
primary purpose rule that baffled Justice Thomas and the dissenters
in Williams.295
Nonetheless, the White court rejected the
government’s rule as too narrow of a reading of the Confrontation
Clause, focusing primarily on the government’s position that the
clause is governed by the hearsay exceptions.296
In his concurrence, Justice Thomas warned that any attempt to
formalize the government’s proposed rule, i.e., its “principal purpose”
rule, into something more could be problematic.297 “Attempts to draw
a line between statements made in contemplation of legal
proceedings and those not so made would entangle the courts in a
multitude of difficulties.”298 Justice Thomas foretold what was to
come; the “primary purpose” rule now in existence since Davis has,
indeed, entangled the courts in great difficulties.299 Here, too, Justice
Thomas’s “formality and solemnity” requirement is first announced;
that is, “the Confrontation Clause is implicated by extrajudicial
statements only insofar as they are contained in formalized
testimonial materials, such as affidavits, depositions, prior

See White, 502 U.S. at 352.
Id. (emphasis added).
294 See Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 822 (2006).
295 See Williams v. Illinois, 567 U.S. 50, 114 (2012) (Thomas, J., concurring); id. at 135
(Kagan, J., dissenting).
296 See White, 502 U.S. at 352.
297 See id. at 366 (Thomas, J., concurring).
298 Id. at 364.
299 See id. at 358.
292
293
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testimony, or confessions.”300
Next, in Crawford, the Supreme Court introduced the “objective
witness” rule.301 The Crawford opinion was certainly a landmark one
as Justice Scalia rejected the “amorphous notions of ‘reliability’” that
had plagued confrontation clause analysis since Roberts in 1980,
replacing it with a “testimonial” analysis.302 The Court was asked to
determine whether the defendant’s wife, Sylvia Crawford, and her
statements made to police during an interrogation must have been
subject to confrontation.303 In his quest to answer that question,
Justice Scalia conducted two notable analyses. First, in deciphering
the Confrontation Clause’s “witnesses against” language, he defined
both “witness” and “testimony.”304 The Clause “applies to ‘witnesses’
against the accused—in other words, those who ‘bear testimony.’
‘Testimony,’ in turn, is typically ‘[a] solemn declaration or affirmation
made for the purpose of establishing or proving some fact.’”305
Second, although he need not do this for the case at hand, Justice
Scalia created a “core class of ‘testimonial’ statements.”306 It was
clear that Sylvia Crawford’s statements made in the course of a police
interrogation would meet even the narrowest definition of
“testimonial”; however, Justice Scalia still made efforts to start
defining what the limits of “testimonial” might be.307
Justice Scalia’s “core class” of “testimonial” statements included
Justice Thomas’s “formalized testimonial materials,” but it also
included “statements that were made under circumstances which
would lead an objective witness reasonably to believe that the
statement would be available for use at a later trial.”308 Justice Scalia
believed that these formulations shared a “common nucleus”;
arguably, that each was meant to be used prosecutorially or had the
potential to ultimately serve as a substitute for live in-court
testimony.309 In Justice Scalia’s view, statements obtained as an
“obvious substitute for live testimony [and] do precisely what a

Id. at 365.
See Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 52 (2004).
302 See id. at 61–63.
303 See id. at 38.
304 Id. at 51.
305 Id. (internal citations omitted).
306 Id. at 51–52.
307 See id. at 52.
308 Id. at 52 (first quoting White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346, 365 (1992), and then quoting Brief
for National Ass’n of Criminal Defense Lawyers et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner
at 3, Crawford, 541 U.S. 36 (No. 2-9410)).
309 See Crawford, 541 U.S. at 52.
300
301
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witness does on direct examination . . . are inherently testimonial.”310
The infamous “primary purpose” rule first entered the scene in
Davis where the Court was tasked with deciding whether the two
scenarios before it—Michelle McCottry’s frantic 911 call and Amy
Hammon’s controlled interview with police—violated the
Confrontation Clause.311
Justice Scalia found McCottry’s 911 call to be of a different nature
than that of Hammon’s and Sylvia Crawford’s interviews with
police.312 The Court held that “[statements] are testimonial when the
circumstances objectively indicate that there is no . . . ongoing
emergency, and that the primary purpose of the [police] interrogation
is to establish or prove past events potentially relevant to later
criminal prosecution.”313 Although not quite succinctly put by the
Court, at its core, the primary purpose rule inquires: were the out-ofcourt statements intended to serve as “testimony” so defined in
Crawford as “[a] solemn declaration or affirmation made for the
purpose of establishing or proving some fact.”314 This version of the
“primary purpose” rule was only version 1.0, with many more
updates to come.
B. The “Conventional Witness” Rules Evolve—Bryant and Clark
In spite of Justice Scalia’s desire that the “primary purpose” rule
be applied by relying only on the point of view of the declarant,315 the
Bryant court expanded the rule to analyzing the surrounding
circumstances in which the statements were made, including the
intent of others beyond the declarant that are involved, such as the
police in the case that was before the Court.316 In many respects,
Justice Sotomayor’s opinion in Bryant was a blast back to the past
that was Roberts, announcing that the rules of hearsay in identifying
other circumstances (besides an ongoing emergency) and the
Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 830 (2006).
See id. at 817, 819–20.
312 See id. at 828, 829.
313 Id. at 822. Justice Scalia noteed that this holding should not imply “that statements
made in the absence of any interrogation are necessarily nontestimonial. The Framers were
no more willing to exempt from cross-examination volunteered testimony or answers to openended questions than they were to exempt answers to detailed interrogation.” Id. at 822 n.1
(citing Raleigh’s Case (1603) 2 How. St. Tr. 1, 27 (Eng.)) (where a letter presented from Lord
Cobham “was plainly not the result of sustained questioning”).
314 Crawford, 541 U.S. at 51.
315 See Michigan v. Bryant, 562 U.S. 344, 381 (2011) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
316 See id. at 359 (majority opinion); see also Ohio v. Clark, 135 S. Ct. 2173, 2180 (2013)
(“[W]e further expounded on the primary purpose test [in Bryant]. The inquiry, we emphasized,
must consider ‘all of the relevant circumstances.’”) (quoting Bryant, 562 U.S. at 369).
310
311

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3414577

CONFRONTING THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY

2018/2019]

4/29/2019 11:18 AM

Confronting the Twenty-First Century

993

reliability of statements will be relevant to the primary purpose
analysis.317 The primary purpose rule then morphs into an “objective
analysis of the circumstances of an encounter and the statements and
actions of all parties” rule.318 Justice Sotomayor held “the relevant
inquiry is not the subjective or actual purpose of the individuals
involved in a particular encounter, but rather the purpose that
reasonable participants would have had, as ascertained from the
individuals’ statements and actions and the circumstances in which
the encounter occurred.”319
In Bryant, there appeared to be a mixing of the “objective witness”
and “primary purpose” rules, with the primary purpose rule taking
center stage in later jurisprudence.320 Indeed, Justice Scalia himself
appeared to be embracing that blend—in describing how to assess
“the primary purpose of [an] interrogation,” he noted, after referring
to the definition of “testimony,” that for an out-of-court statement to
be testimonial, the declarant “must make the statement with the
understanding that it may be used to invoke the coercive machinery
of the State against the accused.”321 Thus, after Bryant, the definition
of “testimony” and the “objective witness” and “primary purpose”
rules, in the “conventional witness” context, appeared to be
intimately bound up with one another.
In Clark, the High Court’s most recent take on the “conventional
witness” confrontation analysis is presented.322 In that case, the
Court applied its newly evolved standard from Bryant to statements
made by a child to his teachers, breaking the new test down into
factors—reminiscent of Roberts and a lower court’s nine-factor test
that was disregarded in Crawford.323 Justice Alito, writing for the
majority, announced that under the Bryant rule, the primary purpose
test was but one factor in the analysis, adding that another factor is
“the informality of the situation and the interrogation.”324
See Bryant, 562 U.S. at 358–59.
Id. at 360.
319 Id.
320 See id. at 360; see, e.g., Clark, 135 S. Ct. at 2177.
321 See Bryant, 562 U.S. at 381 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting Davis v. Washington, 547
U.S. 813, 822 (2006)) (citing Richard D. Friedman, Crawford and Beyond: Exploring the Future
of the Confrontation Clause in Light of Its Past: Grappling with the Meaning of “Testimonial”,71
BROOK. L. REV. 241, 259 (2005)).
322 See Clark, 135 S. Ct. at 2181.
323 See id.; see also Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 41, 62–63 (2004) (referring to the
Washington Court of Appeals decision in the matter as well as other factor-based tests formerly
applied by lower courts as examples that a reliability inquiry was amorphous).
324 See Clark, 135 S. Ct. at 2180–81 (quoting Bryant, 562 U.S. at 377) (“Thus, the primary
purpose test is a necessary, but not always sufficient, condition for the exclusion of out-of-court
statements under the Confrontation Clause.”).
317
318
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Significantly, here, in the Court’s most recent confrontation clause
opinion, we see, again, an emphasis on process.
It is against this backdrop that we now turn to how the
“conventional witness” rules have been applied in the forensic
evidence context, with Williams as the prime example of the rules’
failings to provide necessary protection to the accused in this “nonconventional” landscape.
C. First Application of the “Conventional Witness” Rules to Forensic
Evidence—Melendez-Diaz325
Justice Thomas’s early-on and then continued warnings about a
“principal” or “primary purpose” rule should have been heeded.326 He
predicted that such a rule would cause the courts to be entangled in
great difficulties; he was correct.327 In addition, as we see in Justice
Kennedy’s dissents in Melendez-Diaz and Bullcoming that then make
way for the plurality (as well as the concurring opinion of Justice
Breyer) in Williams, the rules are not fit for the forensic evidence
context, and when they are applied, it is by way of unpredictable,
open-ended interpretation.328 This, although the Court has taken
great care to point out the unacceptability of open-ended exceptions
to the Confrontation Clause.329
With the application of the
“conventional witness” rules to this “non-conventional” context,
forensic evidence has become the feared open-ended exception to

325 It should be noted that both Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305, 331–32
(2009) and Bullcoming v. New Mexico, 564 U.S. 647 (2011) were decided before Bryant and the
morphing of the primary purpose rule mentioned in Part III B.
326 See Williams v. Illinois, 567 U.S. 50, 114, 115 (2012) (Thomas, J., concurring) (expressing
the difficulty in applying the primary purpose rule and the lack of historical support for the
newer version of that rule adopted by the plurality); Bryant, 562 U.S. at 378–79 (Thomas, J.
concurring) (quoting Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 838–39 (2006)) (“I have criticized the
primary-purpose test as ‘an exercise in fiction’ that is ‘disconnected from history’ and ‘yields no
predictable results.’”); Davis, 547 U.S. at 838, 839 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part) (quoting New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 656 (1984)) (“Assigning one of
these two ‘largely unverifiable motives,’ primacy requires constructing a hierarchy of purpose
that will rarely be present—and is not reliably discernible. It will inevitably be, quite simply,
an exercise in fiction.”).
327 See Williams, 567 U.S. at 114 (Thomas, J., concurring) (citing Davis, 547 U.S. at 839);
Davis, 547 U.S. at 834 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
328 See generally Williams, 567 U.S. at 57–58, 86–102 (Breyer, J., concurring); Bullcoming,
564 U.S. at 674–84 (Kennedy, J., dissenting); Melendez-Diaz, 557 U.S. at 331–32, 343, 357
(Kennedy, J., dissenting) (arguing the confrontation rules from Crawford and Davis should not
apply, but then, essentially, asserts that forensic evidence should fall outside the Clause’s
reach).
329 See Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 54 (2004) (“The text of the Sixth Amendment
does not suggest any open-ended exceptions from the confrontation requirement to be developed
by the courts.”).
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confrontation.
The first application of these rules in the forensic evidence context
occurred in Melendez-Diaz. There, the Court was tasked with
deciding whether certificates of analysis concluding that a tested
substance was, indeed, a controlled substance, i.e., cocaine, could be
admitted without live testimony by the analysts who wrote the
certificates.330 The Court determined that, without live testimony,
the admission of the certificates of analysis violated the
Confrontation Clause.331 Justice Scalia found “little doubt” that the
certificates fell within the “core class of testimonial statements,”
where affidavits was mentioned twice.332 He noted that certificates
were “incontrovertibly” testimony and were “functionally identical to
live, in-court testimony, doing ‘precisely what a witness does on direct
examination.’”333
Despite having already found the certificates to be “affidavits”
(and, therefore, safely a part of the protected “core class of testimonial
statements”), Justice Scalia went on to find that the objective witness
and primary purpose rules were met.334 Specifically, he noted that
not only were the certificates “made under circumstances which
would lead an objective witness reasonably to believe that the
statement would be available for use at a later trial,” but also under
the state law at issue their sole purpose was to provide prima facie
evidence relevant to the analyzed substance.335 “We can safely
assume that the analysts were aware of the affidavits’ evidentiary
purpose,” Scalia remarked, as the relevant state law was reprinted
on the certificates.336 Unsurprisingly, Justice Thomas would have
stopped the analysis much sooner, joining the opinion only because
the certificates were “plainly affidavits.”337
Nevertheless, the majority in Melendez-Diaz did clarify that it did
not anticipate every witness who had touched the evidence must be
called to testify.338 Specifically, as explained in a footnote and in an
attempt to answer the what or who is an “analyst” question, the Court
briefly commented “we do not hold, and it is not the case, that anyone
whose testimony may be relevant in establishing the chain of

330
331
332
333
334
335
336
337
338

See Melendez-Diaz, 557 U.S. at 308–09.
See id. at 310–11.
See id. at 310.
Id. at 310–11 (quoting Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 830 (2006)).
See id. at 311.
Id. at 311 (quoting Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 52 (2004)).
Id. at 311.
See id. at 330 (Thomas, J., concurring).
See id. at 311 n.1 (majority opinion).
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custody, authenticity of the sample, or accuracy of the testing device,
must appear in person as part of the prosecution’s case.”339 There,
the Court also added that “documents prepared in the regular course
of equipment maintenance may well qualify as nontestimonial
records.”340 This note has become popularly cited among the states,
particularly in the wake of Williams.341
Although the majority opinion in Melendez-Diaz interpreted the
Confrontation Clause such that sufficient protection may be provided
in other similarly situated cases where forensic reports, in their
format, replicated affidavits, its unnecessary application of the
“conventional witness” rules left much to be desired.342 There was no
clarification on how the “objective witness” or “primary purpose” rule
should be applied in instances where a forensic report, such as the
one before it that was virtually identical to an affidavit, was not
admitted, but expert testimony ensued.343
Meanwhile, the dissent in Melendez-Diaz laid out what was to
become an initial version of the Williams plurality, supporting a
forensic evidence exception to the Confrontation Clause by advancing
notions of “amorphous reliability,” i.e., that science is different and
inherently reliable unlike the “conventional witness.”344 This, too, is
where Justice Kennedy asked one of those attendant questions of the
forensic evidence confrontation inquiry (still out there waiting to be
answered by the Court); who or what is an analyst?345 Justice
Kennedy then proceeded down the slipperiest of slopes where he
suggested that even chain of custody witnesses may be swept into the
Clause’s reach under the majority’s rule.346
In his dissent, he also referenced what was, perhaps, the Court’s
earliest version of the surrogate witness—the laboratory director
who, Kennedy asserted, “is arguably the most effective person to
confront . . . .”347 Justice Kennedy recommended other mechanisms,
beyond the Confrontation Clause, that would be, in his view, more
appropriate for challenging forensic evidence, such as retesting by
the defense, the state’s burden to prove the case beyond a reasonable

Id.
Id.
341 This point will be further explored in Part IV where some of the most common lower court
approaches to forensic evidence confrontation are analyzed.
342 See Melendez-Diaz, 557 U.S. at 322–23.
343 See id. at 311.
344 See Melendez-Diaz, 557 U.S. at 343–52 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
345 See id. at 333–34.
346 See id. at 335–36.
347 See id. at 334.
339
340
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doubt, and the evidence rules.348 Regardless of how misguided the
dissent was to presume confrontation would not or is not necessary
to test the reliability of forensic evidence, it was on point when it
accused the majority of “wooden application” of the Crawford and
Davis rules.349 “There is nothing predictable here . . . other than
uncertainty and disruption that now must ensue.”350 There was quite
clearly two, perhaps three camps, forming—one that believed the
“conventional witness” rules could be bootstrapped to forensic
evidence confrontation analysis; another that believed forensic
evidence was excepted from confrontation; and, then, Justice Thomas
and his “formality and solemnity” requirement.351
D. No Surrogates (at Least Not the Razatos Kind) Allowed—
Bullcoming
Two years later, the Court had before it a live witness with a report,
just not the proper witness. In Bullcoming, the state sought to admit
a blood test report through testifying analyst Razatos who worked in
the same laboratory as the performing analyst, Caylor, and was
aware of the testing laboratory’s protocols.352 There was not much
known about Caylor other than he had been placed on unpaid leave
for an undisclosed reason.353 Justice Ginsburg, writing for the Court,
rejected Razatos as an appropriate surrogate, finding “surrogate
testimony of the kind Razatos was equipped to give could not convey
what Caylor knew or observed about the events his certification
concerned, i.e., the particular test and testing process he employed.
Nor could such surrogate testimony expose any lapses or lies on the
certifying analyst’s part.”354
Critically, Justice Ginsburg also held that despite the unsworn
blood test report, “the formalities attending the ‘report of blood
alcohol analysis’ [were] more than adequate to qualify Caylor’s
assertions as testimonial.”355 Notably, Justice Ginsburg makes what
the author believes to be an initial attempt to describe science as
348 See id. at 338, 339–40 (first citing United States v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422, 446
(1978); and then citing Holms v. South Caroline, 547 U.S. 319, 331 (2006)).
349 See Melendez-Diaz, 557 U.S. at 337.
350 Id.
351 See id. at 315, 323; id. at 329 (Thomas, J., concurring) (quoting White v. Illinois, 502 U.S.
346, 365 (1992) (Thomas, J., concurring in part)).
352 See Bullcoming v. New Mexico, 564 U.S. 647, 651, 655 (2011).
353 See id. at 659.
354 Id. at 661–62.
355 Id. at 665; see also Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 52 (2004) (“[T]he absence of
oath was not dispositive”).
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formal; she wrote “[l]ike the Melendez-Diaz certificates, Caylor’s
certificate is ‘formalized’ in a signed document, headed a ‘report.’
Noteworthy as well, the SLD report form contains a legend referring
to municipal and magistrate courts’ rules that provide for the
admission of certified blood-alcohol analyses.”356 Recall, also, that in
the Melendez-Diaz certificates the applicable state law was recited on
the report.357
Significantly, most of the footholds for future (now present)
discourse about who might be an appropriate surrogate witness in
the forensic evidence context can be found in Justice Sotomayor’s
concurring opinion in Bullcoming.358 Many states have relied upon
Justice Sotomayor’s examples of what might make for a good
surrogate witness.359 In her concurrence, Justice Sotomayor lays out
four examples of cases Bullcoming was not; three of those examples
are most relevant to this discussion.360 First, subject of much lower
court exploration is Justice Sotomayor’s note that this was not a case
where “the person testifying is a supervisor, reviewer, or someone
else with a personal, albeit limited, connection to the scientific test at
issue.”361 Justice Sotomayor suggested that the Bullcoming case
would have been different in her eyes if “a supervisor who observed
an analyst conducting a test” was the surrogate witness; however,
she did not expand upon what level of involvement would suffice since
Razatos had played no role at all.362
Next, Justice Sotomayor highlighted that this was not a case where
“an expert witness was asked for his independent opinion about
underlying testimonial reports that were not themselves
admitted . . . .”363 One year later, in Williams, the plurality
highlighted this portion of Justice Sotomayor’s concurrence in
Bullcoming, suggesting that the Williams fact pattern presented
such a case.364 Finally, Justice Sotomayor found that this was not a
356 See Bullcoming, 546 U.S. at 665 (quoting Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 837 n.2
(2006) (Thomas, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part)).
357 See Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305, 311 (2009).
358 See Bullcoming, 546 U.S. at 668–74 (Sotomayor, J., concurring in part).
359 See, e.g., Marshall v. People, 2013 CO 51, ¶ 17; State v. Watson, 185 A.3d 845, 857–58
(N.H. 2018); State v. Michaels, 95 A.3d 648, 662 (N.J. 2014); State v. Lopez, 45 A.3d 1, 13 (R.I.
2012).
360 See Bullcoming, 546 U.S. at 672–74 (Sotomayor, J., concurring in part).
361 Id. at 672.
362 Id. at 673.
363 Id. (citing FED. R. EVID. 703).
364 See Williams v. Illinois, 567 U.S. 50, 67 (2012).

In concurrence, Justice Sotomayor highlighted the importance of the fact that the forensic
report had been admitted into evidence for the purpose of proving the truth of the matter
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case “in which the State introduced only machine-generated results,
such as a printout from a gas chromatograph.”365 Thus, she indicated
that the Court did not need to find whether raw data in conjunction
with expert testimony (via a surrogate witness) was appropriate.366
In his Bullcoming dissent, Justice Kennedy expanded upon what
he had previously stated in his Melendez-Diaz dissent.367 One
fundamental flaw in his dissent was when Justice Kennedy relied
upon the record that “the certifying analyst’s role here was no greater
than that of anyone else in the chain of custody.”368 For support, he
cited to trial testimony that “once the material is prepared and placed
into the machine, you don’t need any particular expertise to record
the results” and found Caylor (the certifying analyst) to be
comparable to a mere chain of custody witness.369 That is simply not
the case.
In Part I of this article, blood testing and its procedures are
summarized based on the very briefing that was before the Court in
Bullcoming.370 After the machine produces results, the GC graphs
must necessarily be reviewed and judgment calls made as to any
unknown peaks or co-elution (or the lack thereof).371 In addition, as
Justice Ginsburg relays in footnote eight of the opinion, “[a]t
Bullcoming’s trial, Razatos acknowledged that ‘you don’t know unless
you actually observe the analysis that someone else conducts,
whether they followed th[e] protocol in every instance.’”372
Another problematic component to Justice Kennedy’s dissent was
his willingness to judge science as reliable without more process,
referring to the lab report as impartial and the product of
“experienced technicians in laboratories that follow professional

it asserted. She emphasized that “this [was] not a case in which an expert witness was
asked for his independent opinion about underlying testimonial reports that were not
themselves admitted into evidence.”
Id. (quoting Bullcoming, 564 U.S. at 673 (Sotomayor, J., concurring in part)). “We would face
a different question,” she observed, “if asked to determine the constitutionality of allowing an
expert witness to discuss others’ testimonial statements if the testimonial statements were not
themselves admitted as evidence.” See Bullcoming, 564 U.S. at 673. “We now confront that
question.” See Williams, 567 U.S. at 67.
365 See Bullcoming, 564 U.S. at 673.
366 See id. at 674.
367 See id. at 674–75 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (citing Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557
U.S. 305, 330–32 (2009) (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
368 See Bullcoming, 564 U.S. at 676.
369 See id.
370 See supra Part I.
371 See supra text accompanying notes 169–73.
372 See Bullcoming, 564 U.S. at 662 n.8 (alteration in original).
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norms and scientific protocols.”373 This is frightfully reminiscent of
Sir Walter Raleigh’s trial transcript where judicial officers Popham,
Warbuton, and the Attorney General spoke highly of the process that
had already occurred prior to trial.374 And it is notable because in
just one year’s time, Justice Kennedy found himself in good company
with Justice Alito and the plurality in Williams where application of
the “conventional witness” rules aligned with much of Justice
Kennedy’s Melendez-Diaz and Bullcoming dissents.375
However, Justice Kennedy correctly continued to point out that the
wooden application of rules from Crawford and Davis would not hold,
noting “[t]he persistent ambiguities in the Court’s approach [were]
symptomatic of a rule not amenable to sensible applications.”376 The
groundwork had been laid in Melendez-Diaz and Bullcoming for the
want of an approach that would fit the forensic evidence context, but
instead we received a fractured, convoluted opinion from the High
Court in Williams.
E. The Need to Abandon the “Conventional Witness” Rules in the
Forensic Evidence Context—Williams
The truest part of the Williams opinion was, quite possibly, Justice
Kagan’s foretelling in her dissent: “What comes out of four Justices’
desire to limit Melendez-Diaz and Bullcoming in whatever way
possible, combined with one Justice’s one-justice view of those
holdings, is—to be frank—who knows what.”377 Indeed, Justice
Kagan referred to Justice Alito’s opinion as the “plurality” for
tradition’s sake, but for no other reason.378 “Five Justices specifically
reject every aspect of its reasoning and every paragraph of its
explication.”379
As previously noted, Williams involved a case where an outside
laboratory, Cellmark, generated a DNA profile for key crime scene
evidence, i.e., the vaginal swabs of a rape victim.380 Thereafter, the
state crime laboratory analyst compared that profile with a sample
See id. at 681 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
See JARDINE, supra note 7, at 417–18, 421, 422, 427.
375 See Williams v. Illinois, 567 U.S. 50, 57–58, 66, 88–89 (2012) (first quoting MelendezDiaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305, 330 (2009) (Kennedy, J., dissenting); and then quoting
Bullcoming, 564 U.S. at 674–75 (Kennedy, J., dissenting)) (citing Bullcoming, 564 U.S. at 679–
80 (Kennedy, J., dissenting)).
376 See Bullcoming, 564 U.S. at 679 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
377 See Williams, 567 U.S. at 141 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
378 See id. at 120.
379 See id.
380 See id. at 61 (plurality opinion).
373
374
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DNA profile belonging to the defendant.381 Ultimately, she testified
that the profiles matched.382 Problematically, no analyst from
Cellmark testified about the generation of the profile from the rape
kit evidence.383 Instead, the testifying analyst (from the state crime
laboratory) relied upon the Cellmark profile and presumed it reliable
based on her prior experience with Cellmark.384 This analyst did not
perform or observe the Cellmark testing nor did she review the raw
data generated from the testing.385
Justice Alito, writing for the plurality, suggested two ways in
which the insulation of the Cellmark DNA profile (not generated by
the surrogate witness or even done so in her laboratory) was
acceptable.386 First that the Cellmark DNA profile was not used to
prove the truth of the matter it asserted, but rather for the surrogate
expert’s opinion.387 Justice Alito’s analysis bore striking resemblance
to the days of “firmly rooted exceptions” of the hearsay rule as the
guidepost for confrontation analysis that was Roberts and uprooted
by Justice Scalia eight years earlier in Crawford.388 The five other
justices (Justice Thomas in his concurrence in judgment and the
dissenters) made quick haste with this open-ended exception to the
Confrontation Clause, asserting that it would be hard to imagine an
instance where information supporting an expert’s opinion would not
also have to be true for such opinion to be proper.389 Justice Thomas
remarked, “[t]here is no meaningful distinction between disclosing an
out-of-court statement so that the factfinder may evaluate the
expert’s opinion and disclosing that statement for its truth.”390
Sensing that the “it was not offered for its truth” argument may
not prove to be convincing, Justice Alito provided a second rationale
for his decision that the Cellmark DNA profile was not
“testimonial.”391 Critically, it is this analysis and Alito’s application
of the “conventional witness” rules in the forensic evidence setting
that demonstrated the extreme malleability of such rules. Justice
Alito professed that the primary purpose of the Cellmark DNA profile

381
382
383
384
385
386
387
388
389
390
391

See id.
See id. at 77.
See id. at 88 (Breyer, J., concurring); id. at 119–20 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
See id. at 60–61, 62 (plurality opinion).
See id. at 62.
See id. at 57–58.
See id. at 58.
See id. at 120–21 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
See id. at 120; id. at 106 (Thomas, J., concurring).
Id. at 106 (Thomas, J., concurring).
See id. at 81–82, 84 (plurality opinion).
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was to “catch a dangerous rapist who was still at large, not to obtain
evidence for use against petitioner, who was neither in custody nor
under suspicion at that time.”392 Justice Alito also implicitly cited to
the “objective witness” rule in finding, through the perspective of the
Cellmark analysts (and other analysts who prepare DNA profiles),
they would have “no way of knowing whether [the profile] will turn
out to be incriminating or exonerating—or both.”393 Of course, this
“new” version of the primary purpose rule was met with aghast by
the five other justices.394
That four justices could go so far afield from past precedents should
and did give the Court pause. The “conventional witness” rules
should not be copied and pasted over into the forensic evidence
context. Science, as Justice Kennedy has reminded us on occasion, is
different.395 If left to an approach Justice Breyer had on his mind in
Williams with regard to DNA reports,396 the constitutional guarantee
of confrontation in the Twenty-First century and beyond is in real
trouble. There is urgent need for a new workable rule that provides
the necessary guarantees of testing in the crucible with regard to
forensic evidence. The lower courts that see this kind of evidence far
more frequently require guidance from the High Court now. What
came of Williams at the state level is in line with Justice Kagan’s
“who knows what” prediction.
IV. THE PATH OF MUCH CONFUSION AND ARBITRARINESS: LOWER
COURTS FERRYING IN THE UNMANAGEABLE WAKE OF WILLIAMS
Words like “muddled” and “abyss” have been used by the lower
courts to describe the state of the Supreme Court’s confrontation
clause doctrine in the forensic evidence context.397 One unlucky lower
court heard a case that was actually pending throughout the
trifecta—Melendez-Diaz, Bullcoming, and Williams—and each time

Id. at 84.
See id. at 85.
394 See id. at 113–14 (Thomas, J., concurring) (quoting Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813,
822 (2006)) (first citing Michigan v. Bryant, 562 U.S. 344, 380–81 (2011) (Scalia, J., dissenting);
then citing Davis, 547 U.S. at 838–42 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part);
and then citing Bryant, 562 U.S. at 378 (Thomas, J., concurring)); id. at 135 (Kagan, J.,
dissenting).
395 See Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305, 345 (2009) (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
396 See Williams v. Illinois, 567 U.S. 50, 93 (2012) (Breyer, J., concurring).
397 See People v. Lopez, 286 P.3d 469, 483 (Cal. 2012) (Liu, J., dissenting) (citing Williams,
567 U.S. 50); People v. John, 52 N.E.3d 1114, 1128 (N.Y. 2016) (Garcia, J., dissenting) (first
citing Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004); then citing Melendez-Diaz, 557 U.S. 305;
and then citing Bullcoming v. New Mexico, 564 U.S. 647 (2011)).
392
393
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was asked to analyze the case per the Supreme Court’s decision.398
That court rightfully exclaimed that “[m]aking sense out of the case
law in this area is to some extent an exercise in ‘tasseomancy.’”399
A comprehensive review of cases in lower courts across the nation
reveals there are three common approaches to confrontation in the
forensic evidence context that have emerged in the wake of Williams.
First, some courts have applied some version of the “primary
purpose” rule, whether that be the Davis (i.e., pre-Williams),
Williams, or Clark version of this ever-evolving rule coupled with
some analysis of Justice Thomas’s “formality and solemnity”
approach.400 Second, some courts have adopted an accusatory-like
primary purpose rule (following closely in the footsteps of Alito’s
modified primary purpose rule in Williams), such as the state of
Washington which has created an “inculpatory” test.401 Finally, a
third, and perhaps most prominent, approach is for lower courts to
rely on Bullcoming (in particular Justice Sotomayor’s concurrence) to
find that the surrogate witness before the court is not the improper
Bullcoming surrogate.402 Critically, each of these approaches allow
for insulation of the performing analyst and the work preceding the
end results, and, in some cases, could permit future insulation of the
end results themselves when there is a misunderstanding of science.
A. The Many Shades of the Primary Purpose Rule Plus Formality
and Solemnity
Some courts, after having found that Williams had no precedential
value, have decided to apply the pre-Williams version of the primary
purpose rule.403 Others have either adopted some version of the
Williams primary purpose rule along with Thomas’s “formality and
solemnity” approach or have set out to predict what at least five
justices of the High Court would agree upon as a confrontation rule
See People v. Barba, 155 Cal. Rptr. 3d 707, 711 (Ct. App. 2013).
See id. at 728. The court was referring to both the Supreme Court’s and its own
precedent. See id. at 728–30.
400 See, e.g., People v. Barba, 155 Cal. Rptr. 3d 707, 723–27 (Ct. App. 2013); People v. Lopez,
286 P.3d 469, 476–79 (Cal. 2012); People v. Holmes, 150 Cal. Rptr. 3d 914, 919 (Ct. App. 2012);
Jenkins v. United States, 75 A.3d 174, 189–91 (D.C. 2013); State v. Norton, 117 A.3d 1055,
1073–74 (Md. 2015); State v. Mattox, 2017 WI 9, ¶¶ 26–27, 30, 373 Wis. 2d 122, 890 N.W.2d
256; Anderson v. State, 2014 WY 13, ¶¶ 37–41, 317 P.3d 1108, 1121 (Wyo. 2014) (quoting State
v. Medina, 306 P.3d 48, 63 (Ariz. 2013)).
401 See State v. Lui, 315 P.3d 493, 499, 506–07, 508 (Wash. 2014).
402 See, e.g., Ex parte Ware, 181 So. 3d 409, 416–17 (Ala. 2014); Marshall v. People, 2013 CO
51, ¶¶ 17–20; State v. Watson, 185 A.3d 845, 857–58 (N.H. 2018); Paredes v. State, 462 S.W.3d
510, 517–18 (Tex. Crim. App. 2015).
403 See Jenkins, 75 A.3d at 189.
398
399
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in light of Williams.404 Still, others have not been as direct in
accepting Williams and instead have developed a similar two-part
primary purpose and formality test.405 Finally, in light of the
Supreme Court’s most recent confrontation opinion, at least one court
has adopted a Clark primary purpose approach in the forensic
evidence context.406
First, in Jenkins, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals
concluded that “Williams produce[d] no new rule of law that [it] could
apply . . .” and proceeded to employ the pre-Williams primary purpose
rule.407 The court held that serology and DNA testing in that case
were testimonial because the testing was “conducted for the primary
purpose of establishing some fact relevant to a later criminal
prosecution: the identity of the [victim’s] killer.”408 Unfortunately,
resorting to the pre-Williams primary purpose rule is what led to the
fractured Williams opinion in the first instance. As both Justices
Kennedy and Thomas have recognized, continued “wooden
application” of the “conventional witness” rules will result in great
difficulties for courts in the future.409 This is particularly true when
we look to the result in Williams where the High Court was split in
the application of these rules.410
Next, in Norton, the Maryland Court of Appeals, after taking the
opportunity to further refine its approach, adopted both the plurality
and Thomas’s concurring opinions in Williams.411 Specifically, the
court subjected a DNA report to two inquiries—first, whether the
report was sufficiently formal and, second, whether the primary
purpose of the report was to accuse a targeted individual.412 The
court embraced a “if not this, then maybe that” approach by finding
“[s]hould there be a determination that the document in issue was
not formal, the next inquest would be” Alito’s modified primary
purpose rule. This approach is also problematic in that the court
(much like Justice Thomas) focused solely on the formality of the

404

74.

See People v. Barba, 155 Cal. Rptr. 3d 707, 730 (Ct. App. 2013); Norton, 117 A.3d at 1073–

See Lopez, 286 P.3d at 476–79.
State v. Mattox, 2017 WI 9, ¶ 32, 373 Wis. 2d 122, 890 N.W.2d 256.
407 Jenkins, 75 A.3d at 189.
408 Id. at 191.
409 See Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305, 337 (2009) (Kennedy, J.,
dissenting); White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346, 364 (1992) (Thomas, J., concurring in part).
410 See Williams v. Illinois, 567 U.S. 50, 82–85 (2012) (plurality opinion); id. at 134–38
(Kagan, J., dissenting).
411 State v. Norton, 117 A.3d 1055, 1073 (Md. 2015).
412 Id. at 1073–74.
405
406
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form of the report, and not the process of the scientific testing,413 and
because Alito’s primary purpose rule requires that a suspect already
be identified at the time of testing even though the test will very
likely be used at a later criminal prosecution.414
Next, at least one court of appeal in California has applied
Williams by deciding that at least five justices would agree with its
confrontation analysis in the instant case because neither Justice
Alito’s primary purpose rule nor Justice Thomas’s “formality and
solemnity” requirement had been met.415 In Barba, a case that was
sent back to California on three separate occasions as it had the
fortune of pending throughout the Melendez-Diaz, Bullcoming, and
Williams opinions, the court conducted a comprehensive review of its
own cases as well as the Supreme Court’s opinions.416 Ultimately,
the court decided that based on direction from its precedence, it “must
determine whether there was a confrontation clause violation under
Justice Thomas’s opinion and whether there was [such] a . . .
violation under the plurality’s opinion [in Williams].”417 The court
also added to its mix that, again, based on its own precedence,
Williams did not stand for the proposition that if a suspect had
already been identified or was targeted, then the confrontation clause
did not apply; instead, “that narrow language [of Williams] actually
serves as the jumping-off point for a broader interpretation.”418 The
Barba court held there was no confrontation violation where Justice
Thomas would approve that the DNA reports lacked the required
“formality and solemnity” and the plurality would agree because the
DNA reports’ primary purpose was not to accuse a targeted
individual.419 Further, the court also delved into surrogate analysis
in finding that the witness who ultimately testified was the accuser

413 See supra Part II, section B regarding the need to focus on process over mere form
under Justice Thomas’s “formality and solemnity” approach.
414 Although the Norton court found the forensic evidence to be “testimonial” under this
approach, the approach itself is arbitrary and unpredictable as the next court could apply the
same rules and reach a different conclusion. See Norton, 117 A.3d at 1074. The Norton court
is all but an example of this as evidenced when it cited to its “Derr II” opinion that led it to
take the instant case to further refine the approach it utilized in that case. See id. (citing
Derr v. State, 73 A.3d 254, 272 (Md. 2013) (noting that Derr II was decided correctly as, in
addition to not being admissible under Justice Thomas’s approach, the Derr II evidence would
not have met Justice Alito’s rule).
415 See People v. Barba, 155 Cal. Rptr. 3d 707, 730 (Ct. App. 2013).
416 See generally Barba, 155 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 711, 714–723 (noting that the Supreme Court
has remanded this case back to the California Court of Appeals three times and expansively
reviewed California’s and the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence on this issue).
417 Id. at 723–24 (quoting People v. Dungo, 286 P.3d 442, 456 (Cal. 2012)).
418 See Barba, 155 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 727.
419 See id. at 730.
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and she was subject to rigorous cross-examination.420 The court held,
“[s]o long as a qualified expert who is subject to cross-examination
conveys an independent opinion about the test results, then evidence
about the DNA tests themselves is admissible.”421 In addition to
those problems already outlined regarding Alito’s and Thomas’s tests
in Williams, this last finding by the court further insulates from
reliability testing the performing analyst and his or her work earlier
on in the scientific process.
Just four months earlier than the Barba opinion, the California
Supreme Court, in Lopez, articulated a slightly different approach by
focusing on three different versions of the primary purpose rule, but
ultimately deciding that the “formality and solemnity” requirement
carried the day in the case.422 The Lopez court highlighted that the
primary purpose inquiry was a complex one, explaining that there
are at least three different versions of that rule: (1) a primary purpose
of accusing a targeted individual, (2) a primary purpose of
establishing some fact with the understanding that the statements
may be used in a later prosecution, and (3) a primary purpose of
establishing past facts potentially relevant to later prosecution.423
Ultimately, the court was able to do an end-round of the primary
purpose conundrum and simply held that the documentary evidence
at issue was “not made with the requisite degree of formality or
solemnity to be considered testimony.”424 Here, too, this “formality
and solemnity” approach is plagued with an over-emphasis on the
mere form of the scientific report or document rather than the
scientific process itself.
Finally, within this category of approaches the Wisconsin
Supreme Court has applied the High Court’s most recent
confrontation case, Clark, to the forensic evidence context. In Mattox,
the court held that a toxicology report relied upon by a medical
examiner to determine cause of death was not testimonial.425 After
finding that Williams had no precedential value, the Mattox court
found that the Clark case informed its review as Clark “reaffirm[ed]
the primary purpose test: the dispositive ‘question is whether, in light
See id. at 718, 730–31.
Id. at 730. Notably, this is akin to the third (perhaps most dominant) lower court
approach, infra, where courts have applied Justice Sotomayor’s surrogate analysis from her
concurrence in Bullcoming. See Bullcoming v. New Mexico, 564 U.S. 647, 672–73 (2011)
(Sotomayor, J., concurring in part).
422 People v. Lopez, 286 P.3d 469, 477 (Cal. 2012).
423 Id.
424 Id.
425 State v. Mattox, 2017 WI 9, ¶ 41, 373 Wis.2d 122, 890 N.W.2d 256.
420
421
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of all the circumstances, viewed objectively, the “primary purpose” of
the [out-of-court statement] was to creat[e] an out-of-court substitute
for trial testimony.’”426 The court used four factors outlined in Clark,
including the “formality/informality of the situation producing the
out-of-court statement,” focusing on whether the statements were
given to law enforcement or not.427 Although the first factor, the
“formality/informality” inquiry, does suggest an interest in the
process of how the evidence was obtained, it was simplistically
applied in Mattox where the court noted that the report was not
prepared for or provided to law enforcement.428 Most problematic
was the court’s analysis of whether the intention of the report was to
serve as a substitute for in-court testimony; the focus was on the
front-end, i.e., at the time of the creation of the report, rather than
what the prosecution’s intention in using such evidence was at the
criminal trial.429 Although the report may have only been intended
to assist the medical examiner in determining cause of death at the
time of its creation, it was ultimately used to help convict the
defendant. Science and its process should not be insulated from the
crucible of cross-examination based on a rule at risk of such arbitrary
application.
B. Following the Footsteps of Justice Alito—an Accusatory or
Inculpatory Test
In Washington, the state supreme court, after determining that the
case before it was unlike Williams, struck out on its own to define the
Confrontation Clause’s phrase “witnesses against.”430 In Lui, a
supervisor, who had not performed or observed the underlying DNA
testing, was permitted to testify from the DNA reports of two
subordinate analysts at trial in lieu of such analysts testifying. 431
The court noted that “a majority of the [Supreme] Court has never
agreed on a test for expert witnesses, making it very difficult for
courts to effectively follow.”432 It then laid out a new rule.433
Specifically, the Lui court held that a reading of the words

426 Id. at ¶ 32 (quoting Michigan v. Bryant, 562 U.S. 344, 358 (2011)) (citing Ohio v. Clark,
135 S. Ct.2173, 2180 (2015)).
427 Mattox, 2017 WI 9, ¶ 32 (citing Clark, 135 S. Ct. at 2180–82).
428 Mattox, 2017 WI 9, ¶ 33.
429 See id.
430 See State v. Lui, 315 P.3d 493, 503–04 (Wash. 2014).
431 See id. at 497.
432 Id. at 503.
433 See id. at 503–05.
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“witness” and “against” together “in the context of Supreme Court
hints and the reasoned practices of other jurisdictions” gave way to a
workable rule: “If the declarant makes a factual statement to the
tribunal, then he or she is a witness. If the witness’s statements help
to identify or inculpate the defendant, then the witness is a ‘witness
against’ the defendant.”434 This approach, of course, disregards still
valid precedent in Melendez-Diaz and Bullcoming where the
Supreme Court struck down arguments that evidence had to be
inculpatory or accusatory before it could be subject to
confrontation.435
Perhaps more problematic was the Lui court’s demonstrated
misunderstanding of DNA science.436 The court claimed that human
decision-making did not enter the DNA testing process until the very
last stage where electropherograms are interpreted.437 As made clear
in Part I, nothing could be further from the truth; analysts have to
make important judgment calls throughout the entire process and, in
fact, the author knows of several analysts who would adamantly
object to the court’s belittling of their role in the process.438
What is possibly worse, however, is that the Lui court goes on to
say that even at that point the Confrontation Clause does not
attach.439 “The necessary inculpatory element enters the equation
once an expert compares the DNA profiles.”440 The court believed
that an allele table did not inculpate or identify anyone and would
not have any particular meaning to a non-expert, referring to it as,
in the surrogate expert’s words, “gobbledygook.”441 The dissent
forcefully challenged this, asserting that the creation of the allele
table from the raw data, i.e., the interpretation of the raw data, was

Id. at 504–05.
See Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305, 313–14 (2009) (citing Kirby v. United
States, 174 U.S. 47, 53, 55 (1899)); Bullcoming v. New Mexico, 564 U.S. 647, 665 (2011); see
also Williams v. Illinois, 567 U.S. 50, 117 (Thomas, J., concurring) (quoting Melendez-Diaz, 557
U.S. at 313) (“[W]e previously rejected the view that a witness is not subject to confrontation if
his testimony is ‘inculpatory only when taken together with other evidence.’”); Williams, 557
U.S. at 138 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (citing Melendez-Diaz, 557 U.S. at 317–18) (“And MelendezDiaz made yet a more fundamental point in response to claims of . . . reliability of scientific
evidence: It is not up to us to decide . . . what evidence is trustworthy and what is not.”).
436 See Lui, 315 P.3d at 507; Brief of Amicus Curie the Innocence Network, Williams, supra
note 29, at 15; supra Part I.C.2.
437 Lui, 315 P.3d at 507 (“Only here does any element of human decision-making enter the
process; an expert must translate the peaks and valleys of the electropherogram into a DNA
profile.”).
438 See supra Part I.C.2.
439 See Lui, 315 P.3d at 508.
440 Id.
441 Id.
434
435
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inculpatory.442
[T]he graphic Pineda referred to was prepared as a visual aid
for trial, and it is both readable and meaningful to a
layperson. The graphic Pineda referred to on the stand takes
the familiar form of a chart. Each column displays a source of
DNA, and each line shows a potential for a genetic match. The
more matches between a suspect and a sample, the greater
the likelihood that the sample contains the suspect’s DNA.
While expertise is necessary to calculate precisely how
probative any given result is in terms of probability, anyone
can see that there are far more matches between the samples
and Lui’s DNA than any other potential suspect. Thus, the
report is plainly inculpatory and hardly “gobbledygook.” But
even if the report were written in hieroglyphics, the Sixth
Amendment guarantees a defendant the right to confront all
witnesses against him, not just those who offer easy-tounderstand testimony or who openly profess the defendant’s
guilt.443
The Lui majority opinion is problematic. It insulates from
reliability testing not only every single stage of the DNA testing
process prior to the comparison of DNA profiles, but, based on its
finding that only such comparison of DNA profiles is “inculpatory,” it
may be reasonably construed as permitting surrogate experts to
testify who have not reviewed the raw data and made their own
interpretations.
Furthermore, courts that have applied this kind of accusatory or
inculpatory test appear to disagree on when DNA analysis does, in
fact, become inculpatory. In John, the Court of Appeals for New York
relied on its own case law that articulated a primary purpose rule
and “testimonial” analysis informed by “‘whether the statement was
prepared in a manner resembling ex parte examination and second,
whether the statement accuses [the] defendant of criminal
wrongdoing.’”444 The court held that the testifying analyst was a

See id. at 517 (Stephens, J., dissenting).
Id.
444 People v. John, 52 N.E.3d 1114, 1122–23 (N.Y. 2016) (quoting People v. Rawlins, 884
N.E.2d 1019, 1033 (N.Y. 2008)) (citing People v. Pealer, 985 N.E.2d 903, 905–06 (N.Y. 2013)),
cert. denied sub nom. Meekins v. New York, 557 U.S. 934 (2009). The John court first noted
that the primary purpose rule was essential to determining whether evidence was
testimonial: “[A] statement will be treated as testimonial only if it was ‘procured with a
442
443
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mere conduit for the conclusion of others who had conducted critical
work during the DNA testing process.445 In the John court’s
assurance that its opinion would not require all analysts to testify,446
the court found that “the generated numerical identifiers and the
calling of the alleles at the final stage of the DNA typing [ ] effectively
accuse[d] [the] defendant of his role in the crime charged.”447
Significantly, this is different from what the Lui court in Washington
found as accusatory, i.e., that it was the comparison of the profiles
and not the calling of alleles (or creation of the “gobbledygook” allele
table) that was inculpatory.448
Both New York’s and Washington’s take on what is accusatory or
inculpatory within the DNA analysis context are problematic. Still
insulated from reliability testing is all of the critical work that
impacts the end results and final interpretation stage.
C. “This Is No Bullcoming Surrogate” Test
Inspired by Justice Sotomayor’s concurrence in Bullcoming
comprised of examples of what an appropriate surrogate witness
might look like, some lower courts have adopted a “no Bullcoming
surrogate” witness approach.449
In order words, courts have
distinguished the instant surrogate witness before them from the
improper surrogate in Bullcoming.
For example, in Marshall v. People, the Colorado Supreme Court
held that the testifying witness was a proper surrogate under

primary purpose of creating an out-of-court substitute for trial testimony.’” John, 52 N.E.3d
at 1122 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Michigan v. Bryant, 562 U.S. 344, 358
(2016)) (citing Pealer, 985 N.E.2d at 905–06).
445 John, 52 N.E.3d at 1124–26.
446 In this respect, the John court not only relied on an accusatory test, but it also held in
line with other jurisdictions that have found permissible surrogate testimony that is different
from that which was found to be improper in Bullcoming. See id. at 1128. “We conclude that
an analyst who witnessed, performed or supervised the generation of defendant’s DNA
profile, or who used his or her independent analysis on the raw data, as opposed to a
testifying analyst functioning as a conduit for the conclusions of others, must be available to
testify.” Id.
447 Id. at 1127.
448 See supra notes 436–443.
449 See, e.g., Ex parte Ware, 181 So.3d 409, 416–17 (Ala. 2014); Marshall v. People, 2013 CO
51, ¶¶ 17, 18 (quoting Bullcoming v. New Mexico, 564 U.S. 647, 658, 661 (2011)); State v.
Watson, 185 A.3d 845, 854–55, 857–58 (N.H. 2018) (quoting Bullcoming, 564 U.S. at 672–74
(Sotomayor, J., concurring)); State v. Michaels, 95 A.3d 648, 673–74, 675 (N.J. 2014); State v.
Lopez, 45 A.3d 1, 17, 19–20 (R.I. 2012) (citing Bullcoming, 564 U.S. at 674 (Sotomayor, J.,
concurring) (decided four days after Williams); Paredes v. State, 462 S.W.3d 510, 517–18 (Tex.
Crim. App. 2015).
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Bullcoming.450 As such, [u]nlike in Bullcoming, where the testifying
witness had no connection with the particular lab report at issue,
here [the testifying analyst] supervised the performance of the tests
and certified the lab report.”451 That particular witness had reviewed
the raw data and developed her own independent conclusions about
the test results.452 The Marshall court cited to other states that had
adopted similar surrogate witness approaches.453 The dissent in
Marshall found that the surrogate’s testimony there had the same
constitutional concerns of the Bullcoming surrogate—testimony
about results without performing or observing the test that generated
those results, resulting in impermissible insulation of important
stages of the testing process.454 To that end, the dissent cited to the
Bullcoming court’s reminder that “[t]he ‘text of the Sixth Amendment
does not suggest any open-ended exceptions from the confrontation
requirement to be developed by the courts.’”455
Further, in State v. Michaels, the New Jersey Supreme Court,
believing Williams to be too fractured to follow, applied both
Melendez-Diaz and Bullcoming to its analysis.456 Notably, the court
highlighted the impetus to many states adopting the surrogate
witness analysis: “Justice Sotomayor’s separate opinion has helped
curb the belief that Bullcoming stands for the proposition that
forensic reports require, for their admission, the testimony of all
analysts involved in the handling and testing of a sample used in any
forensic analysis.”457 The court then went on to find no confrontation
clause violation under Melendez-Diaz and Bullcoming.458
Recently, in 2018, the New Hampshire Supreme Court also applied
this Bullcoming surrogate approach, finding that where the
testifying expert reviewed all the documentation, raw data, and
testing results, as well as issued and signed the admitted report, he
was sufficiently different from Razatos in Bullcoming and, therefore,
there was no Confrontation Clause violation.459
This approach, though it can be commended for moving toward a

See Marshall, ¶ 18.
Id.
452 See id.
453 See id. ¶ 19.
454 See id. ¶¶ 38–41 (Bender, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citing
Bullcoming v. New Mexico, 564 U.S. 647 (2011)).
455 Marshall, ¶ 41 (quoting Bullcoming, 564 U.S. at 662).
456 See State v. Michaels, 95 A.3d 648, 666, 667–68 (N.J. 2014).
457 Id. at 662.
458 See id. at 673–74.
459 See State v. Watson, 185 A.3d 845, 857–58 (N.H. 2018).
450
451
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witness who has become informed as to the final stages of the testing
process, still allows to be insulated the early stages of preparation
and analysis that are also critical and involve human decisionmaking and, thus, present ripe opportunity for error that must be
subjected to reliability testing.
V. A “NEW” CONFRONTATION FRAMEWORK FOR THE FORENSIC
EVIDENCE CONTEXT: THE TESTIMONY OF SCIENCE AND ITS
PROCESSES SATISFY A MODIFIED “FORMALITY AND SOLEMNITY”
REQUIREMENT
From Williams to the also confusing and wholly incomplete lower
court approaches, it is apparent that we need a rule from the
Supreme Court that is clear, workable, and predictable. And a rule
that will provide the protections guaranteed by the Confrontation
Clause. With qualification, there is one approach that would fare
better than all others in allowing for testing of forensic evidence in
the crucible cross-examination. That is Justice Thomas’s “formality
and solemnity” approach, but with an emphasis on the scientific
process, not the mere form of the scientific report or documentary
evidence. Forensic evidence is testimonial because it satisfies a
modified version of Justice Thomas’s “formality and solemnity”
requirement; therefore, when it is introduced against the accused at
trial, it must be confronted.460
A. Science as the Witness That Bears Testimony Against the
Accused
It is true, as Justice Kennedy asserted in Melendez-Diaz and
Bullcoming,461 and the plurality insinuated and Justice Breyer
embraced in Williams,462 science is different.
It is not the
“conventional witness” who is often affected by emotions, motives, or
the present circumstances.463 It is the same day-in-and-day-out
regardless of whether the investigation has begun and a dangerous
suspect remains at large (or has yet to be identified) or the suspect

See discussion infra Part IV.B.
See Bullcoming v. New Mexico, 564 U.S. 647, 680–81 (2011) (Kennedy, J., dissenting);
Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305, 330–34, 339, 345–46 (2009) (Kennedy, J.,
dissenting).
462 See Williams v. Illinois, 567 U.S. 50, 84–85 (2012) (plurality opinion); id. at 93–95, 97–
98 (Breyer, J., concurring).
463 See Melendez-Diaz, 557 U.S. at 345–46 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
460
461
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has been captured and is the target of investigation or prosecution.464
The one thing we can presume reliable about science is that it shows
up to work every day with the intention of performing in the same
way under the same protocols and standards regardless of the
weather of life.
Nevertheless, science is not solely machine-driven; as addressed in
Part I, each step of the process for toxicology, DNA, and alcohol
breath testing has some human component and, thus, room for
human manipulation, decision-making, and interpretation, which
may yield mischief or mistake.465 In addition, although they may not
be “conventional witnesses,” the human contributors to the process,
the human analysts, are still “percipient witnesses.”466 Therefore,
science is composed of both human- and machine-driven statements
and results, and the forensic evidence, i.e., the final result used at
trial by the prosecution against the accused, is the end product of a
collective or cumulative process.467
The scientific process is made up of statements or implied (written

464 See id. Even Justice Alito would agree with this per the California Court of Appeal in
Barba.

The benefits of DNA testing praised by the Williams plurality would not simply disappear
upon the discovery of a possible suspect. In either case, the same objects would be tested
using the same methods by lab technicians who, as Justice Alito observed, have no idea
whether their work will exonerate or implicate someone who has been “charged or is under
investigation.”
People v. Barba, 155 Cal. Rptr. 3d 707, 728 (Ct. App. 2013) (quoting Williams, 567 U.S. at 85
(plurality opinion)).
465 See supra Part I.
466 See Marshall v. People, 2013 CO 51, ¶ 38 (Bender, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part) (quoting 3 CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER & LAIRD C. KIRKPATRICK, FEDERAL EVIDENCE §
6:6 (3d ed. 2007)) (“When a percipient witness testifies, that witness must testify to what he or
she observed: what two commentators call ‘a combination of perception and memory.’”).
467 See Mnookin & Kaye, supra note 16, at 151–52.
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or nonverbal) assertions468 (or assertive conduct)469 of analysts that
have worked on the evidence and then passed it along to the next
stage of testing with explicit or implied blessing.470 It has already
been established by the Supreme Court that such “statements” are
used for the truth of the matter they assert—Justice Alito’s
proposition otherwise having been summarily dismissed by five
justices.471 The ultimate test result is the final declaration that is
introduced at trial, but, to be sure, many statements and assertions
before that time are made.472 It is these out-of-court (and in the
laboratory) statements and assertions (written or nonverbal) that do
what in-court testimony would do and, if relayed through a surrogate
witness or otherwise insulated from cross-examination, would serve
as improper substitutes for live testimony.473
As Justice Breyer has acknowledged, “[t]he reality of the matter is
that the introduction of a laboratory report involves layer upon layer
of technical statements (expressed or implied) made by one expert

468 See FED. R. EVID. 801(a) (“‘Statement’ means a person’s oral assertion, written assertion,
or nonverbal conduct, if the person intended it as an assertion.”); FED R. EVID. 801 n. (a)

Whether nonverbal conduct should be regarded as a statement for purposes of defining
hearsay requires further consideration. Some nonverbal conduct, such as the act of
pointing to identify a suspect in a lineup, is clearly the equivalent of words, assertive in
nature, and to be regarded as a statement. Other nonverbal conduct, however, may be
offered as evidence that the person acted as he did because of his belief in the existence of
the condition sought to be proved, from which belief the existence of the condition may be
inferred. This sequence is, arguably, in effect an assertion of the existence of the condition
and hence properly includable within the hearsay concept.
(citing Edmund M. Morgan, Hearsay Dangers and the Application of the Hearsay Concept, 62
HARV. L. REV. 177, 214, 217 (1948); and the elaboration in, Ted Finman, Implied Assertions as
Hearsay: Some Criticisms of the Uniform Rules of Evidence, 14 STAN. L. REV. 682 (1962)); cf.
United States v. Washington, 498 F.3d 225, 230 (4th Cir. 2007) (finding that the raw data of
the machine consists of statements of the machine not the analysts and that analysts did not
say or write such information) (citing FED R. EVID. 801(a)). In its amicus curiae brief in
Williams, the Innocence Network accurately reflected on this point: “When Cellmark sent the
electropherograms to [the testifying analyst], Cellmark made implicit assertions that it
followed proper protocols and competently performed the steps that preceded data generation.”
Brief of Amicus Curie the Innocence Network, Williams, supra note 29, at 40.
469 See People v. M.F., 25 N.Y.S.3d 816, 822 (Sup. Ct. 2016) (citing Young v. United States,
63 A.3d 1033, 1045 (D.C. 2013); State v. Michaels, 95 A.3d 648, 669 (N.J. 2014)) (finding that
the initial analyst’s role was not limited to application of formula but included “assertive
conduct” and “diagnosis”).
470 See M.F., 25 N.Y.S.3d at 820.
471 See Williams v. Illinois, 567 U.S. 50, 104, 106–07 (Thomas, J., concurring) (quoting
Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 59 n.9 (2004)); Williams, 567 U.S. at 125–26 (Kagan, J.
dissenting) (quoting Crawford, 541 U.S. at 59 n. 9 (2004)).
472 See Williams, 567 U.S. at 107–08 (Thomas, J., concurring).
473 See Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 830 (2006); Crawford, 541 U.S. at 52.
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and relied upon by another.”474 In addition, Scholars Mnookin and
Kaye highlight the differences between “conventional witnesses” and
“forensic science witnesses” in their article Confronting Science:
Expert Evidence and the Confrontation Clause; they describe that one
of “the most critical dimensions of scientific knowledge production”
is “that it is a collective, rather than an individual enterprise.”475 On
the other hand, “conventional witnesses” do not “usually testify about
knowledge produced through such a collective, interconnected
process. Usually such a witness testifies to firsthand, personal
observations.”476 Mnookin and Kaye point out that “[b]y contrast, the
knowledge claims of forensic science witnesses are, intrinsically,
strongly interlinked with the actions and knowledge production of
others. Expert opinions and conclusions, inevitably and necessarily,
require reliance on materials produced by others, data provided by
others, and judgments and opinions reached by others.”477
One straightforward example is, perhaps, in the context of alcohol
breath testing where an analyst who has prepared and certified the
dry gas external standard condones its use in the field by the
laboratory’s patrons and even sends a “certificate[] of analysis” that
smacks of the same formality and solemnity as those certificates in
Melendez-Diaz.478 That certificate or the fact of its existence supports
the surrogate expert’s testimony at trial that the defendant’s breath
test is accurate and reliable.479
All of this is true for toxicology and DNA testing as well. Analysts
who perform work in earlier stages of those processes send the
sample along to the next stage to be further processed; if, during the
process, an analyst believes a sample is not acceptable to proceed in
analysis, there are protocols and standard operating procedures in
place that would call for the evidence to be held back or not
reported.480 Based on all of the preparation, testing, decisionmaking, analysis, and interpretation that goes into the scientific
process, the final statement, i.e., the testing result, is introduced by

See Williams, 567 U.S. at 89 (Breyer, J., concurring).
See Mnookin & Kaye, supra note 16, at 102. (emphasis in original).
476 See id. at 150.
477 See id. at 151.
478 See Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305, 308 (2009).
479 See, e.g., Lightfoot v. State, No. 05-12-00428-CR, 2013 Tex. App. LEXIS 9052, at *2 (Ct.
App. July 23, 2013).
480 See, e.g., WASH. STATE PATROL TOXICOLOGY LAB., TEST METHOD-CONFIRMATIONVOLATILES 7, 9 (July 24, 2017), http://wsp.wa.gov/forensics/docs/toxicology/sop_manuals/sop_vo
latiles_07-24-2017.pdf (where certain parameters during the testing for blood alcohol must be
met in order for both a batch and subject sample to be accepted).
474
475
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the prosecution to prove or establish some fact against the accused.481
Science is the witness that bears cumulative testimony consisting
of all parts of the process; it is a witness that consists of both human
and machine-driven data, but a witness nevertheless.482 The
cumulative scientific process that supports the accuracy and
reliability of the final results (as well as those end-product results
themselves) are “solemn declaration[s] or affirmation[s] made for the
purpose of establishing or proving some fact.”483 Science is a witness
that bears testimony.
When science is introduced at trial by the prosecution to prove or
establish some fact, it is sufficiently “against” the accused.484 As
precedent has made clear, evidence need not be inculpatory on its
face or accusatory in order to be of the kind that shall be subject to
confrontation.485 That science is not vulnerable to the same motives
and emotions and life circumstances of the “conventional witness,”
suggests that its proposed use at trial may be examined. That is,
courts need not worry with what the primary purpose may or may
not have been when the statements were made in this context
because the same influences on “conventional witnesses” are not at
work when it comes to science.486 Certainly, the final results of
testing would prove or establish facts against the accused, but the
entire scientific process made up of statements and assertions by
each performing analyst is also used to establish a fact necessary for
conviction—the accuracy, reliability, and truth of the final results.
For instance, although the use of the external dry gas standard may
not be, on its face, inculpatory, it is vital to the overall accuracy and
reliability of the breath test results and functions as evidence against
the defendant at trial.487
That such work may not be inculpatory or accusatory per se is of
no moment; as Justice Scalia wrote,
[t]he text of the Amendment contemplates two classes of
witnesses—those against the defendant and those in his favor.

But see Williams v. Illinois, 567 U.S. 50, 84 (2012).
See Mnookin & Kaye, supra note 16, at 151–52.
483 See Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 51 (2004).
484 See id. at 68.
485 See Williams v. Illinois, 567 U.S. 50, 116 (2012) (Thomas, J., concurring); id. at 135–36
(Kagan, J., dissenting); Bullcoming v. New Mexico, 564 U.S. 647, 664 (2011); Melendez-Diaz v.
Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305, 313–14 (2009).
486 See Mnookin & Kaye, supra note 16, at 150–51.
487 See Lightfoot v. State, No. 05-12-00428-CR, 2013 Tex. App. LEXIS 9052, at *2 (Ct. App.
July 23, 2013).
481
482
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The prosecution must produce the former; the defendant may
call the latter. . . . [Therefore], there is not a third category of
witnesses, helpful to the prosecution, but somehow immune
from confrontation.488
As Justice Thomas added, the concept of “inherently inculpatory”
is contrary to history: “The 16th-century Marian statutes instructed
magistrates to transcribe any information by witnesses that ‘shall be
material to prove the felony.’”489 Thus, states that have adopted
“inculpatory” or “accusatory” tests for determining what is
“testimonial” in the forensic evidence context have truly ventured far
off course.
Science serves as a witness made up of cumulative statements and
assertions that, when sought to be admitted by the prosecution at
trial, comprise of testimony against the accused.490 Science and its
process renders “testimony.” Furthermore, these statements and
assertions are of “testimonial” nature because science is formal and
solemn.
B. Science and Its Process Is “Testimonial” Satisfying a Modified
“Formal and Solemnity” Requirement
As Justice Thomas has noted, “[T]he plain terms of the ‘testimony’
definition we endorsed necessarily require some degree of solemnity
before a statement can be deemed ‘testimonial.’”491 Under Justice
Thomas’s approach, there is room to include “formal” or “solemn”
processes that resemble the Marian examination; his listing of
“formalized testimonial materials” is not exhaustive.492 And that is
great, because the scientific process is nothing but formal and
solemn. It is directed by numerous protocols and procedures as
outlined in laboratory manual after manual.493 Science is monitored
See Melendez-Diaz, 557 U.S. at 313–14.
See Williams, 567 U.S. at 116–17 (Thomas, J., concurring) (emphasis added).
490 See Mnookin & Kaye, supra note 16, at 151.
491 Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 836 (2006) (Thomas, J. concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
492 In all of his prior opinions as well as in Williams, Justice Thomas articulates his approach
using “such as” when describing those “formalized testimonial materials” that have made it
onto his list, indicating this list is not an exclusive one. See Williams, 567 U.S. at 111 (Thomas,
J., concurring); see also State v. Norton, 117 A.3d 1055, 1074 (Md. 2015) (citing Williams, 567
U.S. at 11) (“The Report [at] issue . . . . come[s] within ‘formalized testimonial materials’ to
which Justice Thomas made reference and gave non-exclusive examples.”).
493 See, e.g., WASH. ST. PATROL, BREATH TEST PROGRAM: QUALITY AND OPERATIONS MANUAL
(2018), http://www.wsp.wa.gov/breathtest/docs/webdms/Breath_Calibration_Manuals/BTP%2
0Quality%20and%20Operations%20Manual%20Issued%20January%202018.pdf;
WASH.
488
489
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by standards and generally accepted practices throughout not just
the country, but the world.494 Analysts are given permits to do the
work and they are regularly subjected to proficiency testing.495
Laboratories require ongoing documentation as well as the use of
preprinted forms, which sometimes cite to court rules and statutes
themselves.496 Forensic science responds to court admissibility
standards with laboratories preparing documentation and case files
for court as well as training analysts how to testify.497 Many
laboratories are accredited and bound by higher standards to
maintain that accreditation.498 Science is nothing but formal and
solemn. If it were not, it would have great difficulty even satisfying
the low admissibility bar that is Evidence Rule 702, Frye, or

STATE PATROL, TOXICOLOGY LABORATORY DIV., TESTING QUALITY ASSURANCE MANUAL (2017),
http://wsp.wa.gov/forensics/docs/toxicology/sop_manuals/testing_quality_assurance_manual_0
7-10-2017.pdf [hereinafter TESTING QUALITY ASSURANCE MANUAL]; WASH. ST. PATROL CRIME
LABORATORY DIVISION, DNA ANALYSIS QUALITY ASSURANCE MANUAL (2018), http://wsp.wa.gov/
forensics/docs/crimelab/manuals/technical/dna/DNA_QA_Manual_Revision_30.pdf.
494 Some laboratories, such as the Washington State Patrol Breath Test Section and
Toxicology Laboratory Division are accredited according to the requirements of ISO17025,
which is an international standard used to determine technical competency. See TESTING
QUALITY ASSURANCE MANUAL, supra note 493, at 20 (citing to laboratory’s accreditation and
accrediting bodies under section 4.1); Letter from Brad Putnam, Accreditation Manager, ANSIASQ Nat’l Accreditation Bd., to Robert Sharpe, Lieutenant, Wash. State Patrol, Breath Test
Program (Oct. 5, 2018) (on file with ANSI-ASQ National Accreditation Board); Crime &
Forensic Laboratory Services, WASH. STATE PATROL, http://www.wsp.wa.gov/crime/crime-andforensic-laboratory-services/ (last visited Mar. 27, 2018); see also ISO/IEC 17025:2005, INT’L
ORG. FOR STANDARDIZATION, https://www.iso.org/standard/39883.html (explaining that
ISO/IEC 17025:2005 specifies the general requirements for competence to carry out tests and/or
calibrations).
495 See, e.g., N.Y. STATE DEP’T. OF HEALTH: WADSWORTH CTR., CLINICAL LABORATORY
EVALUATION PROGRAM: A GUIDE TO PROGRAM REQUIREMENTS AND SERVICES 5, 6 (2015),
https://www.wadsworth.org/sites/default/files/WebDoc/339464620/CLEPGUIDE%20July%202
015.pdf.
496 See Bullcoming v. New Mexico, 564 U.S. 647, 665 (2011); Melendez-Diaz v.
Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305, 310, (2009); see, e.g., N.Y. STATE DEP’T OF HEALTH, CLINIC
LABORATORY EVALUATION PROGRAM CERTIFICATE OF QUALIFICATION: APPLICATION CHECKLIST,
https://www.wadsworth.org/sites/default/files/WebDoc/CQ_Initial_App_0816.pdf.
497 Sometimes laboratories respond to (or are forced to respond to) litigation, such as the
case in King County, Washington, where litigation surrounding the necessity of Uncertainty
and confidence intervals inspired the Washington State Patrol Breath Test Program to begin
publishing uncertainty calculations for breath tests (provided in the Quality Assurance
Procedure) even though, ultimately, it was found that uncertainty calculations were not
required for admissibility purposes. See State v. King Cty. Dist. Court W. Div., 307 P.3d 765,
766 (Wash. Ct. App. 2013); WASH. ST. PATROL, MEASUREMENT UNCERTAINTY FOR BREATH
ALCOHOL TESTING, https://www.wsp.wa.gov/breathtest/docs/webdms/Studies_Articles/Measur
ement%20Uncertainty%20for%20Breath%20Alcohol%20Testing.pdf. In addition, more and
more laboratories are becoming accredited or taking steps toward separating themselves from
law enforcement agencies to become more neutral or independent as science dictates, such as
the Houston Forensic Science Center. See Accreditations, HOUS. FORENSIC SCI. CTR., http://ww
w.houstonforensicscience.org/accreditation.php (last visited Mar. 27, 2019).
498 See, e.g., Crime & Forensic Laboratory Services, supra note 494.
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Daubert.499
The sheer volume of manuals, protocols, standard operating
procedures, accreditation requirements, laboratory policies,
documentation, and so on impresses upon the analysts the formal
and solemn nature of their work. These things serve as proof that
forensic evidence and its process is “‘sufficiently formal to resemble
the Marian examinations.’”500 Indeed, it is hard to imagine a more
formal or solemn process that reflects an out-of-court substitute for
in-court testimony than the statements and assertions (written and
non-verbal) that are made during the course of the forensic
processing of evidence. The manuals, protocols, standard operating
procedures, accreditation requirements, laboratory policies, and the
like is what has led Justices Kennedy, Alito, and Breyer to essentially
advocate for a forensic evidence exception to the Confrontation
Clause.501 However, it is this kind of formal or solemn out-of-court
process that is intended to serve as a substitute for in-court process
that has always been objectionable under the Clause.502
As outlined in Part II, Justice Liu of the California Supreme Court
was first to emphasize this concept that process over form matters.503
As he so smartly put together, “[W]e must look at the process that
produced the statements, ‘taking into account all of the surrounding
circumstances’ in order to discern not only the statements’ ‘form’ but
also their ‘function’ and ‘purpose.’”504 In addition, to Justice Liu,
there have been other courts that have hinted around the formality
of science. First, we saw, even if ever so brief (and perhaps
inadvertently), Justice Ginsburg touch on this concept in Bullcoming
where she wrote “[l]ike the Melendez-Diaz certificates, Caylor’s
certificate is ‘formalized’ in a signed document, headed a ‘report.’
Noteworthy as well, the SLD report form contains a legend referring
499 See FED. R. EVID. 702; Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 592–94 (1993);
Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013, 1014 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
500 See Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305, 329 (2009) (Thomas, J., concurring)
(citing Giles v. California, 554 U.S. 353, 378 (2008) (Thomas, J., concurring)).
501 See Williams v. Illinois, 567 U.S. 50, 62 (2012); Williams, 567 U.S. at 93 (Breyer, J.,
concurring); Bullcoming v. New Mexico, 564 U.S. 647, 681 (2011) (Kennedy, J. dissenting);
Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305, 345–46, 351 (2009) (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
502 See Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 830 (2006); Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S.
36, 52 (2004).
503 See People v. Lopez, 286 P.3d 469, 486 (Cal. 2012) (Liu, J., dissenting).
504 See id. at 488 (quoting Williams v. Illinois, 567 U.S. 50, 84 (2012) (plurality opinion))
(citing Williams, 567 U.S. at 139–40 (Kagan, J, dissenting)). Justice Liu ultimately found that
laboratory reports and certain notations were testimonial as they were produced with
government involvement and formality, holding that the produced surrogate witness was
improper. See Lopez, 286 P.3d at 489–90. It should be noted that Justice Liu did put particular
emphasis on the fact that this was a government-driven laboratory. See id. at 489.
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to municipal and magistrate courts’ rules that provide for the
admission of certified blood-alcohol analyses.”505
Perhaps more explicitly, some lower courts have, though rather
briefly, examined the formal nature of science. For example, in
People v. John, the New York Court of Appeals, after highlighting the
surrogate expert’s testimony that every individual who prepared
information within the reports “had a business duty to do so
truthfully and accurately,” wrote: “It is incongruous to our state’s
mission to foster scientific excellence in our public DNA crime
laboratories to suggest that the recording of the test results in the
reports of accredited labs is not an entry of scientific certainty
because of the absence of a hypertechnical requirement of
formalism.”506 The court found that even though the DNA reports at
issue were not sworn, “they were obviously facts prepared to be used
as critical evidence at a criminal trial and [were] sufficiently formal
to be considered testimonial.”507
To explore the formal and solemn nature of forensic evidence and
the process of how all of its statements and assertions culminate, let
us take toxicology and the Washington State Patrol’s accredited
laboratory as an example. First, each analyst must be permitted. 508
Next, the laboratory is accredited by the American Board of Forensic
Toxicology (ABFT) as well as by the American Society of Crime
Laboratory Directors/Laboratory Accreditation Board or ASCLD/
LAB.509 The ABFT was created in 1975 “to provide, in the interest of
the public, and the advancement of the sciences, a certification
program in forensic toxicology.”510 The entity analogizes itself to “the
certifying board in the various medical specialties and scientific
505 See Bullcoming v. New Mexico, 564 U.S. 647, 665 (2011) (citing Davis v. Washington, 547
U.S. 813, 837 n.2 (2006) (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
506 People v. John, 52 N.E.3d 1114, 1126 (N.Y. 2016).
507 Id.
508 See WASH. REV. CODE § 46.61.506(3) (2018). Notably, in addition to the laboratory’s
toxicologists, breath test technicians in the state of Washington must also have a permit per
the statute. Id. See JAMES P. VAN DIEST, BREATH TEST PROGRAM PERMIT CARD, https://www.w
sp.wa.gov/breathtest/docs/webdms/Permit_Cards/Van%20Diest,%20James%20%20Breath%20Test%20Permit%20Card%20-%2006-06-2021.pdf (last visited Dec. 29, 2018),
for an example of a permit and the language within.
509 See Crime & Forensic Laboratory Services, supra note 494 (“The laboratory was American
Board of Forensic Toxicology (ABFT) accredited in July 2005, becoming the 19th Forensic
Toxicology laboratory to achieve ABFT accreditation. The Breath Test Program and Toxicology
Laboratory successfully attained ASCLD/LAB ISO International accreditation of their breath
alcohol calibration program in November 2009.
The Toxicology Laboratory further
attained ASCLD/LAB ISO International accreditation for its toxicology testing program in
February 2016.”).
510 American Board of Forensic Toxicology, AM. BOARD FORENSIC TOXICOLOGY,
https://www.abft.org/ (last visited Apr. 17, 2019).
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fields.”511 Meanwhile ASCLD/LAB was developed as a standards
subcommittee in the 1980s and merged with the ANSI National
Accreditation Board (ANAB) in 2016.512 In turn, ANAB is “the largest
multi-disciplinary accreditation body in North America” and
accredits a multitude of systems and entities, including “calibration
and testing labs, forensic test and calibration service providers,
inspection bodies, police crime units, reference material producers,
and proficiency test providers.”513 ANAB claims to “make sure [their]
clients follow international standards and are competent to do their
work,” emphasizing that much like one would not want to be treated
by a doctor who is not board certified, ANAB’s work and accreditation
duties are equally critical.514
This ANAB or ASCLD/LAB
accreditation requires the state toxicology laboratory to follow, inter
alia, the prominent scientific international standard for competency,
ISO/IEC17025.515
The laboratory also distributes several manuals.516 It has standard
operating procedures (SOPs) for each category of drug that can be
tested within the laboratory.517 For example, the SOPs related to the
testing of volatiles, i.e., ethanol, lay out the exact procedures that
should be followed by analysts in every single blood alcohol sample
processed at the laboratory.518 In addition, the laboratory produces
an operations manual that covers its mission statement; its goals and
directives; its legal direction;519 chain of command and personnel
responsibilities; ethics and professional responsibility; records
Id.
Our History, AM. SOC’Y CRIME LABORATORY DIRECTORS, https://www.ascld.org/aboutus/our-history/ (last visited Apr. 17, 2019).
513 About ANAB, ANSI NAT’L ACCREDITATION BOARD, https://www.anab.org/about-anab
(last visited Apr. 17, 2019).
514 See id.
515 See TESTING QUALITY ASSURANCE MANUAL, supra note 493, at 20 (citing to laboratory’s
accreditation and accrediting bodies); see also ISO/IEC 17025:2005, supra note 494 (specifying
the general requirements for laboratories to competently carry out tests and/or calibrations).
516 See Toxicology Lab Division: Overview, WASH. STATE PATROL, TOXICOLOGY LABORATORY
DIV., http://wsp.wa.gov/forensics/toxicology.htm#toxforms.
517 Id.
518 See WASH. STATE PATROL, TOXICOLOGY LAB., supra note 170, at 1–12.
519 Significantly, this portion of the manual states:
511
512

The TLD is a publicly funded, legal entity that is responsible for its legislatively mandated
actions. The TLD provides scientific and technical assistance to all coroners, medical
examiners and prosecuting attorneys, as mandated by Revised Code of Washington (RCW)
43.43.670, 46.61.506 and 68.50.107; and the Washington Administrative Code (WAC) 44814, 448-15 and 448-16, and statewide criminal justice agencies.
WASH. STATE PATROL, TOXICOLOGY LAB. DIV., OPERATIONS MANUAL 6 (2016),
http://wsp.wa.gov/forensics/docs/toxicology/sop_manuals/operations_manual.pdf.
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management; the release of results; courtroom testimony;520
administrative procedures; evidence management; and so on.521
Notably, as to ethics and professional responsibility, the manual
states:
All Laboratory employees are required to review guidelines
for ethics and professional responsibility, relevant to the field
of forensic toxicology, on an annual basis. The American
Society
of
Crime
Laboratory
Directors/Laboratory
Accreditation Board (ASCLD/LAB) document ASCLD/LAB
Guiding Principles of Professional Responsibility for Crime
Laboratories and Forensic Scientists will be reviewed
annually with all Laboratory personnel and employee review
will be documented.522
In addition to the voluminous operations manual, the laboratory
also produces a quality assurance manual.523
It covers the
laboratory’s quality management system; document control; internal
audits and management review; control of nonconforming work;
personnel qualifications and training; equipment maintenance;
reference materials; assuring the quality of results; proficiency
testing; records and reports; and traceability and quality control.524
Critically, the manual directs what information must be placed in the
toxicology report and “[t]he results of each test carried out by the
Laboratory shall be reported accurately, clearly, unambiguously and
objectively, and in accordance with any specific instructions in the
test methods.”525
It would be difficult to find that the scientific process in this
laboratory is anything but formal and solemn.526 It is true that not
520

As to courtroom testimony the manual reads:

Providing testimony in a legal context is one of the most important responsibilities for
TLD personnel. Employees must approach this responsibility with sincerity, honesty and
diligence. Testimony is a significant part of the employee’s responsibility and will be
subject to the same quality assurance standards as other aspects of their work.
Id. at 26.
521 See id. at 2–3.
522 Id. at 15.
523 See TESTING QUALITY ASSURANCE MANUAL, supra note 493.
524 See id.
525 Id. at 82.
526 It is also worth noting that as to the forensic toxicologist who was recently investigated
by the laboratory for his inattention during extraction, there was a formal procedure in place
for laboratory management to follow, and they did follow it. See supra text accompanying notes
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every laboratory report will be sworn or contain the exact
“formalized” language Justice Thomas is looking for; however, mere
form should not reign over what is clearly a formal and solemn
process.527 The statements and assertions that constitute forensic
evidence occur during a process that is “sufficiently formal to
resemble Marian examinations.”528 Critically, the dissents in
Melendez-Diaz and Bullcoming, as well as the Williams plurality and
Justice Breyer (in his concurrence), along with multiple lower courts
permit the insulation of this process from confrontation based, in
large part, on this level of formality or notions of “amorphous
reliability.”529 Forensic evidence and its process is sufficiently formal
and solemn under Justice Thomas’s approach; thus, all of the
statements and assertions that support such evidence must be
confronted. Our last question then, is, who in the “collective” must
be called to testify?
VI. IF SCIENCE IS FORMAL AND SOLEMN, THEN WITHIN THE
“COLLECTIVE” THE PERFORMER OR AN OBSERVER MUST BE
CONFRONTED
Who must come? Not everyone. But, it must, at minimum, be a
“percipient” witness to the instant processing and testing of the
evidence on the analyst’s benchtop through its entire analytical life
to the end results.530 In other words, the performing analyst or an
observer to such work. Those individuals once or more removed from
the instant testing process are not intended to be captured. 531
Rather, the defense may utilize notice and demand statutes or other
procedural mechanisms to request confrontation of those individuals
who may actually be best described as “Melendez-Diaz footnote one
witnesses.”532 The percipient witness to the instant testing process
123–24.
527 See Williams v. Illinois, 567 U.S. 50, 140 (2012) (Kagan, J., dissenting) (“Indeed, Justice
Thomas’s approach, if accepted, would turn the Confrontation Clause into a constitutional geegaw—nice for show, but of little value.”).
528 See Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305, 329 (2009) (Thomas, J., concurring)
(quoting Giles v. California, 554 U.S. 353, 378 (2008)).
529 See, e.g., Williams, 567 U.S. at 76–77 (plurality opinion); id. at 99 (Breyer, J., concurring);
Bullcoming v. New Mexico, 564 U.S. 647, 682 (2011) (Kennedy, J., dissenting); Melendez-Diaz,
557 U.S. at 351 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
530 See Marshall v. People, 2013 CO 51, ¶ 28 (C.J., Bender, concurring in part and dissenting
in part).
531 One such example would be breath test technicians who conduct the annual quality
assurance procedure on breath testing machines discussed infra. That analyst is at least once
removed from the instant testing process.
532 See Melendez-Diaz, 557 U.S. at 311 n.1; see also People v. M.F., 25 N.Y.S.3d 816, 821
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of the evidence from benchtop to results must, however, be subject to
confrontation.533
To answer Justice Kennedy’s well-put question—who or what is an
“analyst,” (or for that matter, who is the relevant percipient witness
when it comes to forensic evidence) versus a mere link in the chain of
custody or some other nominal actor in the process—Justice Scalia’s
Melendez-Diaz footnote one is instructive. There, Scalia announces
that it is not the rule that “anyone whose testimony may be relevant
in establishing the chain of custody, authenticity of the sample, or
accuracy of the testing device” must be called to testify.534 He further
explained that it is unnecessary for each person who laid hands on
the evidence or who created documents related to equipment
maintenance to be confronted.535 Therefore, it is not the person who
delivered the blood sample to the laboratory, for example, who must
appear for confrontation purposes. Similarly, an individual who
conducted an annual quality assurance procedure (QAP) also need
not be confronted unless a specific issue is raised by the defense. 536
Rather, it is the analyst who has received the sample and begins the
stages of testing (including preparation) and then plays a role in
shepherding the evidence throughout the testing process who is the
“performing analyst” that must be confronted. These are the
individuals who make assertions (both written and non-verbal) that
their work is competent and trustworthy and, therefore, may be
relied upon to label the forensic evidence accurate and reliable.
To further delineate what the relevant percipient witness for
confrontation purposes looks like, let us address each of the three
forensic science disciplines covered herein. First, for alcohol breath
testing, it is important to note that this discipline is comprised of at
least two instant testing procedures: one focused on the subject’s
breath test and the other focused on the external standard (e.g., dry

(Sup. Ct. 2016) (“If any stage of the testing or particular analyst’s work is then called into
question by the cross-examination, the defense may renew its application to the court to have
the prosecution call an additional witness. This procedure is essentially what Justice Breyer
suggests in his concurrence in Williams.”).
533 See Marshall, ¶ 28.
534 Melendez-Diaz, 557 U.S. at 311 n. 1.
535 See id.
536 See Anderson v. State, 2014 WY 13, ¶ 41, 317 P.3d 1108, 1122 (Wyo. 2014) (holding that
an annual certification procedure performed on a breath testing device was relevant only to
routine maintenance and not to prove an element of a crime); M.F., 25 N.Y.S.3d at 821 (“If any
stage of the testing or particular analyst’s work is then called into question by the crossexamination, the defense may renew its application to the court to have the prosecution call an
additional witness. This procedure is essentially what Justice Breyer suggests in his
concurrence in Williams.”).
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gas).537 That is, it is not the subject’s breath test alone that is the
only relevant forensic evidence in alcohol breath testing cases.538 In
other words, an individual beyond the operator of the machine
(usually a police officer) at the time of the defendant’s breath test
must be confronted in these cases.
With that in mind, regarding the external standard, because it is
intricate to the accuracy and reliability of every breath test as it is
run with every evidential breath test539 and the subject’s breath test
process will abort if the external standard does not read within the
acceptable range,540 it is the analyst with actual knowledge541 of the
external standard, the one who took the “ingredients” and put them
together to create the standard and, thereafter, tested and certified
it who must appear. This analyst differs substantially from a
technician who conducts an annual QAP on the breath testing
machine for maintenance purposes, falling within the “MelendezDiaz footnote one witness” category.542 Although the QAP is
important to the proper working order of the device,543 it is not
intimately bound up with the subject’s breath test process like the
external standard, which must be tested and comply with set
See WASH. STATE PATROL, supra note 203, at 5, 7.
See id.
539 Draeger Alcotest 9510 Operator’s Manual, supra note 205.
540 Id.
541 See Paredes v. State, 462 S.W.3d 510, 517 (Tex. Crim. App. 2015) (“When the testifying
expert has no personal knowledge of how the testing was conducted, a defendant still cannot
adequately challenge through cross-examination the conclusion of that non-testifying analyst
offered in that non-testifying analyst’s report.”).
542 See Melendez-Diaz, 557 U.S. 305, 311 n. 1 (2009); see also Anderson v. State, 2014 WY
13, ¶ 41, 317 P.3d 1108, 1122 (Wyo. 2014) (noting that the primary purpose of the
certification was for maintenance purposes, not for proving some fact at trial).
537
538

543

A QAP for breath testing machines has been defined as:

A testing procedure for evidentiary breath test instruments in which known traceable
reference materials are used to set and confirm the adjustment and establish
quantitative estimates for bias and precision. Several other performance measures are
also evaluated in order to ensure the proper working order and evidential suitability of
the instrument.
WASH. STATE PATROL, supra note 203, at 8.
Notably, the QAP process is by no means beyond reproach or inherently reliable. Recently, in
New Jersey, the state’s supreme court rendered more than 20,000 breath tests invalid because
several of the state’s machines were not calibrated properly. See State v. Cassidy, 197 A.3d 86,
89 (N.J. 2018); NJ Supreme Court Says More Than 20,000 Breathalyzer Tests Inadmissible,
NBC N.Y. (Nov. 13, 2018), https://www.nbcnewyork.com/news/local/NJ-Supreme-Court-20000Breathalyzer-Tests-Inadmissible-500391391.html.
Notably, the officer was criminally
charged. Cassidy, 197 A.2d at 89. For more information about NIST, see About NIST, NAT’L
INST. STANDARDS TECH., https://www.nist.gov/about-nist (last updated June, 14, 2017).
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parameters in order for every breath test to be completed.544 The
analyst who creates, tests, and certifies the external standard or an
observer to this critical work must be confronted.
For DNA testing, the analyst that must be confronted is the
individual who receives the evidentiary sample on the benchtop and
performs an initial evaluation of how the evidence was received and
then follows the evidence through the five stages of DNA testing—
extraction, quantitation, amplification, capillary electrophoresis, and
interpretation to final product.545 Further, it is much the same for
toxicology where the analyst that must be confronted is one who first
observed the evidentiary sample on the benchtop and then followed
the sample through pre-analysis, analysis, and interpretation to final
results.546 Here too, an observer to this work in both contexts would
satisfy the confrontation mandate.
The lower courts’ focus on the proper Bullcoming surrogate witness
has been misguided and cuts against the constitutional guarantee of
confrontation. Instead, we should focus on who is the best “shepherd”
for the forensic evidence.547 Such a shepherd is either the performing
analyst who can speak to his or her own work, which, as Part I
demonstrates,548 is subject to mischief and mistake at each stage of
testing, or another percipient witness, i.e., an observer to that work.
An observer, of course, could simply be a qualified analyst who, in
person, stands by and observes the performing analyst’s work. In
multi-analyst structures, this position could be assigned by the
laboratory and rotate among personnel, where observing duties last
for a certain period of time. This observer would be present for each
stage of testing even if the underlying performing analyst should
change over that course. However, we can think more creatively; in
some instances, it may be possible to video record549 the underlying
work and the observer can review the video as well as the machine-

Draeger Alcotest 9510 Operator’s Manual, supra note 205.
See, e.g., State v. Lui, 315 P.3d 493, 508 (Wash. 2014).
546 Bullcoming, 564 U.S. at 660, 661 (citing Melendez-Diaz, 557 U.S. at 319 n.6).
547 The concept of being of a “shepherd” comes from the use of the word “shepherded” to
describe what happened in the testimony before the John court. People v. John, 52 N.E.3d
1114, 1124 (N.Y. 2016). It is used herein to describe the shepherding of forensic evidence by
the performing analyst or an observer to that analyst’s work from start to finish in the relevant
testing process.
548 See Part I; see also Bullcoming, 564 U.S. at 661–62 nn. 7–8 (describing the importance of
the underlying performing analyst’s work in that case).
549 See Brief of Amicus Curie the Innocence Network, Williams, supra note 29, at 30
(suggesting a reviewing analyst could observe a videotape of the procedures). It should be
noted, however, that there could be some DNA work that is perhaps too small to be captured
clearly by video.
544
545
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generated raw data, conduct his or her own interpretation of the data,
make independent findings, and write a report.550 In this way, the
assigned observer of the live or video recorded work becomes a
shepherd for the forensic evidence. Such observer would be
responsible for testifying on behalf of the forensic evidence. That
observer would be responsible for not only viewing the testing, but
also reviewing the machine-generated raw data, interpreting that
data, and coming to his or her own conclusions in the form of a report
signed by the observer.551 Thereafter, the observer would be
responsible for testifying and for any admission of the report.552
Not every laboratory is structured in the multi-analyst form,553 but,
to be sure, this approach would require those laboratories that are to
do some restructuring and hiring to take analysts “off the line” to
become observers. Nonetheless, the cost and burden of assigning an
observer would pale in comparison to requiring every analyst part of
the instant testing and process to testify.554 Regardless, we should
keep in mind that this is a constitutional right.555 As Justice
Stephens of the Washington State Supreme Court reminded us:
While the confrontation clause places a burden upon the
courts and prosecutors . . . this is hardly a persuasive
argument for dispensing with one of the bedrock guaranties of
our criminal justice system. The Sixth Amendment also
guarantees to criminal defendants the right to a speedy and
public trial, to have facts (even “neutral” and “scientific” facts)
found by a jury, and to be appointed a competent lawyer at no
cost. Each of these guaranties has cost . . . . [I]ncalculable
money, time, and lost convictions, and the costs continue to
mount. If the majority is willing to exempt laboratory
analysts from cross-examination to save a little, why not
strike confrontation entirely, or do away with jury trials and
court-appointed attorneys, and save much more?556
In addition, although the use of forensic evidence is on the rise,
See id.
See id.
552 See id. at 3031.
553 Per the author’s firsthand knowledge, the DNA section of the Washington State Patrol
Crime Laboratory is structured with one analyst assigned to an evidentiary sample throughout
its course at the laboratory.
554 See Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305, 342 (2009) (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
555 See State v. Lui, 315 P.3d 493, 526 (Wash. 2014) (Stephens, J., dissenting).
556 Id.
550
551
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there is evidence that criminal trials are not.557 As NACDL noted in
its recent 2018 report:
In 2016, 97.3% of defendants in the federal criminal justice
system opted to concede their guilt. And in 2017, that number
held steady at 97.2%. That means that in recent years fewer
than 3% of federal criminal defendants chose to take
advantage of one of the most crucial constitutional rights.558
It appears the sky is falling in a different direction these days.559
In the end, with the recent “dismantling” of the National
Commission on Forensic Science and the current narrative of forensic
science in our criminal justice system, we are left with too few checks
on the reliability of forensic evidence and with too great a need to
stay on current course.560 The Confrontation Clause must continue
to live and breathe as our criminal justice system continues to evolve
in this Twenty-First century and beyond. This approach permits that
to happen.
VII. CONCLUSION
Just months ago, the Supreme Court denied a writ of certiorari in
Stuart v. Alabama,561 a case that would have offered the Court an
opportunity to provide direction to lower courts tasked with
interpreting the mess that is confrontation clause analysis within the
context of forensic evidence.562 As Justice Gorsuch wrote in
dissenting from the denial of certiorari, “[t]his Court’s most recent
foray in this field, Williams v. Illinois, yielded no majority and its
various opinions have sown confusion in courts across the country.”563
557 JOSEPH PETERSON ET AL., THE ROLE AND IMPACT OF FORENSIC EVIDENCE IN THE
CRIMINAL JUSTICE PROCESS 1 (2010); NAT’L ASS’N OF CRIMINAL DEF. LAWYERS, THE TRIAL
PENALTY: THE SIXTH AMENDMENT RIGHT TO TRIAL ON THE VERGE OF EXTINCTION AND HOW TO
SAVE IT 14 (2018).
558 Id. (emphasis omitted) (citing U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, 2016 SOURCEBOOK OF FEDERAL
SENTENCING STATISTICS, S-23 fig. C (2017); U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, 2017 SOURCEBOOK OF
FEDERAL SENTENCING STATISTICS, S-25 fig. C (2017)). See also U.S. COURTS, STATISTICAL
TABLES FOR THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY - JUNE 2016 tbl. D-4 (2016) (This figure includes
defendants who were acquitted after trial. It does not include those whose charges were
dismissed by means other than acquittal.).
559 See Bullcoming, 564 U.S. at 667; Melendez-Diaz, 557 U.S. at 325; id. at 352, 355
(Kennedy, J., dissenting).
560 See Mnookin, supra note 39, at 100, 114.
561 Stuart v. Alabama, 139 S. Ct. 36 (2018).
562 See id. at 36 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting).
563 Id. (internal citation omitted).
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Applying whatever rules could be deciphered from Williams and the
“conventional witness” rules from Crawford and Davis to cases
involving the non-conventional witness—science—resembles a
return to “amorphous notions of reliability” that were flatly rejected
in Crawford.
Permitting surrogate witness testimony in lieu of testimony from
the performing analyst or an observer of the scientific testing is the
modern-day Marian examination. It condones the insulation of
science and its process. It is Justice Warburton, responding to Sir
Walter Raleigh’s request for confrontation, exclaiming, “[b]y law, a
man may be condemned upon presumption and circumstances,
without any witness to the main fact.”564 Just as the petitioner in
Crawford wrote for the Court sixteen years ago, the Court will soon
again be presented with “an opportunity to clarify the operation of
the Confrontation Clause and to refasten this critical provision of
criminal procedure to its historical and textual underpinnings.”565
When Justice Thomas’s approach is modified to, as proposed in this
article, emphasize process over mere form, it is readily apparent that
the scientific process is solemn and formal, and, thus, must be
confronted. Within the forensic evidence context, to re-align the
Confrontation Clause with its command that the reliability of
evidence be tested in the crucible of cross-examination, the High
Court should accept review when next presented with this issue and
adopt this modified version of Justice Thomas’s approach.

JARDINE, supra note 7, at 421 (emphasis added).
Brief for Petitioner at 1, Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004) (No. 02-9410), 2003
U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 668 at 11.
564
565
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